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                                                           Abstract 
 
 
This research explores the influence of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on nonprofit 
Islamic organizations with activities in the United States. The study employs discourse analysis 
to examine newspaper articles, interviews of leaders of these organizations, as well as data and 
figures released by these organizations. The articles were mainly taken from US media, namely 
CNN and Washington Post as representatives of the US media. Instruments of data collection 
about these organizations include, semi- structured interviews, a questionnaire, and an in-depth 
analysis of media materials, news reports and articles of CNN and Washington Post. Content 
analysis was used to analyze media articles and news stories. Data analysis reveals some 
important information such as the presumed serious negative impact on their organizations 
activities which include Da’wa activities, congregational religious services introducing Islam to 
non-Muslims, establishing mosques and Islamic centers. Political and other activities were also 
found to be deeply affected by the 9/11 events. In addition, events of 9/11 also negatively 
impacted the level of participation of Muslim youth and Muslim Scholars in the various activities 
arranged by these organizations. Also, the US government closely monitors the activities of these 
organizations. On the American media level, the results indicate that US media often projects 
negative views of the activities of the Islamic organizations based in America.The research ends 
up giving some suggestions and recommondations to enhance and re-vitalize the activities of the 
Islamic charity organizations. 
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Abstrak 
 
 
Penyelidikan ini merungkai tentang pengaruh serangan September 11, 2001 (9/11) terhadap 
organisasi sukarela Islam dengan aktiviti di Amerika Syarikat. Kajian mengambil kira analisis 
beberapa buah surat khabar, temu bual dengan pemimpin organisasi-organisasi ini, dan juga data 
serta nombor-nombor yang dikeluarkan oleh organisasi ini. Artikel-artikel ini diambil daripada 
sumber media Amerika seperti CNN dan Washington Post mewakili media negara mereka. 
Instrumen dalam pengumpulan data mengenai organisasi ini termasuklah dengan mengadakan 
temu ramah secara semi-struktur, soal selidik dan analisis mendalam terhadap meterial media, 
laporan berita dan artikel di dalam CNN dan Washington Post. Analisis kandungan digunakan 
untuk menganalisis artikel media dan laporan berita. Data analisis mendedahkan beberapa 
informasi penting seperti tanggapan serius serta impak nagatif terhadap aktiviti organisasi 
mereka termasuklah dakwah, menyebarkan agama Islam dan memperkenalkan agama kepada 
bukan muslim, penubuhan masjid dan pusat agama. Politik dan aktiviti lain juga turut terjejas 
dek kerana kejadian 9/11. Tambahan pula, kejadian 9/11 ini turut memberi kesan negatif 
terhadap tahap penglibatan belia dan sarjana Muslim dalam pelbagai aktiviti yang dianjurkan 
oleh organisasi-organisasi ini. Pada media Amerika, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa media 
Amerika selalu mengambarkan pandangan negatif terhadap aktiviti oraganisasi Islam yang ada di 
Amerika. Penyelidikan ini berakhir dengan memberikan beberapa cadangan dan sokongan bagi 
menaikkan dan mengembangkan aktiviti amal organisasi Islam. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.0  Introduction   
 
On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists from the Islamic 
militant group al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger jets and flew two of those planes, 
American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the North and South 
towers of the World Trade Centre complex in New York City. The other hijacked jet, 
American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and the fourth 
hijacked jet, United Airlines Flight 93, intended to crash in the United States Capitol 
Building in Washington D.C. but its passengers tried to overcome the hijackers and the 
plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people have 
died in the attacks, including all 227 civilians and 19 hijackers aboard the planes. These 
incidents, here in after, will be referred to as 9/11.  
 
The 9/11 incidents have influenced the world in many ways and to varied, wide-
ranging degrees. There is a change in attitudes toward Muslims whether they live inside 
or outside the United States (U.S.). Legislative changes made many Muslims and non-
profit organizations subject to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in 
the U.S. at large had also been affected. Among the negative impacts of the September 
11 incidents was the shutting down of international Muslim organizations, freezing or 
minimizing their activities on the assumption that they had some relations with terrorist 
groups that were connected to the events of the two towers of the World Trade Center.  
Some of these organizations were based in the U.S. while others were working from 
outside the soil of the U.S.  
Johnson (2011) reported that the Pew Research Center administered a survey of 
1,003 adults in August 2010 and the findings showed that “more Americans have 
unfavourable than favourable views of Islam.” 
 
The Charity & Security Network (2011) reported that the U.S. government had 
terminated nine U.S. based charities claiming that these organizations had connections 
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with terrorists and support terrorism. In addition, the Department of Treasury could also 
freeze funds belonging to these charities. 
 
The present study explores the influence of the 9/11 incidents on non-profit 
Islamic organizations, which have activities inside and outside the U.S.  Content 
analysis is used to examine articles, selected from newspapers published in the U.S. as 
well as interviews with leaders of these organizations and data and figures released by 
these organizations.  The selected articles were mainly taken from U.S. media, namely 
CNN (www.cnn.com) and The Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com) as 
representatives of U.S. media.  
 
1.1  The Statement of the Problem  
Immediately after the events of  9/11, the American government launched a 
campaign against Muslim charitable organizations, probably due to the assumption that 
they provide financial or other kinds of assistance to groups, which the government has 
a tendency to describe  as "terrorist." Moreover, when the U.S.A. Patriot Act (Uniting 
and Strengtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorist Acts) was enacted by President George W. Bush on October 26, 
2001, it gave the government the authority to treat and label any group as a terrorist 
organization (U.S.A.Patriot Act). As a result, charitable organizations became 
vulnerable of being described and treated as terrorist organizations and their members 
could be detained for questioning  and their assets may be frozen. These instances were 
widely reported in the national and international media (Charity & Security Network, 
2011). Therefore, the activities of these organizations were highly suspect  and deeply 
affected. 
 
  
1.2   The Objectives of the Study  
This study focuses on the activities and services three pre-selected non-
profit Islamic organizations provide to Muslim communities in the US. The 
selected organizations are; The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), The 
Muslim World League (MWL) and The Council on American- Islamic Relations 
(CAIR). 
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 The study seeks to fulfill the following objectives:  
 
1. To assess the impact of 9/11 media reports on selected Islamic 
non-profit organizations and their activities.  
2. To shed light on the most and least affected areas of activities of 
the three largest Islamic organizations that were selected for the study.  
3. To study the U.S. media coverage of 9/11 and assess this type of 
coverage from a professional point of view.   
 
1.3  Research Questions  
The study will attempt to answer the following questions:  
1- What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in 
general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular ?  
2- What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of 
Islamic organizations ? 
3- What is the content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to 
Islam, Muslims and Islamic nonprofit organizations? 
 
1.4 The Significance of the Study  
The present study is significant to many stakeholders, as it provides valuable 
information on the current situation of non-profit Islamic organizations, which are 
working in the United States. Moreover, the other aspect of significance is based on the 
fact that there is very little literature and research on the impact of 9/11 on non-profit 
Islamic organizations. The study employs different instruments of collecting data on 
this issue, it is likely to first hand information on this matter which still poses a lot of 
questions and concerns on a global scale. 
 
There are several benefits of forming a non-profit organization. Innovative non-
profit organizations have helped institutions to influence elections and change laws, 
business practices and cultural focus. They provide a learning platform that is used to 
organize and educate the public around wealth, poverty and health among other issues. 
On the other hand, the main benefit of non-profit organizations is that they have less 
competition than other institutions. For instance, when non-profit organizations have 
different causes, it means there will be less competition in terms of winning over 
possible volunteers, contributors, participants, board members and members within the 
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organizations. This equates to more funding coming to the innovative non-profit 
organization.  
 
It is worth mentioning here that since funds are normally limited for donors, 
non-profit organizations rely on grants from other funding sources to operate. For this 
reason, innovative non-profit organizations gain more donations since they have the 
ability to bring together more people and solicit funding from contributors. Donors 
might feel the need to spend their money on innovative organizations that do not rely on 
funding from other sources.  
 
Kroessin (2007) pointed out that the history of charitable organizations in the 
Muslim world depended mainly on the principles of belief and compassion, which are 
involved in Islamic teaching through the Quran and traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). Kroessin (2007) says: 
 
"In Islamic theology, humankind is seen as a trustee of all the world’s God-
given resources. Only through following ‘divine guidance’ can a functioning social and 
global system be established and maintained. In Islamic teaching, this system is based 
on the optimal utilization of the resources God has endowed to mankind, and their 
equitable use and distribution." 
 
Here, the basic mechanism for the redistribution of money in Islam is Zakah 
(obligatory charity), which became a mandatory act of worship at the time when the 
Islamic state was established by the Prophet Muhammad in 622. Many Quranic verses 
deal with this topic. Linguistically, the word Zakah is derived from the verb ‘zaka’, 
which means to grow and improve. Zakah must be given by every Muslim according to 
the Quran:  
 
"Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and the needy, and for those 
employed to collect [Zakah] and for bringing hearts together and for freeing captives 
and for those in debt and in the way of Allah and for the traveler – an obligation 
imposed by God and God is Knowing and Wise" (Quran, 9, p.60).  
 
The expenditures of charity (Zakah) could perhaps be translated into the 
following headings according to Kroessin (2007):  
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• poverty reduction;  
• administrative overheads for civil servants dealing with public welfare;  
• peace-building and community cohesion;  
• promotion of freedom, basic human rights and civil liberties;  
• personal insolvency settlements;  
• public work, including security and defence; and  
• supporting the homeless, refugees and migrants.  
 
 Kroessin (2007) also added that “voluntary charity (in Arabic Sadaqah, 
meaning to give away and realising one’s faith by action)  is also strongly encouraged. 
It is based on many sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, such as ‘Charity is due upon a 
person on every day that the sun rises’. Charity here goes beyond material support to 
encompass any voluntary act, even the offering of a smile. It is regarded as an 
individual devotion given directly to the beneficiary, without the need for state 
administration or mediation”. 
There are other regulations and teachings that stress particular seasons for giving 
charity. Usually these are the seasons in which Muslims are encouraged to do good 
deeds, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan and performance of the  Hajj 
(pilgrimage) during the Hajj season. During these seasons,  Muslims are expected to pay 
sums of their money either in Zakah El-fitr or to distribute meat during Eid Al-Adha 
when cows, goats or camels are slaughtered for their meat which is then distributed to 
feed the needy. In other Muslim countries, the collection of Zakah may be organized by 
the state, such as countries like Pakistan, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, for example. In other 
cases, it is collected by Islamic charities.  
 
The private organizations have become a substitute for the state welfare system 
in the Muslim world as a part of social responsibility, where the organization is 
responsible for collecting and distributing charitable assets. These organizations collect 
donations in mosques and community centres, and at the offices of Islamic charities and 
charity shops. Donors are encouraged to remain anonymous in the belief that it is better 
to give alms discreetly than to publicise one’s philanthropy. Thus, one should not 
underestimate the importance of charitable giving in the Muslim World. For example, 
the Saudi government is the largest giver of charity through unilateral and bilateral 
funds. This places the Kingdom among the largest donors in the world, with 
disbursements of $48 billion between 1975 and 1987  (Kroessin, 2007). 
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However, due to  U.S.  pressure the Saudi government has clamped down on 
public fundraising activities, including banning charity collection boxes in mosques and 
closing down some leading charities. In July 2003, the Saudi Ministry of Information 
announced that all NGOs had been barred from sending funds abroad. In Somalia, for 
instance, the local branch of the Saudi charity the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation 
(AHIF) was labelled as a terrorist entity by the U.S. Office for Foreign Assets Control 
in 2004, prompting the Saudi government to close the organisation down (Charity & 
Security Network, 2011). Morever such accusations were allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda. 
In another case, in the Palestinian Territories, the U.S. government in 2003 cited the 
British charity Interpal as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization’ on the 
grounds that it supported Hamas activities. In 1996, the Charity Commission had 
carried out an inquiry into allegations that some of Interpal’s funds had been channeled 
to Hamas, but no evidence of inappropriate activity was found (Charity & Security 
Network, 2011).   
 
The U.S. Muslim Charities and the War on Terror review in December 2011 
(Charity & Security Network, 2011) also reported that the FBI raided the organization’s 
Oregon branch on February 18, 2004. The charity organization was labelled as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and was accused as being involved in 
money laundering and delivering funds to Chechnya.  
 
The Charity Commission froze Interpal’s bank accounts while it carried out 
another investigation. The U.S. authorities failed to provide any evidence to support 
their allegations, and the inquiry was closed on 24 September 2003. The organization’s 
activities were disrupted and donor confidence may have been undermined. Suspicions 
around the role of established Islamic charities have also altered the way Muslims give 
to charity. Since they are obliged by their faith to give, they are forced into informal 
means of discharging their Zakah, often through donations to unrecognized ‘charities’ 
and fundraisers at local mosques and community centres.  
 
The Saudi NGO World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY 
http://www.wamy.co.uk), one of the charitable organizations selected for this study, has 
seen a 40% drop in its fundraising income since 9/11; its Secretary-General, Saleh 
Wohaibi, attributes this fall to ‘fear of Muslims falling foul of strict US efforts to 
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monitor terror funding.’ But this switch away from established charities may have 
further weakened the transparency and accountability of charitable donations. 
Ironically, attempts to close down or control formal charities may have had precisely the 
opposite effect by forcing charitable giving into less regulated channels.  
 
The significance of the study also arises from its search for the facts of alleged 
relationship between most Muslim charitable organizations and terrorist organizations, 
such as Al-Qaeda. The study seeks to state the fact that most non-profitable 
organizations are not linked to any terrorist deeds and actions and most of these 
charitable organizations are supported by respectful countries, for example, Saudi 
Arabia, which is in disagreement with Al-Qaeda and it even deprived its former leader, 
Osama bin Laden, of his Saudi nationality. Second, the study seeks to ascertain whether 
these organizations are involved in any terrorist actions of any kind or not.  
 
1.5    Methodology of the Study  
This study employs a mixed mode methodology for research; it uses  qualitative 
and quantitative methods to study selected Islamic non-profit organizations based on 
convenience and purposive sampling. Instruments of data collection about these 
organizations include: semi-structured interviews and an in-depth analysis of media 
material such as news reports and articles of CNN and The Washington Post. Content 
analysis has been used to analyze media articles and news stories.  
 
Descriptive research aims to describe data and characteristics about the 
population or phenomenon being studied. Descriptive research answers the questions 
who, what, where, when and how. Although the data description is factual, accurate and 
systematic, the research cannot describe what caused a situation. Descriptive research 
cannot be used to discover a causal relationship, where one variable affects another.  
 
Descriptive research is used to discover frequencies, averages and other 
statistical calculations. A survey investigation is one of the most common tools in 
conducting descriptive research. Descriptive studies include any research that involves 
observation and measurement of the existing conditions without changing any variables. 
Sometimes descriptive research is used prior to conducting an experiment to assess the 
existing conditions and decide on how to manipulate the variables. There are a wide 
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variety of methods that are common in qualitative measurement. Here the researcher 
shall discuss the methods used in this study. 
 
Unstructured interviewing is an important method of the qualitative approach in 
research. It involves direct interaction between the researcher and a respondent or 
group. It differs from quantitative structured interviewing in several important ways. 
First, although the researcher may have some initial guiding questions or core concepts 
to ask about, there is no formal structured instrument or protocol. Second, the 
interviewer is free to move the conversation in any direction of interest that may come 
up. Consequently, unstructured interviewing is particularly useful for a broad 
exploration of a subject. However, there are disadvantages to this lack of structure. 
Since each interview tends to be unique with no predetermined set of questions asked of 
all respondents, therefore it is usually more difficult to analyze unstructured interview 
data, especially when synthesizing across respondents. However, this method is highly 
successful in certain circumstances where the interviewee is very knowledgeable about 
the subject under inquiry. 
 
When designing quantitative surveys, researchers will need to consider issues 
related to choosing an appropriate sample, using valid and reliable measures, and 
conducting a pretest before the survey study is launched. Most surveys are custom-made 
studies designed to answer a specific set of research questions. Some surveys are 
omnibus studies, in which researchers add questions about topic under study to an 
existing survey. 
 
Surveys can be conducted face-to-face, by mail or telephone, or online. They 
can be self-administered or administered by an interviewer. Tools such as computer-
assisted telephone interviewing or touch-screen surveys via a website can be useful. The 
following are the advantages of using a survey in conducting research:  
 When the survey involves a convenience sample (e.g., a mall 
intercept study), data can be collected and analyzed fairly quickly. 
 When the survey involves a statistically valid random sample, the 
results from the sample can be generalized to the entire population if the 
response rate is high enough. 
 Surveys can provide reliable (i.e., repeatable) direction for 
planning programs and messages. 
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 Surveys can be anonymous, which is useful for sensitive topics. 
 Like qualitative research methods, surveys can include visual 
material and can be used to pretest prototypes. 
 They can help generalize your findings beyond your participant 
group. 
 People who are willing to respond may share characteristics that 
do not apply to the audience as a whole, creating a potential bias in the study. 
 They can be useful in assessing the proportion of your target 
audience within a community. 
 They can be useful in assessing the proportion of a target 
audience that practices a behavior. 
 They can be useful in assessing the proportion of a target 
audience that recalls a message. 
 
In this study, the researcher has purposefully selected charitable organizations, 
therefore it is a purposive sampling, one of the non-probablity sampling methods that 
has been identified as the sample of the study (Rosenberry and Vickers, 2007). The 
researcher identified sampling units based on his judgement of what units to select in 
order to facilitate the investigation, much in the way of a convenience or accidental or 
availability sampling (Reinard, 2001). As may be easily deduced from the word, 
convenience sampling allows the researcher to select groups, therefore there is no 
attempt at random sampling. 
 
There are many  charities that are based in the US and some literature noted that 
there are more than 40 such organizations. Some examples are Al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation Inc. (AHIF), Global Relief Foundation (GRF), Goodwill Charitable 
Organization Inc,. Holy Land Foundation (HLF), Islamic American Relief Agency 
(IARA-USA), Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development Inc, (Kindhearts), 
CARE International Inc, (Care Inc) and others. 
 
The current research is a study in which three organizations are selected and will 
be studied in-depth to find out how nonprofit Islamic organizations have been affected  
in the aftermath of the 9/11 events in terms of their activities and services rendered to 
Muslim communities in the United States. The three selected organizations are:  
- The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). 
10 
 
http://www.wamy.co.uk 
 
- The Muslim World League (MWL). 
http://www.themwl.org 
 
- The Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR). 
http://www.cair.com 
 
Both WAMY and MWL have American branches working under United 
Nations umbrella but the CAIR is an American organization based in the United States. 
These organizations were specifically selected because they are the most active and high 
profile organizations in the field of Muslim charity. Moreover, they represent the 
Islamic World appropriately, as WAMY exists in Saudia Arabia, MWL is in Saudi 
Arabia and has branches in different parts of the world, and CAIR represents Muslims 
in America. Statisitically, these organizations represent a considerable percentage of 
organizations all over the world (nearly 30%).  
 
1.5.1 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 
The first organization mentioned in this research is World Assembly for Muslim 
Youth (WAMY). Its importance may arise from the fact that its headquarters are in 
Saudi Arabia. The researcher selected this organization because it may represent other 
charity organizations of Arab origin in the U.S. which played a key role in influencing 
the results and outputs of the post- 9/11 period. This organization is clearly a charitable 
organization which was impacted directly by the events of  September 11 and the 
reactions of the U.S. and other Western governments after the events of September 11. 
 
WAMY is based in Saudi Arabia, so it is not surprising that it came under 
scrutiny and became a subject of detailed observation and described as a terrorist 
organization by the United States. The U.S. government suspected WAMY to be 
involved in connection with terror funding, and believed that there is a linkage between 
WAMY and Al-Qaeda, via the umbrella of 'charity'. It is also believed that WAMY's 
efforts in Somalia are also being aided and abetted by Oxfam and Oxfam Novib 
(http://www.oxfam.org) based in the UK and Holland, whose leftwing anti-Western 
agenda (aided by politicians and governmental supporters), and has been extensively 
documented. Oxfam Novib is the Dutch local front of Oxfam which is well-known 
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across the globe as a confederation of charities aimed at establishing a fair world 
without poverty. 
 
Peter Siebelt (2007) claimed that there is a link between Novib and Islamist 
initiatives and that the charity played a role in organizing demonstrations against the 
Dutch far right politician Pim Fortuyn, (who warned of the Islamisation of Holland as 
well as the call to closing the borders). Siebelt (2007) blamed Novib for helping to 
organize a rally which he characterized as a call to murder and was a prelude to 
Fortuyn's assassination by animal rights activist Volkert van der Graaf. 
 The U.S. State Department and UN funded mass migration of Somalians to the 
United States, where the resettlement has led to a formation of a "mini-Mogadishu" 
begging the question of how the State Department worked with WAMY in efforts to 
bring a mass migration of a population of Somalians who have been sending US tax 
payer money back to support their clans and warlords in Somalia. 
 
 According to those suspicious of the charity, WAMY is providing funding 
under the guise of education touted as a "trust building initiative" aimed at "focusing on 
mutual exchanges and understanding." Given that WAMY’s mission statement is to 
promote Islam, any educational aid coming from them will be approved by the Islamists 
who are running the country.  
 
In charities such as WAMY humanitarian work is interpreted in the light of 
Islam, and aligned to fit the precepts of Islamic law. The view of humanitarianism in 
Islam is illustrated by the WAMY booklet "Human Rights from an Islamic Perspective" 
which attempts to reconcile Islamic humane principles with those of modern Western 
societies such as the US.  
 
WAMY (2010) Critics of WAMY believe that it is involved in disseminating 
hate literature, including books "that encourage religious hatred and violence against 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims themselves. The poster on the WAMY website defines 
their mission, a 'clear-cut Muslim' holding a Quran, and in the background, the symbol 
of the British parliamentary democracy, the tower of Big Ben, being overshadowed by a 
mosque dome with a minaret. www.WAMY.co.uk . 
  
12 
 
It is clear that U.S. government and some Americans have a misunderstanding in 
analyzing WAMY activities by linking them to terrorism and terrorist actions, which are 
farfetched and rather impossible. WAMY is a charitable organization and part of Saudi 
Arabia, which is always in struggle with terrorists inside and outside the country and is 
always warning their citizens to follow moderate Islam as instructed in the Holy Quran 
and by Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) more than 14 hundred years ago.    
 
1.5.2 The Muslim World League (MWL) 
The second charity organization selected for this study is the Muslim World 
League (MWL). It is an international organization headquartered in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia. Founded in 1962 by the Saudi government, it is also originally an Arabic 
charity organization and is considered as one of the most famous organizations all over 
the Muslim World. Therefore, the researcher intended to display the importance and the 
effects of such organization for the Muslim people especially with regard to some 
international events such 9/11.  
 
MWL(2008) MWL is a Saudi Arabia-based international organization that 
provides a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam around the world through a large 
network of charities and affiliated organizations. Critics of MWL claim it has attempted 
to portray itself as a broad global Islamist organization, outwardly emphasizing tolerant 
aspects of Islam and promoting itself as a leader in interfaith dialogue. Its ideological 
backbone, however, is described as an extremist-based interpretation of Islam and 
several of its affiliated groups and individuals have been described as linked to terror-
related activity. www.theMWL.org. 
 
While the MWL has on several occasions condemned terrorism in general terms, 
US continued to describe it as an institution of having a long history of providing 
financial support to terrorist groups or having organizational links to them, including to 
Hamas, Abu Sayyaf group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Jemaat al Islamiyya, and Al-
Qaeda. The MWL has offices throughout the Muslim world as well as in non-Muslim 
majority countries. The organization's website lists thirty-six offices outside of Mecca, 
including Washington, New York and London. The degree to which these offices are 
active is unclear; however, the organization has reportedly used its network to fund 
Islamic centers and mosques and to distribute materials promoting its fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam. Through the MWL's Fiqh Council, a body that establishes 
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jurisprudence according to its own interpretation of Islamic law, the Saudi 'ulama 
(religious establishment) has attempted to coordinate the efforts of Imams around the 
world.  
 
David Bukay (2008) The Fiqh Council holds yearly religious conferences in 
Mecca and disseminates fatawa (religious edicts) upholding a strict fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam in the Wahhabi theological tradition. The Wahhabi tradition is 
embodied in the strict interpretation of fiqh (jurisprudence) by the Saudi 'ulama. 
Wahhabi theology calls for a return to the sunnah, i.e. the way Muhammad and his 
companions lived in the early days of Islam. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a Muslim theologian 
of the 18th century after whom the movement is named, did not accept the developed 
body of Islamic law as it was applied in the centuries following the advent of Islam, and 
thus advocated a return to the literal practices of the sunnah. Therefore, his movement is 
considered by some Muslim scholars as a sect, and not part of orthodox Islam as 
defined by the 'ijma, or consensus of Muslims. This fundamental and often radical 
interpretation of Islam is often expressed in the statements made by the MWL 
leadership. This is one of the reasons the charity is suspected of having links to terrorist 
organizations. The Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur'an and Sunnah is one of 
eight different bodies that comprise the MWL. The other seven are the Al Haramain and 
Al-Aqsa Mosque Foundation; The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Council; Holy Quran 
Memorization International Organization; International Islamic Organization for 
Education; International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO); Makkah Al-Mukarramah 
Charity Foundation for Orphans; and the World Supreme Council for Mosques. The 
World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY), based in Riyadh and sponsored by the 
Saudi government with chapters worldwide, is another group closely connected to the 
MWL. 
 
1.5.3 The Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR). 
         The third selected organization for this research is the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which was founded in June 1994 by three officers 
of the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP)—Omar Ahmad (IAP President; became 
CAIR President), Nihad Awad (IAP PR Director; became CAIR Secretary & 
Treasurer), and Rafeeq Jaber (IAP Chicago Chapter President; became CAIR Vice 
President). The importance of this organization in our present research arises from its 
importance in the world of philanthropy, which provided for the Islamic world in all 
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parts of the world since its inception, and emerged as its leading role in this area during 
and after the events of 9/11.  
 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is one of America's largest 
Muslim civil liberties advocacy organizations that deals with civil advocacy and 
promotes human rights. It is headquartered on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., with 
regional offices nationwide. Through media relations, lobbying, and education, CAIR 
presents what it views as an Islamic perspective on issues of importance to the 
American public, and seeks to empower the American Muslim community and 
encourage its social and political activism. Annual banquets, through which CAIR 
raises the majority of its funds, are attended by American politicians, statesmen, 
interfaith leaders, activists and media personalities.  
 
Robert Faturechi (L.A.Times 2011) In 2007 the organization was named by US 
Federal prosecutors, along with 245 others, as an unindicted co-conspirator in a Hamas 
funding case involving the Holy Land Foundation, which caused the FBI to cease 
working with CAIR outside of criminal investigations due to its designation. A federal 
appeals court removed the label for all parties and sealed the list on October 20, 2010, 
ruling the designation was the result of "simply an untested allegation of the 
Government, made in anticipation of a possible evidentiary dispute that never came to 
pass."  
 
CAIR (2010) CAIR's mission statement is "to enhance understanding of Islam, 
encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build 
coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding". CAIR’s literature describes 
the group as promoting understanding of Islam and protecting Muslim civil liberties. It 
has intervened on behalf of many American Muslims who claim discrimination, 
profiling, or harassment. Its stated core principles include supporting freedom of 
religion, protecting all Americans' civil rights, and encouraging inter-faith dialogue. 
CAIR believes that "the active practice of Islam strengthens the social and religious 
fabric of our nation." CAIR is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization with affiliates in 20 
states (many of which manage multiple offices), and 33 chapters in the US and Canada 
(CAIR-CAN). www.CAIR.com.  
CAIR has conducted investigations, issued reports, held press conferences, filed 
lawsuits, and organized political action to protest aspects of US counterterrorism policy. 
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From 2002–2004 CAIR organized the Library Project, an effort to put quality materials 
about Islam in all 17,000 public libraries in the United States. The initiative sent a set of 
18 books and tapes to public libraries written by Muslim and non-Muslim authors on 
Islamic history and practices, as well as an English translation of the Quran. As of 
December 2004, CAIR received 7804 sponsorships for the $150 set. The initiative was 
funded with an initial $500,000 matching contribution from Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin 
Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, whose donation to the Twin Towers Fund was refused 
by then-Mayor Rudy Guliani because it came with a letter blaming U.S. support for 
Israel for the 9/11 attacks. In 2003, CAIR employee Randall "Ismael" Royer, a native 
from St Louis was arrested for his role in the Northern Virginia jihad terrorist network.  
 
Free Trad  ( 2010 )In 2004 CAIR launched a "Not In the Name of Islam" 
petition in order to "disassociate the faith of Islam from the violent acts of a few 
Muslims." It encouraged Islamic organizations, mosques, and individuals to sign it. The 
petition repudiated terrorism and any group that committed such acts, citing a portion of 
the Quran that told believers to stand for justice even if it was against friends or family. 
The petition was posted on CAIR's homepage, and garned over 690,000 signatures 
before being taken down in a sitewide renovation in 2007. In 2005 CAIR coordinated 
the joint release of a fatwa by 344 American Muslim organizations, mosques, and 
imams nationwide that stated: "Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use 
of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or 
terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other 
method of attack is haram or forbidden—and those who commit these barbaric acts are 
criminals, not martyrs." The fatwa cited passages from the Quran and hadith that 
prohibit violence against innocent people and injustice, and was signed by the Fiqh 
Council of North America. Authors Kim Ezra Shienbaum and Jamal Hasan in their 
book Beyond Jihad: Critical Voices from inside Islam (2006) felt it did not go far 
enough in that it did not address attacks on military targets.  
 
Also in 2005, following the Quran desecration controversy of 2005 at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, CAIR initiated an "Explore the Quran" campaign, 
aimed at providing free copies of the Quran to any person who requested it. Nearly 
34,000 Americans requested copies. In 2006, during the protests over cartoons depicting 
Prophet Muhammad, CAIR responded by launching an educational program "Explore 
the Life of Muhammad", to bring "people of all faiths together to learn more about the 
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Islamic Prophet Muhammad and to use mutual understanding as a counterweight to the 
tensions created by the cartoon controvers” It provided free copies of a DVD or book 
about the life of Muhammad to any person who requested it. Almost 16,000 Americans 
requested materials. In June 2006, CAIR announced a $50 million project to create a 
better understanding of Islam and Muslims in the US ($10 million per year for five 
years), in a project to be spearheaded by Paul Findley, a former US Congressman. 
www.cair.com 
CAIR (2006) California Senator Barbara Boxer in December 2006 withdrew a 
"certificate of accomplishment" originally given to former CAIR official Basim Elkarra 
after Boxer's staff looked into CAIR, and she became concerned about some of CAIR's 
past statements and actions, and statements by some law enforcement officials that it 
provides aid to international terrorist groups. 
The Jiwish press (2013) In May 2007, the U.S. filed a lawsuit against the Holy 
Land Foundation, the largest Muslim charity in the United States at the time, for 
providing funds to Hamas, and federal prosecutors filed pleadings. Along with 300 
other organizations, they listed CAIR (and its chairman emeritus, Omar Ahmad), 
Islamic Society of North America (largest Muslim umbrella organization in the United 
States), Muslim American Society and North American Islamic Trust as unindicted co-
conspirators, a legal designation that can be employed for a variety of reasons including 
grants of immunity, pragmatic considerations, and evidentiary concerns. While being 
listed as co-conspirator does not mean that CAIR has been charged with anything, the 
organization was concerned that the label will forever taint it. In response, National 
Association of Muslim Lawyers and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, saying that the move to list the 
largest Muslim organizations in America as unindicted co-conspirators was an effort to 
smear the entire Muslim community. They also stated that the list breached the 
department’s own guidelines against releasing the names of unindicted co-conspirators.  
 
The Investigative Project on Terrorism reported that on August 7, 2007, a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent testified at the Holy Land Foundation trial 
that CAIR was "listed as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee", 
that it had received money from the Foundation (conflicting with Nihad Awad's 
Congressional testimony), and that co-founders Awad and Omar Ahmad were "listed as 
individual members [of] the Brotherhood Palestine Committee in America." On October 
22, 2007, the Holy Land Foundation trial ended in a mistrial.  
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CAIR (2009) stated that the reason for the mistrial, and no convictions on any of 
the charges, was that the charges were built on fear, not facts. In 2008, the FBI 
discontinued its long-standing relationship with CAIR. Officials said the decision 
followed the conviction of the HLF directors for funneling millions of dollars to Hamas, 
revelations that Nihad Awad had participated in planning meetings with HLF, and 
CAIR's failure to provide details of its ties to Hamas. During a 2008 retrial of the HLF 
case, FBI Special Agent Lara Burns labeled CAIR "a front group for Hamas.” In 
January 2009, the FBI's DC office instructed all field offices to cut ties with CAIR, as 
the ban extended into the Obama administration. U.S. Congressmen Sue Myrick (R-
NC), Trent Franks (R-AZ), John Shadegg (R-AZ), and Paul Broun (R-GA) wrote 
Attorney General Eric Holder on October 21, 2009, that they were very concerned about 
CAIR's relationships with terrorist groups, and requesting that the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) provide each Congressman with a summary of DOJ's evidence and findings that 
led DOJ to name CAIR an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation 
terrorism trial.  
Smiling Ted (2010) The four Congressmen also wrote House of Representatives 
Sergeant at Arms Wilson Livingood a letter the same day asking that he work with 
members of the House Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Intelligence Committees to 
determine if CAIR was successful in placing interns in the committees' offices, to 
review FBI and DOJ evidence regarding CAIR's Hamas ties, and to determine whether 
CAIR is a security threat. Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), "appalled", said "I 
urge the rest of my colleagues to join me in denouncing this witch hunt." She was 
echoed by Keith Ellison (D-MN), the first Muslim elected to the U.S. Congress, in a 
speech that included a statement by the House's Tri-Caucus. The four Republican 
Congressmen, joined by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) and Congressman Patrick 
McHenry (R-NC), then wrote IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman on November 
16, 2009, asking that CAIR be investigated for excessive lobbying and failing to register 
as a lobbying organization.  
 
CAIR condemned the Fort Hood shooting and expressed prayers for the victims 
and condolences for their families. CAIR pointed to an arrest of five men in Pakistan on 
December 10, 2009, as a "success story between Muslims and Muslim community 
organizations (like CAIR) and American law enforcement authorities. When the five 
men left Washington for Karachi on November 28, the families of the men discovered 
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an extremist videotape. Worried, they contacted CAIR, which set up a meeting with the 
FBI on December 1, and the families shared their sons' computers and electronic 
devices with FBI agents. A US law enforcement official described them as models of 
cooperation. CAIR hoped the event would ease "strained" relations of American 
Muslims with the FBI.  
 
CAIR (2011) Hours after it was announced by President Barack Obama that 
Osama bin Laden had been killed, CAIR released a statement: "We join our fellow 
citizens in welcoming the announcement that Osama bin Laden has been eliminated as a 
threat to our nation and the world through the actions of American military personnel. 
As we have stated repeatedly since the 9/11 terror attacks, bin Laden never represented 
Muslims or Islam. In fact, in addition to the killing of thousands of Americans, he and 
Al-Qaeda caused the deaths of countless Muslims worldwide. We also reiterate 
President Obama's clear statement tonight that the United States is not at war with 
Islam" 
  
1.5.4 Reasons for Selecting These Organizations  
Bradlee Dean (320130 There are many organizations working in  philanthropy 
all over the world, and some of those organizations carry the message of Islam, 
especially in the field of charitable work, and call for Islam. However, the researcher 
has chosen three of the largest Muslim charity organizations in the world, which have a 
strong and distinctive role in the world and in the United States in particular.  
 
Of the leading Islamic organizations chosen by the researcher, the Muslim 
World League (MWL), is one of the oldest Islamic charity organizations and the most 
prevalent. It has branches in all countries of the world in addition to its many branches 
in all countries of the Islamic world. Muslim countries have provided the necessary 
legal and politcal cover for the organization. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
partners with the Muslim World League in its efforts, but the main advantage of it is 
that it focuses on youth and their  work in the field of  philanthropy. For these reasons it 
has many  active branches around the world and especially in the United States of 
America. 
 
The CAIR  is the largest of the Islamic and American organizations, interested 
in civil rights of Muslim Americans. It has a number of branches in several  U.S. states 
19 
 
and has great influence in the social life and political society of the U.S. It has played an 
effective role in handling the hate campaign against Muslims in the aftermath of 
September 11 events and continues to play that role. 
 
 
1.6  Limitations of the Study  
This study has some limitations which should be regarded when considering the 
study and its contributions. The study focuses on a major event in recent history and its 
impact on Islamic nonprofit organizations i.e. 9/11 and the aftermath.  
 
For this reason, and to narrow the scope of the study, the researcher has chosen 
to limit the study to three main Islamic organizations out of more than forty. In addition, 
the impact of 9/11 events touched every country in the world, but the researcher 
confines the study to the United States, because this event is very extensive and 
complex. The selection of the case study design normally results in many limitations as 
far as the generalization of the results of the study is concerned.  Another limitation of 
this study is that instead of trying to understand the wide range of media that cover the 
event, it confines its scope to two media representatives, namely, the CNN and 
Washington Post as they are considered as among  the most popular and influential 
media in the United States and worldwide. 
 
20 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.0   Introduction  
More than a decade after 9/11/2001, the consequences of this event continue to 
affect the Islamic Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Muslim communities 
in the United States as well as the rest of the world. The 9/11 events constituted a new 
era to Muslims in which they began facing new complicated situations. Muslims 
became careful with every movement or action as  might be misinterpreted or fabricated 
against them. Thus, civil rights were jeopardized and their religion was always under 
question. To all intents and purposes the Muslims suddenly became demonized and 
became the new enemy. 
 
The horrible and tragic event of September 11, 2001 has changed the global 
scenario with dramatic consequences on the seven million American Muslims. 
American Muslims, who had been struggling and hardly been able to integrate and 
become an integral part of American social and political life, all of a sudden became 
subject to suspicion, ridicule and threat. The existing achievements and assets such as 
thousands of mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools and charitable organizations 
came under direct scrutiny. 
 
Although the facts of the tragedy that took place on September 11, 2001 are 
indisputable, there exist many diverse points of view to explain why they happened and 
how to respond. The responses, from the war on terrorism to various reactions to Islam, 
have created their own series of diverse views and perspectives. To achieve an authentic 
literate discourse on the myriad of issues surrounding 9/11, the crisis must be framed in 
the global context in which it exists. Through the educational sphere of media literacy, 
this lesson offers a process to foster the authentic discourse and an approach to framing 
a global context.  
 
In today's information age, the media has become the dominant force in shaping 
our view of reality and our understanding of the way the world works. As educators in 
this era, we have a professional responsibility to teach our students how best to access 
and evaluate the vast spectrum of information, in the variety of forms and structures, 
which they have available to them.  
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Media sources may intend to be objective in their reporting, but, today more 
than ever, we have come to understand that all media is constructed. Because of the 
nature of decisions that go into producing media, from the audience it is intended to 
serve, to the way the story is told, to the voices that are edited to be presented, all media 
embodies a point of view. If one voice can be heard as advocacy, many voices can be 
heard as education. The best of scholarship comes from studying more than one source 
(whether primary, secondary or reference). This process of learning also applies to 
becoming media literate. Developing media literacy skills can give students tools to 
identify and evaluate information about their world, from a local to global context. 
 
To develop a more global context for analyzing and discussing the crisis 
stemming from 9/11 and its aftermath both the corporate and independent media have 
typically not approached the events of 9/11 with open inquiry. It would appear that, 
with very few exceptions, the corporate mainstream media and their independent 
alternatives have dismissed critical 9/11 questions as conspiratorial or unpatriotic             
Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009) Traditional American mythology was used 
to exalt the official story of 9/11, a story that has become the only story. New York 
University historian Judt (2006) recently lamented that today's discourse centers almost 
exclusively on "official accounts as officially rendered and received." Nowhere is this 
truer than in the case of 9/11. It was clear to any media user that the mainstream 
corporate media and even the progressive press have initially repeatedly endorsed the 
government-sponsored official story formalized in the 9/11 Commission Report. This 
narrative tells us that nineteen Islamist extremists conspired and outwitted the best-
defended country in the world. Due to the fact that government agencies ignored the 
many pre-warnings, these terrorists were able to catch American defenders by surprise, 
hijack four jets, and ram three of them into targets symbolic of American economic and 
military might. 
 
However, is the official narrative  the full and true story? Are there other 
narratives that may have more credibility and evidence? Are significant details being 
ignored? These are not questions that the American news media have asked, or 
encouraged the public to ask. Resistance from the news media, both corporate and 
independent, has effectively prevented adequate reportage, fact-based discussions, and 
in-depth analyses of 9/11. This paradoxical suppression has made the full story of 9/11 a 
recurring concern in the publications of Project Censored (www.projectcensored.org). 
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In fact, some pundits have actively questioned and continue to rely upon strong 
religious overtones in defense of American mythology and government-endorsed 
interpretations of 9/11.  
          Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009 )  An example is the MSNBC 
journalist Tucker Carlson, who exemplified this tendency during an interview with 9/11 
scholar and theologian Dr. David Ray Griffin. On the program, Carlson attacked the 
professor for challenging the official narrative of 9/11. As soon as Griffin claimed he 
rejected the government's explanation for the events of 9/11, Carlson interrupted and 
stated that: " . . . it is wrong, blasphemous, and sinful for you to suggest, imply, or help 
other people come to the conclusion that the US government killed 3,000 of its own 
citizens because it didn't." In this case, as in many others, the interviewer questioned 
even the prospect of discussion concerning alternative ideas about 9/11 before it began, 
thus framing the rest of the interview and reinforcing the official myths of 9/11." 
(Tucker, Carlson, MSNBC, August 9, 2006 on air) 
Since intellectuals, politicians, journalists, pundits, and radio/TV/Internet 
personalities have long reinforced these mythic motives, they have become part of 
America's historical grand narrative.  
 
In the Aftermath of 9/11, a frenzy of media reporting and narratives took place. 
It has been observed that during times of psychological trauma, societies tend to revert 
and hold on to their comfort zone and myths. After 9/11, many distraught Americans 
looked to their traditional mythology for personal meaning and national purpose; no one 
wanted to appear unpatriotic. Always responsive to popular moods and trends, 
politicians also framed subsequent events in familiar terms of traditional myths. In turn, 
the media, echoing powerful political lobbies and forces, resurrected the myths of 
national purpose and loyalty, moral exceptionalism, and triumph over adversity, to 
make sense of tragic events.  
 
Leading the way for others in the media, CBS News anchor Dan Rather 
proclaimed, "I'm going to do my job as a journalist, but at the same time I will give 
them [the Bush administration] the benefit of the doubt, whenever possible in this kind 
of crisis, emergency situation. Not because I am concerned about any [public] backlash. 
I'm not. But because I want to be a patriotic American without apology." (Engel, The 
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Guardian, 17 may, 2007). Rather later regretted such a stance, but at the time, this 
reinforced the power of nationalism in a time of crisis. Most in the corporate press 
relinquished their role as watchdogs and became activists to those in power. Another 
factor that has blocked discussion of the events of 9/11 is the denial that a supposedly 
democratically elected government could have played a role in the attacks. Other 
interpretations of 9/11 events have rarely received fair and open treatment in the 
American press. Both of these alternative hypotheses suggest possible involvement by 
elements within the American government: letting the attacks happen on purpose to 
enable a war, or making the attacks happen on purpose to enable a war. A better 
knowledge of American history might have helped both journalists and the public to 
consider these additional possibilities in a broader context. 
 
Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009 ) Mainstream corporate media have 
largely excluded historical context of the type that might generate critical inquiry 
surrounding the tragic events of 9/11 and the War on Terror. The facts surrounding 
certain important historical events have virtually been written out of history. A walk 
down this can be an antidote to another kind of censorship. 
As it analyzes the role of the media in popularizing myths in the public mind, 
this chapter will further deconstruct the denials and deceptions of the official narrative 
of 9/11.  
 
On September 11, 2001, government officials and media outlets began to 
construct an official account with unprecedented dispatch. Even before the attacks were 
over, the counterterrorism division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was 
telling National Security Advisor Richard Clarke it was Al-Qaeda operatives who had 
attacked the World Trade Center. This account was adapted and amplified in the days, 
weeks, and months following the attacks. On the one hand, top officials were claiming 
that these were sneak attacks and that they were caught completely off guard. Yet by 11 
a. m. on 9/11, the FBI had started releasing the names, nationalities, and photos of the 
nineteen suspected hijackers. Before the smoke and dust settled, media were ready to 
supply instant meaning, relying heavily on traditional mythology and popular history.  
 
If the federal establishment knew so little as to be taken completely by surprise 
how could they so rapidly come up with an exact list of those responsible? Had federal 
agencies been keeping close watch on these Al-Qaeda operatives? Adding to the 
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contradictions, the accuracy of this roster proved suspect. In the weeks immediately 
following the attacks, several news outlets, including the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), reported that individuals on the FBI's list were still alive. Those 
reports had to raise doubts about the validity of the official story, which may be one 
reason why they received scant media coverage in the U.S. 
Huff, (2004) said that just two hours after the Towers came down, Senator Orin 
Hatch (R- Utah) of the Senate Intelligence Committee implicated bin Laden in the 
events of 9/11, even though few facts pointed to his involvement then or later. Through 
media stories, bin Laden became the ready-made, chief suspect of the 9/11 attacks. The 
FBI would later drop him from the Most Wanted list, citing lack of evidence. If these 
were surprise attacks, then how, on the very day of the attacks, could the government 
and some corporate media outlets have known who was responsible? For example, 
CNN, at four o'clock in the afternoon on 9/11, blamed bin Laden "based on new and 
specific information developed since the attacks. Corporate media and the federal 
government were peering through the smoke of the day with amazing clarity, fashioning 
a larger-than-life villain, foreshadowing future policy, and perhaps generating a self-
fulfilling prophesy in the ensuing War on Terror. President Bush wrote in his diary the 
night of the attacks, "The Pearl Harbor of the twenty-first century took place today. We 
think it's Osama bin Laden.  
 
 
Kwin (2009) Right after the attacks, the City of New York impounded the 
firefighters' tape and the Fire Department forbade anyone to discuss its contents 
because, it claimed, the tape might later become evidence in court trials. This 
suppression of evidence continued under mayors Rudy Giuliani and Michael 
Bloomberg. Only three years later, after ongoing pressure from the families of victims 
and a suit by the New York Times would the city finally release the taped oral histories. 
 
Because of the way the buildings disintegrated and dropped, other observers also 
suspected that the Towers had not simply "collapsed." In fact, CBS news anchor Dan 
Rather reported on 9/11 that the collapse was "reminiscent of . . . when a building was 
deliberately destroyed by well-placed dynamite to knock it down. He pointed out this 
resemblance in the broadcast (11, September, 2001). Since 9/11, however, no one in the 
corporate media has ever made such a comparison again. 
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Muslims in the United States were for many decades somewhatignored socially, 
and totally ignored politically. However,events of the past forty years have been witness 
to an increased interest in the religion of Islam and its adherents. Large numbers of 
immigrants from Muslim countries increased the size of the American Muslim 
community. The Gulf War brought Muslims into the media spotlight. Also, the events 
of September 11th, 2001 and the destruction of the World Trade Center made popular 
sentiment turn against Muslims, and paved the way toward legislation that has targeted 
Muslims as potential enemies. These events in American history have helped to 
stimulate both civil and political action from Muslims in the United States.  
 
The following pages will describe the development of civil and political activity 
of the Muslim community.The discussion consists of two parts: First, Muslims have 
undergone a series of changes in the way they engage in civil and political processes, 
becoming more effective in focusing their civil activities to gain political power. 
Second, these changes are best viewed as developments in a periodization marked by 
three major events involving the United States: The Immigration Act of 1965, the Gulf 
War, and the events of September 11, 2001.  
 
Harverd Uni. (2004) The development of Muslim civil and political involvement 
can be looked at as a three-phase process. In the period prior to the Gulf War, Muslim 
political participation in politics was for all intents and purposes non-existent. Muslim 
community networks were built with the goal of promoting and providing an Islamic 
way of life for Muslims in the U.S. These groups are correctly seen as functioning 
within the realm of civil society. Political involvement was lacking. A common theory 
for why this was the case is that as Muslims in a non-Muslim country, many questioned 
whether participation in a system of non-Muslim government was even permitted. It is 
also important to realize that at this time Muslims were relatively new to the United 
States and thus to its political system. Many immigrant Muslims came from countries 
where political involvement or opposition to government policies frequently resulted in 
economic devastation, imprisonment, or death. Consequently, people who fled these 
regimes were not anxious to become involved in any activity that had, in their 
experience, led to mistreatment by the ruling party. For these reasons, the nascent 
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Muslim community learned to participate in an innocuous way that allowed for greater 
social participation without conflict of interest in the surrounding community.  
 
The second phase began in the 1990s after the Gulf War ended. Muslims in the 
United States were thrust suddenly into the media spotlight during the Gulf War. The 
United States was at war with Saddam Hussein’s military regime, which happened also 
to be a Muslim-majority country. Even after the war had ended, those who even looked 
like a part of the enemy were scrutinized by their American neighbors as, at worst, 
potential traitors and, at best, as complete foreigners. The influx of Iraqi refugees, those 
who had risen up in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s regime, increased the attention on 
Muslims in U.S. and elsewhere received, not necessarily for the better. The negativity 
American Muslims felt as a result of that war helped to change the nature of Muslims’ 
civil and political activity. The 1980s question ‘Should Muslims participate in the 
politics of a non-Muslim nation?’ changed to ‘How can Muslims effectively participate 
in the political process of the United States to affect positive change for the country as a 
whole?’  
 
In the third and present phase, that question remains the same, but the way in 
which Muslims in the United States are involving themselves in American politics has 
changed from the activities of 1990s. This dramatic change took place after September 
11th. Now, Muslims in U.S. have found ways to engage in political activity not only 
through their own efforts, but also by joining forces fo example, with other faith-based 
groups, as well as secular organizations. In so doing, they have increased not only their 
political reach, but gained a foothold on the political platform already built by these 
groups. 
 
2.1 September 11th and Charitable organizations 
IPT News (2010)The impact of September 11th, 2001 on Muslims’ political 
engagement cannot be overestimated. Public animosity towards Muslims as well as 
government sanctioned profiling and spying by the FBI became the norm. The Muslim 
community of the United States was under attack politically as the government took aim 
at the community through mandatory registration for Muslim males and infiltration of 
mosques accused of promoting terrorism and anti-American sentiment.  
The researcher chose the case of the Portland Muslim community as an example 
for this research because the Portland Muslim community came under public scrutiny 
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immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The infamous Portland 7 case grabbed national 
headlines as a group of Muslim men from Portland’s Sunni Masjid as-Sabr were 
arrested on charges of attempting to assist the Taliban in fighting the U.S. Army 
(Associated Press, August, 6, 2003). Also, less than a year after those arrests, 
Mohammad Kariye the Imam of the same mosque was arrested at Portland International 
Airport by the Portland Joint Terrorism Taskforce on the grounds of a sealed 
indictment. Rumors that he had siphoned money through the mosque to finance travel 
for  individuals to join the mujaheden and terrorist groups (IPT News, December 1, 
2010) further stained the image of Masjid as-Sabr and outraged the community as they 
began to feel their civil rights erode.  
 
Harverd Uni. (2004) The felt threat to this community, however, did not only 
spur reaction from Muslims themselves. A wave of interfaith activity begun by various 
Christian and Jewish communities around Portland created a whole new arena in which 
the religious identity of Muslims could play out in the civil societal context. What is 
fascinating about this interfaith dialogue is that it has become a political tool. The 
Jewish and Christian community of the United States are well represented at the 
political level, Portland is no exception. Interfaith dialogue existed prior to September 
11th and it grew from an initial show of outreach and solidarity from other faith-based 
communities to a platform from which people of faith, especially those from the Jewish 
and Christian sectors. 
 
In the United States, a group of Saudi-initiated charity organizations established 
the Friends of Charities Association (FOCA) in January 2004. FOCA’s members 
pledged their commitment to the principle of transparency and accountability. FOCA’s 
Transparency Project is an attempt to reassure donors, government and the international 
community that Islamic charities operate with transparency, and not as a front for 
terrorist activities, while striving to strenghten all weaknesses and loopholes. FOCA 
focuses on proving its organizations’ activities are legitimate. For this reason, every one 
of the organizations is required to show that: 
 its activities and purposes provide a tangible benefit to the public 
 those people who are eligible for benefits are either the public as 
a whole, or a significant section of it, in that they are not a restricted group or 
one where members share a private connection, such as social clubs or 
professional associations with specific membership, 
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 the charity's activities must be legal and must not be contrary to 
public policy. 
To register as a charity, the organization has to be either incorporated or 
governed by a legal document called a trust or a constitution. This document has to 
explain the organization's purposes and structure. 
 
A voluntary organization is an organization set up for charitable, social, 
philanthropic or other purposes. It is required to use any profit or surplus only for the 
organization's purposes, and it is not a part of any governing department, local authority 
or other statutory body.  
 
For a voluntary organization to be a charitable organization or charity, its overall 
goals or the purposes of the organization, must be charitable. A trust is essentially a 
relationship between three parties, the donor of some assets, the trustees who hold the 
assets and the beneficiaries (those people who are eligible to benefit from the charity). 
When the trust has charitable purposes, and is a charity, the trust is known as a 
charitable trust. The main disadvantage of a trust is that, as with an unincorporated 
association, it does not have a separate legal entity and the trustees must themselves 
own property and enter into contracts. The trustees are also liable if the charity is sued 
or incurs liability. 
 
Ali Mazrui (2004) noted that the African-American Muslim community has 
been very active in arranging meetings of local politicians or political candidates and 
the Muslim community. During the Summer of 2004, at least three mayoral candidates 
attended monthly potlucks at the Muslim Community Center (MCC), the predominantly 
African American mosque. The Imam of MCC has attended meetings and events with 
imams and presidents of other mosques to ask questions and to make sure that mayoral 
candidates take into account the ten to fifteen thousand Muslims in the Portland area. A 
leader at MCC explains, “We are trying to position ourselves with those in authority. I 
think Muslims in this country are going to see more and more that everything is 
political. You have to be involved if you want to change something. I think that we’re 
becoming more and more aware and making more and more of an effort to become 
involved politically, to be able to influence decisions, so this meeting is just an 
extension of that”.  
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The most recent endeavor into the realm of politics has come in the form of the 
Oregon Muslim Citizens Alliance (OMCA), a newly formed group. One of the founders 
stated that the purpose of OMCA is to empower the political engagement of the 
Muslims because Muslim immigrants usually do not engage with the political process 
and they do not vote. Most of the immigrants come from countries where there is 
authoritarian rule and they go to America to seek a better life. OMCA does not wish to 
become associated with just one political philosophy or one ethnic group or religious 
sect. Instead, the purpose is to create a Muslim community that understands its rights 
and duties as American citizens, and to form a powerful political force. 
 
Harverd Uni. (2004) The Muslim community in Portland is, of course, only a 
small section of the American Muslim community. The development of civil and 
political activities of the community has been shaped by its social context. However, a 
review of similar national groups which have developed over the past forty or so years 
has revealed a similar pattern of development. The Muslim Students Association of the 
1960s, Islamic Circle of North American and Islamic Society of North America of the 
1970s and 1980s, Council on American-Islamic Relations of the 1990s, and the 
American Muslim Voice of the post-9/11 era, all are national Muslim groups are all 
good examples of the trend to move from isolated civil activities involving only 
Muslims to more political activity to try to bridge the gap between American Muslims 
and American society. Further research into these national organizations may show how 
periods of social change affect the development of identities of various social groups, 
whether ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Muslims are becoming more visible 
politically because political engagement may be the only way to change government 
sanctioned discrimination and legislative targeting.  
2.2 War on Terror 
 Khurshid Khan (2012) The War on Terror is an international military campaign 
led by the United States and the United Kingdom with the support of other North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as non-NATO countries. Originally, the 
phrase “War on Terror” was coined by former US president George W. Bush to denote 
a global military, political, legal and ideological struggle against organizations 
designated as terrorist and regimes that were accused of having a connection or 
supporting these organizations. The campaign was originally waged against Al-Qaeda 
and other militant organizations with the purpose of eliminating them.  
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Terrorist attacks and plots that caused the initiation of this campaign include an 
attempted bombing of Los Angeles International Airport in the year 2000, the October 
2000 USS Cole bombing, followed in 2001 by the September 11 attacks.  
 
1. The US government had a number of objectives for the War on 
Terror after 9/11, which included: Identify, locate and destroy terrorists such as 
Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and their organizations; 
2. Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists.  
3. End the state sponsorship of terrorism 
4. Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability 
with regard to combating terrorism 
5. Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism 
6. Work with willing and able states 
7. Enable weak states 
8. Persuade reluctant states 
9. Compel unwilling states 
10. Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists 
11. Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens. 
           The U.S. government and media framed the 9/11 attacks and defined the events 
very early in the process of understanding and responding to 9/11. Governments use the 
process of definition to prepare the public for a particular response to the events. The 
media has repeated similar processes as they encourage support of, and preparation for, 
war against Iraq. Examples of the media role regarding 9/11 and Iraq are used to 
illustrate the limitations of mainstream media.  
 
By any measure, the events of September 11, 2001, that required an official 
response from the US Government. This response could have taken many forms 
depending on whether 9/11 was considered a crime or act of war. Although hijacking is 
normally treated as a crime, in this instance, the hijacking ended with the destruction of 
the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon. Instead of a hijacking the masses saw 
commercial airlines used as missiles to attack buildings. Similarly, Timothy McVeigh 
used a van loaded with explosives to attack a building in Oklahoma City; howeverthis 
was treated as a crime not an act of war. 
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Kenneth Mentor (2002) International humanitarian law reflects the lessons of 
the Holocaust and World War II. This law has been codified in the Geneva Conventions 
and other universally accepted treaties. The events of 9/11 were so far beyond the 
imagination of those who wrote these laws that it is safe to assume that these laws were 
not written to address the events of 9/11. In effect, it is very difficult to define 9/11 by 
referring to international humanitarian law. The ready acceptance of the media and 
government interpretation of the events and the attacks were not carried out by the state 
but by an organization that has never claimed responsibility for the acts.  
Although inadequate to define these events, international law remains important 
in our efforts to resolve international disputes without violations of accepted 
humanitarian principles. It would be very difficult to make a case that since the events 
of 9/11 were hard to define that the Bush Administration suddenly had the right to 
ignore humanitarian laws that clearly apply to the behavior of the United States. The 
administration never needed to worry about making this argument since questions were 
never raised in a manner that was loud and clear enough that they could not be ignored. 
 
Historically, wars have been waged by nation-states. The objective of war has 
been to control other nation-states or to seize control and/or protect a geographic area. 
In this case the United States directed the energies of the military to stop an 
organization. The initial stated objective was to hunt down and kill members of this 
organization without regard to international borders.  In effect, the US Government 
rushed into a war with no clear enemy and without knowing the true motivation for this 
war. Vengeance, oil and political strategy are the top candidates but without an open 
debate of the issues, moderated by a free and uncensored press, it will be difficult to 
know the true motivations. 
        The American Civil Liberties Union has spoken out against the way U.S. 
law targeting funding for terrorism has suppressed Muslim charity organizations.  The 
Federal Government argues that some charities are a front for terrorism. The efforts of 
the government to stop the funding of terrorism post 9/11 are too vague and they are 
unfairly applied to Muslim charity organizations. 
 
These laws are impeding Muslim Americans from practicing their religion 
through charitable giving,  which is an essential requirement of their religion. These 
policies are counter productive and they are making it very hard for American Muslims 
to practice their religious beliefs because they target their charities.  
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Kenneth Mentor (2002) They are killing legitimate aid to places in the world 
where Muslim hearts and minds could be won over. Many of the regions that would 
have received aid from those charities are legitimate allies of the U.S. war on terror. The 
U.S. Treasury Department has shut down nine Muslim Charities, only one of which was 
actually found guilty of giving money to terrorists. These eight charities have been 
denied due process and have no way to appeal against their closure 
Strong criticism has not changed the FBI’s mind about using informants to 
monitor activity in mosques. Not only were informants monitoring mosques but they 
have been monitoring local gyms in an effort to get information on local mosques. The 
FBI claims that they do not investigate places, but instead investigate people who are 
suspected of ties to terrorism. 
 
An informant stated that he was instructed to get members of a local mosque to 
come to the gyms. The FBI would then obtain security footage from the gyms and the 
informant would identify the men in the video. He would also be asked to provide other 
information on the men and the FBI would carry out background checks on them. The 
purpose of the background checks was to find any information that the FBI could use to 
persuade the men into becoming informants (Glover, The Los Angeles Times, 28 April, 
2009). 
2.2.1  The September 11 Attacks in the U.S. media   
The 9/11 attacks were a series of coordinated suicide attacks targeted at the 
United States on September 11, allegedly carried out by Al-Qaeda, headed by Osama 
Bin Laden. The Al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. They were 
able to use the airlines and crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in 
New York City. The attack was horrendous and resulted in killing about 3000 persons 
(CBS News)  
The twin towers collapsed in two hours, and affected the neighboring areas. 
Another group of hijackers crashed into the Ministry of Defense base, The Pentagon, 
and caused some damage, too. All people on board of the hijacked airplanes were 
reported killed. Most of the dead persons were mainly civilians and included 
multinationals (CNN.com) 
2.3  Aftermath of the September 11 Attacks  
The 9/11 attacks had a massive and immediate influence upon various aspects of 
life in the U.S. and world wide. On the day of the attack the television networks 
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suspended normal programming and began 24-hour coverage that would last a week, 
filling out the script of Osama Bin Laden as the mastermind of the attack with a large 
number of background stories about Islamic terror. The networks' coverage of Ground 
Zero was framed almost exclusively as a human interest story of the tragedy of lost life 
and the rescue operation that soldiered on with "hope against hope." Questions about the 
plausibility of the official explanation of the collapses and about what officials were 
doing with the evidence of this vast crime went unasked.  
 
Rev Cutie (2009) On September 13, 2001 the White House announced that 
there was "overwhelming evidence" that bin Laden was behind the attacks. Shutdowns 
and evacuations of large buildings in major cities around the nation started soon after 
the towers in New York started crumbling. This clearly helped to bolster the 
psychological impact of the attack. A shutdown in civil aviation went into effect on the 
morning of September 11. Takeoffs were forbidden, and all aircraft in the air were 
ordered to land, in most cases at airports that were not their destinations. Starting 
September 13 certain charter jets were quietly allowed to fly.  
 
The Bush Administration submitted the 342-page USA PATRIOT ACT to 
Congress on September 24, 2001, just 13 days after the attack. Other legislation would 
follow, but most of the policies enacted in the name of the War on Terror would be 
accomplished through executive orders. Two Senators who attempted to slow the 
passage of the PATRIOT ACT received letters containing anthrax.  
2.4   Immediate response 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, then President of the United States, 
George W. Bush declared a war on terrorism, with an intention to retaliate and capture 
members of Al-Qaeda and their mastermind, Osama Bin Laden. Thus the United States 
started what would be later be known and have deeper impact on the whole world, " 
War On Terror" and planned invasion of Afghanistan to enforce Taliban to expel Al-
Qaeda members, (Washington  Post) Other countries, especially NATO members 
showed strong support to the US in the anti-terrorism campaign. Both economic and 
military methods were used against countries thought to be harboring terrorists. As a 
result, massive operations took place outside of the United States.  
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Quizlet (nd) In the aftermath of the attacks, many U.S. citizens held the view 
that the attacks had "changed the world forever." The Bush administration announced a 
war on terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to 
justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. These goals would be 
accomplished by means including economic and military sanctions against states 
perceived as harboring terrorists and increasing global surveillance and intelligence 
sharing. Immediately after the September 11 attacks U.S. officials speculated on 
possible involvement by Saddam Hussein; although unfounded, the association 
contributed to public acceptance for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On October 7, 2001, the 
War in Afghanistan began when U.S. and British forces initiated aerial bombing 
campaigns in Afghanistan targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda camps, then later invaded 
Afghanistan with ground troops of the Special Forces. This was second-biggest 
operation of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism outside of the United States, and the 
largest directly connected war on terrorism, a U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. was not the 
only nation to increase its military readiness, but there were with other notable 
supporters, for example the Philippines and Indonesia; countries that have their own 
internal conflicts with terrorism. 
 
Murray(2006) Because the attacks on the United States were judged to be within 
the parameters of its charter, NATO declared that Article 5 of the NATO agreement was 
satisfied that on September 12, 2001, the US war on terrorism has the support of NATO 
and that NATO would actually participate in a "hot" war.  
Following the attacks, 762 mainly Muslim suspects were rounded up the United 
States. On December 12, 2001, Fox News reported that some 60 Israelis were among 
them; Federal investigators were reported to have described them as part of a long-
running effort to spy on American government officials. A "handful" of these Israelis 
were described as active Israeli military or intelligence operatives.  
 
Following the attacks, 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants were fingerprinted 
and registered under the Alien Registration Act of 1940. 8,000 Arab and Muslim men 
were interviewed, and 5,000 foreign nationals were detained under Joint Congressional 
Resolution 107-40 authorizing the use of military force to deter and prevent acts of 
international terrorism against the United States 
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Murray (2006) A federal technical building fire safety investigation of the 
collapses of the Twin Towers was conducted by the United States Department of 
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The goals of this 
investigation, completed on April 6, 2005, were to investigate the building construction, 
the materials used, and the technical conditions that contributed to the outcome of the 
WTC disaster. The investigation was to serve as the basis for: 
 Improvements in the way in which buildings are designed, 
constructed, maintained, and used; 
 Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials; 
 Revisions to building and fire codes, standards, and practices; 
 Improved public safety. 
The report oncludes that the fireproofing on the Twin Towers' steel 
infrastructures was blown off by the initial impact of the planes and that, if this had not 
occurred, the towers would likely have remained standing.  
The fires weakened the trusses supporting the floors, making the floors sag. Olson 
(2011) The sagging floors pulled on the exterior steel columns to the point where 
exterior columns bowed inward. With the damage to the core columns, the buckling 
exterior columns could no longer support the buildings, causing them to collapse. In 
addition, the report asserts that the towers' stairwells were not adequately reinforced to 
provide emergency escape for people above the impact zones. NIST stated that the final 
report on the collapse of 7 WTC will appear in a separate report.  
 
The Inspector General of the CIA conducted an internal review of the CIA's 
performance prior to 9/11, and was harshly critical of senior CIA officials for not doing 
everything possible to confront terrorism, including failing to stop two of the 9/11 
hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, as they entered the United States and 
failing to share information on the two men with the FBI. The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), chaired by former New 
Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, was formed in late 2002 to prepare a full and complete 
account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, including preparedness for, and 
the immediate response to, the attacks. On July 22, 2004, the report was released.  
 
9-11 researches (2002) For the first time in history, all nonemergency civilian 
aircraft in the United States and several other countries including Canada were 
immediately grounded, stranding tens of thousands of passengers across the world. The 
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order was given at 9:42 by Federal Aviation Administration Command Center national 
operations manager Ben Sliney. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "This was 
an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as 
about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident.” 
 
2.4.1.    International Reaction  
The first reaction as reported by international media was the immediate response 
of condemnation by both global media and governments. The United States received 
tremendous support from most nations of the world. Arab and Islamic presidents, 
leaders and kings showed unmistakable solidarity with United States, (CNN.com) with 
an exception of a few countries.  
 
People in Afghanistan felt unsafe and tried to seek ways out of the country to 
protect themselves from any potential attack of the US. Thousands of Afghan citizens 
fled to neighboring Pakistan. A few months afterwards, the United States with an 
international coalition, executed a military operation against Afghanistan aiming to 
expel the Taliban regime and capture Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden (CNN.com). 
Many other countries like the United Kingdom, France, China, Pakistan, Jordan, 
Germany, India, Uganda, and Russia imposed regulations to control bank accounts of 
organizations, businesses and individuals suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda. 
Several people were arrested in different parts of the world as they were labeled as 
terrorist suspects. The global status quo had become unfavorable to Arabs and Muslims 
worldwide.   
 
Most Muslim political and religious leaders condemned the attacks. The leaders 
vehemently denouncing the attacks included the presidents of Egypt, Jordan, the 
Palestinian Authority, Libya, Syria, Iran and Pakistan. The exception was Iraq, when 
then-president Saddam Hussein, said of the attacks that "the American cowboys are 
reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity." Saddam would later offer sympathy 
for the Americans killed in the attacks. Renowned Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
denounced the attacks and the killings of hundreds of civilians as a "heinous crime" and 
urged Muslims to donate blood to the victims. He did however criticise the United 
States' "biased policy towards Israel" and also called on Muslims to "concentrate on 
facing the occupying enemy directly", inside the Palestinian territories. The alleged 
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Hezbollah "spiritual mentor" and Lebanese Shia cleric Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah 
condemned the attacks. 
Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said he was not interested in 
exporting such attacks to the United States, however he criticized the "unfair American 
position".Afghanistan's Taliban rulers condemned the attacks and also vehemently 
rejected suggestions that Osama bin Laden, who had been given asylum in Afghanistan, 
could be behind them. Huge crowds attended candlelit vigils in Iran, and 60,000 
spectators observed a minute's silence at Tehran football stadium.  
 
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) immediately condemned the attacks. 
Fox News reported that in Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp, 
revelers fired weapons in the air, with similar celebratory gunfire heard at the 
Rashidiyeh camp near the southern city of Tyre as well.  
 
Reports and images of Palestinians from East Jerusalem, Nablus, and Lebanon 
taking to the streets in celebration, were broadcast around the world, and many 
newspapers, magazines, websites and wire services were running photographs. The 
PNA claimed such celebrations were not representative of the sentiments of the 
Palestinian people, and the Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo said the PNA 
would not allow "a few kids" to "smear the real face of the Palestinians". In an attempt 
to stop further reporting, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Arafat's Cabinet secretary, said the 
Palestinian Authority could not "guarantee the life" of an Associated Press (AP) 
cameraman if footage he filmed of post-9/11 celebrations in Nablus was broadcast. 
Rahman's statement prompted a formal protest from the AP bureau chief, Dan Perry. 
 
There were also rumours that the footage of some Palestinians celebrating the 
attacks was stock footage of Palestinian reactions to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. This rumour was proven false shortly afterwards, and CNN issued a statement to 
that effect.  
2.4.2.    Domestic Scene   
 
In the pre-9/11 American Muslims were able to build their own institutions and 
enjoyed equal civil rights with the original Americans. Everybody was considered equal 
before the law. They were optimistic and hopeful in their new homeland because many 
38 
 
of them, particularly the new immigrants had been deprived of much freedom in their 
native countries. Because they represent the minority, American Muslims mainly focus 
their efforts on creating suitable environment for their children in order to preserve their 
religion. For this reason the newly arrived Muslims were not active in political life 
except in the late 1980s.  
 
All privileges the 7 million American Muslims gained over time suddenly 
changed on September 11, 2001 with several negative consequences of the attacks. 
American Muslims, who had succeeded in integrating into American political life, 
suddenly became suspects. The community after 9/11 worried more about protecting the 
existing achievements rather than achieving new ones such as building 2000 mosques 
and many  Islamic centers in various American cities, as well as Islamic schools and 
charitable organizations. In the post 9/11 Islamic community faced hostility and 
prejudice as never before.  
 
Abdus Sattar Ghazali (2012) in his valuable book argued that the USA Patriot 
Act, was mainly targeting Muslim countries. "The fallout impacted the daily life of 
Muslims at schools, in the workplace, in general public encounters and mistreatment at 
the hand of federal officials." Ghazali (2012) reported that many Muslim homes and 
businesses were reported to have been attacked and their owners interrogated for 
baseless allegations.  
 
According to Amnesty International reports, racial profiling by US law 
enforcement agencies has increased since 9/11. Under the guise of fighting terrorism, 
these agencies used various forms of degrading, discriminatory and dangerous practices. 
A report released by the California Senate Office of Research in May 2004 concluded 
that Arab-Americans and the Muslim minority were badly affected by the Patriot Act 
and other federal legislations adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (231). 
 
Even immigration laws were being used against Muslims as an anti-terrorism 
device. American authorities treated minor violations by Muslims and Arabs with harsh, 
and tough methods while treating smoothly hundreds of cases made by other 
immigrants who violated the same laws. "The approach is basically to target the Muslim 
and Arab community with a kind of zero-tolerance immigration policy. No other 
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community in the U.S. is treated to zero-tolerance enforcement," according to David 
Cole (2011), a Georgetown University law professor.  
2.4.3. Impact on Islamic Organizations   
Top Muslim organizations in the United States were swift to condemn the 
attacks on 9/11 and called "upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills 
and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families". 
Top organizations include: Islamic Society of North America, American Muslim 
Alliance, American Muslim Council, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic 
Circle of North America, and the Shari'a Scholars Association of North America. In 
addition to massive monetary donations, many Islamic organizations launched blood 
drives and provided medical assistance, food, and residence for victims.  
 
Abdus Sattar Ghazali (2012) According to the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant 
and Refugee Rights, the U.S. government has closed down 25 Muslim charities and 
frozen $8 million in donations in Illinois alone. Furthermore, dozens of Muslim 
charitable groups in the US have been investigated since 2001. Several were shut down, 
without any official finding that they were aiding terrorist organizations. The 
organizations shut down were not on any government watch list before their assets were 
frozen. The predictable result is that Muslims have no way of knowing which groups 
the government suspects of ties to terrorism. Organizations and individuals suspected of 
supporting terrorism are guilty until proven innocent.  
 
However, in a major setback to government campaign against the Muslim 
charities in the name of security, on October 22, 2007 a District Judge in Dallas, Texas, 
ordered a mistrial in a show case trial of the leading Muslim charity Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development. After 19 days of deliberations by the jury, 
Judge A. Joe Fish declared a mistrial for most former leaders of HLF charged with 
financing Hamas militants after jurors failed to reach a verdict. One of the defendants, 
former HLF Chairman Mohammed El-Mezain, was acquitted of most charges. 
 
Ghazali (2012) spoke of all the American laws that have been twisted and the 
due-process that has been denied in an apparent bid to stifle any future Muslims from 
ever thinking about equality or competition in what was an accessible American 
political process before the 9/11. The government initiatives have reshaped public 
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attitudes about racial profiling and created a harsh backlash against the Muslim 
community. This negative attitude has increased  since the September 11 attacks. The 
most startling survey revealing this rise in antipathy to date was released in December 
2004 by Cornell University, which found that 44 percent of Americans surveyed 
believed that the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim 
Americans. In June 2006, some New York state legislators attempted to make the 
profiling of Muslims legal. 
 
The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have had a worldwide impact. 
The effect on the Islamic world has been especially complex because the terrorists were 
Muslims. The United States has an estimated six million Muslims; more than half of 
them are Arabs. Muslims living in this country are more educated and tend to have 
higher incomes than average Americans. Unlike Muslim minorities in Europe, 
American Muslims are generally more assimilated into mainstream society. When 
terrorists struck New York and Washington DC, U.S. Muslims were as shocked and 
horrified as other Americans. In addition to coping with terror, many Muslims say they 
had to deal with the pain of being shunned by their fellow Americans.  Nidal Ibrahim 
who is Executive Director of the Arab-American Institute in Washington was reported 
to have said that Muslims would be vulnerable to physical attacks while doing mundane 
things like walking down the road.  
 
2.5     The Spread of Islam in the USA                                 
Most historians now agree, it is possible that there has been an Islamic presence 
in the Americas from the nation’s earliest years, some of them point to Muslim 
preachers (as conquerors, merchants and scholars) fanned out across West Africa 
several hundred years before any Christians arrived. Siddiqi (2000) mentioned in his 
brief report about the history of Islam in the U.S. that there have been some discussions 
among scholars and historians that there may have been some Muslims in America long 
before the African slaves arrived in the early 17th century.   
Based on the fact that Muslims in the region of West Africa were very 
successful in converting the people of the area between the Senegal and Gambia 
Rivers into their faith, and since the vast numbers of Africans from this region were 
enslaved and shipped west, Muwakkil (2002) stated that 10 to 25 percent of all 
enslaved Africans shipped to the Americas from the 17th to 19th century were 
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Muslims. Barry Fell (1980) a New Zealand archaeologist, had some interesting 
findings. According to Fell, the Pima people in the Southwest US possess a 
vocabulary containing Arabic words. He has found Islamic petrogyphs (rock 
carvings) in places like California; in fact, in Inyo county, one such petrogyph 
contains the following statement in Arabic: "Yasus ben Maria” This phrase 
translates into "Jesus, Son of Mary", which is commonly found in the Holy Quran. 
Fell stated that this petrogyph is old; older than the U.S. In fact, Ivan Van Sertima 
(1976) has published a work in which he provided details of this. In his work, he 
identified 12th and 13th century Chinese documents, which spoke of an "Arab" 
Muslim trade that extended beyond the Atlantic coast of West Africa. There is even 
evidence put forward by Clyde-Ahmad (1977) that the first African –American 
Muslim slaves were brought to a then “Latin America” (present day U.S.) by the 
armies of both Spain and Portugal.(p 23) 
Quick (1996) mentioned that Muslims arrived to the new land, the Americas, 
more than 500 years before Columbus. He related the history of Islam in the 
Americas to the History of Islam in the Caribbean and divided it into four phases. 
The first period was a period of exploration and commerce. During the second 
period they traded in slaveryand sought labour and work in their third period. 
Finally, the fourth period witnessed re-connection with the Muslim world. Quick 
(1996) stated that Al-Masudi (a historian, geographer, philosopher, and natural 
scientist) wrote about a young man of Cordoba named Khashkash Ibn Saeed Ibn 
Aswad who crossed the Atlantic ocean, made contact with people on the other side 
across the sea of darkness, and returned in the year 889 CE. Al-Masudi wrote:(p 27) 
Some people feel that this ocean is the source of all 
oceans and in it there have been many strange happenings. 
We have reported some of them in our book Akhbar az-
Zaman. Adventurers have penetrated it at the risk of their 
lives, some returning safely, others perishing in the attempt. 
One such man was an inhabitant of Andalusia named 
Khashkhash. He was a young man of Cordoba who 
gathered a group of young men and went on a voyage on 
this ocean. After a long time, he returned with a fabulous 
booty. Every Spaniard (Andalusian) knows his story. 
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Another Muslim scientist Abu Abd Allah al-Idrisi (1099-1180CE), the famous 
Arab physician and geographer who established himself in the Arabized court of king 
Roger II of Sicily, made a report in his extensive work “Kitab al-Mamalik wa-l-
Masalik”, in the 12th century, on the journey of a group of seamen who reached the isles 
of the Americas. He wrote: 
A group of seafarers sailed into the sea of darkness 
and fog (the Atlantic Ocean) from Lisbon in order to 
discover what was in it and to what extent were its limits. 
They were a party of eight and they took a boat which was 
loaded with supplies to last them for months. They sailed 
for eleven days until they reached turbulent waters with 
great waves and little light. They thought that they would 
perish so they turned their boat southward and traveled for 
twelve days. They finally reached an island that had people 
and civilization but they were captured and chained for 
three days. On the fourth day, a translator came speaking 
the Arabic language! He translated for the king and asked 
them about their mission. They informed him about 
themselves, then they were returned to their confinement. 
When the westerly wind began to blow, they were put in a 
canoe, blindfolded, and brought to land after three days 
sailing. They were left on the shore with their hands tied 
behind their back. When the next day came, another tribe 
appeared, feeing them and informing that between them and 
their lands was a journey of two months (Quick, 1996 p28). 
 
As proof that Muslims had arrived in the Americas not only for trade or looking 
for a new land to live, but they came as scientists, Quick (1996) illustrated that two 
maps were drawn by Haji Ahmad, a Turkish Muslim map maker of 1559CE. He 
explained that this supports the validity of the theory of a Muslim presence in the 
Americas long before Columbus. In the first one, the Western side, however, was 
mapped so well that it is hard to believe that anyone could have drawn this map, who 
did not have access to maps of people well-traveled in the Americas, especially the 
western coasts. It was drawn on a highly sophisticated spherical projection, which puts 
the map about two centuries ahead of the cartography of that time.  
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 Another map of Florida, based on a French expedition of 1694, shows three 
names that demonstrate an earlier Muslim settlement in that area, they were written as; 
Mayarca(Marjorca), Cadica(Cadiz), and Marracou( Marrakesh). Dr. Quick 
questioned how these names could have been used by people if they had not made 
contact with North African or Andalusian Muslims (Quick, 1996).   
 
In fact, the historian illustrated that some of Columbus’s group were Arabs  and 
among them were many translators. More so, when Columbus arrived on the east coast 
of the Americas he found people speaking Arabic with Arabic names. In his work, Dr. 
Mroueh Youssef (1996) refers to this reality; by saying that many references on the 
Muslim arrival to Americas are available, and he summarizes them in the notes in the 
following section.  
 
2.5.1 Historic documents 
 (Quick, 1996) There are many historic documents that support the argument in 
favor of a historic Muslim presence in the Americas possibly preceding the presence of 
Columbus. Below is a brief description of some of these documents and their 
significance in relation to this argument.  
1.  A Muslim historian and geographer Abu-Hassan Ali Ibn Al-Hussain Al-
Masudi (871-957 CE) wrote in his book Muruj adh-dhahab wa maadin aljawhar 
(The meadows of gold and quarries of jewel) that during the rule of the Muslim 
caliph of Spain, Abdullah Ibn Mohammad (888-912 CE), a Muslim navigator, 
Khashkhash Ibn Saeed Ibn Aswad, from Cordoba, Spain sailed from Delba (Palos) in 
889 CE, crossed the Atlantic, reached an unknown territory (Ard majhoola) and 
returned with fabulous treasures. In Al-Masudi's map of the World there is a large 
area in the ocean of darkness and fog which he referred to as the unknown territory 
(Americas).  
2. A Muslim historian Abu Bakar Ibn Umar Al-Gutiyya narrated that during 
the reign of the Muslim caliph of Spain, Hisham II (976-1009CE), another Muslim 
navigator, Ibn Farrukh, from Granada, sailed from Kadesh (February 999CE) into 
the Atlantic, landed in Gando (Great Canary islands) visiting King Guanariga, and 
continued westward where he saw and named two islands, Capraria and Pluitana. He 
then returned back to Spain in May 999 CE).  
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3. A renowned American historian and linguist, Leo Weiner of Harvard 
University, in his book, Africa and the Discovery of America (1920) wrote that 
Columbus was well aware of the Mandinka presence in the New World and that the 
West African Muslims had spread throughout the Caribbean, Central, South and 
North American territories, including Canada, where they were trading and 
intermarrying with the Iroquois and Algonquin Indians. 
2.5.2 Geographic Explorations 
 (Quick, 1996) In addition to the above-mentioned documents, there are other 
historic documents and books that recount explorations conducted by Muslims who are 
believed to have reached the Americas long before the establishment of the United 
States of America. Below is a brief description of some of these voyages and 
explorations as mentioned in the historic literature.  
1. The famous Muslim geographer and cartographer AL-Sharif AL-Idrisi 
(1099- 1166CE) wrote in his famous book Nuzhat al-mushtaq fi ikhtiraq al-afaq 
(Excursion of the longing one in crossing horizons) that a group of seafarers (from 
North Africa) sailed into the sea of darkness and fog (The Atlantic ocean) from 
Lisbon (Portugal), in order to discover what was in it and what extent were its 
limits. They finally reached an island that had people and cultivation and they met a 
translator who spoke to them in the Arabic language.   
 
2. The Muslim reference books mentioned a well-documented description of 
a journey across the sea of fog and darkness by Shaikh Zayn Eddine Ali Ben Fadhel 
AL-Mazandarani. His journey started from Tarfaya (South Morocco) during the 
reign of the King Abu-Yacoub Sidi Youssef (1286-1307CE) 6th of the Marinid 
dynasty, to Green Island in the Caribbean sea in 1291 CE (690 HE). The details of 
his ocean journey are mentioned in Islamic references, and many Muslim scholars 
are aware of this recorded historical event.  
3. The Muslim historian Chihab Ad-dine Abu-L-Iabbas Ahmad Ben fadhl Al-
umari (1300-1384CE/700-786HE) described in detail the geographical explorations 
beyond the sea of fog and darkness by Mali's sultans in his famous book The 
Pathways of Sights in the Provinces of Kingdoms. 
 
4. Sultan Mansu Kankanmusa (1312-1337 CE) was the world renowned 
Mandinka monarch of the West African Islamic empire of Mali. While traveling to 
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Makkah on his famous Hajj in 1324 CE, he informed the scholars of the Mamluk 
Bahri sultan court (An-Nasir Nasir Edin Muhammad III-1309-1340 CE) in Cairo, 
that his brother, Sultan Abu Bakari I (1285-1312CE) had undertaken two 
expeditions into the Atlantic Ocean. When the sultan did not return to Timbuktu 
from the second voyage of 1311 CE, Mansa Musa became sultan of the empire.  
 
5. Columbus and early Spanish and portuguese explorers were able to 
voyage across the Atlantic (a distance of 2400km) thanks to Muslim geographical 
and navigational information. In particular maps made by Muslim traders, including 
AL-MASUDI (871-957CE) in his book Akhbar Az-zaman (History of the World) 
which is based on material a gathered in Africa and Asia. As a matter of fact, 
Columbus had two Muslim captains during his first transatlantic voyage: Martin 
Alonso Pinzon was the captain of the PINTA, and his brother Vicente Yanez Pinzon 
was the captain of the NINA. They were wealthy, expert ship outfitters who helped 
organize the Columbus expedition and prepared the flagship, SANTA MARIA. They 
did this at their own expense for both commercial and political reasons. The 
PINZON family was related to ABUZAYAN MUHAMMAD III (1362-66 CE), the 
Moroccan sultan of the Marinid dynasty (1196-1465CE). 
 
2.5.3 Arabic (Islamic) Inscriptions 
1. Anthropologists have proven that the Mandinkos under Mansa Musa's 
instructions explored many parts of North America via the Mississippi and other 
river systems. At Four Corners, Arizona, writings show that they even brought 
elephants from Africa to the area 
2. Columbus admitted in his papers that on Monday, October 21, 1492 CE 
while his ship was sailing near Gibara on the north-east coast of Cuba, he saw a 
mosque on top of a beautiful mountain. The ruins of mosques and minarets with 
inscriptions of Quranic verses have been discovered in Cuba, Mexico, Texas and 
Nevada 
 
3. Barry Fell of Harvard University introduced in his book Saga America 
(1980) evidence supporting the arrival, centuries before Columbus, of Muslims from 
North and West Africa. Fell discovered the existence of the Muslim schools at 
Valley of Fire, Allan Springs, Logomarsino, Keyhole, Canyon, Washoe and 
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Hickison Summit Pass (Nevada), Mesa Verde (Colorado), Mimbres Valley (New 
Mexico) and Tipper Canoe (Indiana) dating back to 700-800 CE. Engraved on rocks 
in the arid western U.S, he found texts, diagrams and charts representing the last 
surviving fragments of what was once a system of schools - at both an elementary 
and higher level. The language of instruction was North African Arabic written with 
old Kufic Arabic scripts. The subjects of instruction included writing, reading, 
arithmetic, religion, history, geography, mathematics, astronomy and sea navigation 
Fell (1980). (Quick, 1996). 
 
2.5.4 Phases of Muslim Presence in the Americas 
Nyang (1999) states that “the fact remains that Muslims or persons believed to 
be Muslims visited this part of the world in the pre-Colombian past. He, however, does 
not focus on this point and instead divides the history of Islam in the U.S. into several 
phases. The first phase started in 1312 when Mansa Abu Bakr of Mali is believed to 
have traveled from the Sengambian region of African coast to the Gulf of Mexico. This 
period is ridden with controversy because all parties to the debate do not universally 
accept the evidence.  
The second phase is the period before and after the American Revolution, at this 
period at least ten percent of the African slaves were Muslims. However, it should be 
noted that during this phase, African Muslims had different experiences in the 
Americas. The Africans who were transported to the Portuguese and Spanish-dominated 
regions had greater latitude in the practice of their African religions. During this period 
of time some of Muslim slaves returned to Africa and resettled in Dahomey (now called 
Benin).  
Nyang (1999) says that in North America, the harsh treatment of slaves made 
the survival of Islam problematic. He states that there is no evidence of any African 
Muslim slave family that survived slavery and maintained Islam as a way of life. 
Furthermore, Muslims who made history and were written about either returned to 
Africa or became freed men and converted to Christianity. Additionally, during this 
period of slavery, the survivability of Islam among the slaves was impossible because 
the maintenance of one’s religion presupposes freedom.  
According to Nyang (1999) the third phase began after the American Civil War 
when a wave of Arab immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, began to settle along the 
eastern seaboard and into the heartland of Middle America. Muslim immigrants also 
came from India, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. Likewise, Muslim immigrants came 
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from Central Asia and Ukraine. Most of these immigrants arrived in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. 
The fourth phase began with the coming of the Muslim students in the period 
after World War II. Many of these students remained in the US and became US citizens 
and founded the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North 
America (ISNA) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).  
 
In conclusion, Nyang (1999) summarizes the historical development of Islam in 
the  United States of America in ten points: 
1- Islam has gone through many developmental changes and is now 
here to stay. 
2- Islam as a culture and a community is becoming a part of the 
American religious and cultural landscape. 
3- Muslims are becoming more American and more Muslim in their 
projection of self and group interest. 
4- The proliferation of mosques and schools testifies to the symbolic 
and substantive presence of American Muslims in society. 
5- American Muslims have made progress in securing a niche in the 
United States of America. 
6- American immigrant Muslims must learn to deal with 
sectarianism among Muslims in their new home. 
7- Muslim dietary habits and requirements would gradually sensitize 
non-Muslim Americans to be more sympathetic to their Muslim neighbors. 
8- American Muslims will continue to face a dilemma in terms of 
responding to foreign policy decisions of the United States government. 
9- The institution-building efforts of the Muslims cannot not 
succeed unless Muslims create both national and local structures that reinforce 
and support each other. 
10- American Muslims are vulnerable to both religious and racial 
prejudice because Muslims are drawn from all human colors and nationalities 
around the world. 
In summation, the previous section illustrates that many scholars divide the 
historical presence of Muslims in the Americas into two major phases: before Columbus 
and after Columbus. Most researchers have focused on the latter phase although there is 
evidence that proves Muslims may have arrived in the Americas before Columbus.  
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2.5.5 Early Islamic Centers in America 
The development of Islamic institutions and centers in the United States came 
about slowly because the number of Muslims in proportion to the total population has 
been relatively small (an estimated 30,000 in 1954 and 100,000 in the early 1970s). 
Immigrants who came to amass wealth and return to their homelands were not 
interested in establishing institutions; their allegiance remained with their families at 
home whom they supported financially. 
 
Muslims who decided to settle in the U.S. began to think of developing 
institutions and organizations to preserve and maintain their faith and to instruct their 
children. Individuals in different areas took the initiative: Abdullah Ingram in Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa: Muhammad Omar in Quincy, Massachusetts; and J. Howard in 
Washington, DC. 
The earliest recorded group who organized for communal prayer in private 
homes was in Ross, North Dakota in 1900; by 1920 they had built a mosque. Later they 
became so integrated into the community that they assumed Christian names, married 
Christians and in 1948 the mosque was abandoned. 
In 1919, an Islamic association developed in Highland Park, Michigan, to be 
followed by one in Detroit in 1922, then by the American Muhammedan Society (of 
Tatar origin) in Brooklyn in 1922, the Young Men’s Muslim Association (of Arab 
origin) in Brooklyn in 1923, and the Arab Banner Society of Quincy in 1930. 
2.5.5 American Muslim Organizations 
The end of World War II saw the arrival of large numbers of Muslim students 
from all parts of the Islamic world, on American university campuses. Initially small 
Muslim student associations were established on some campuses. A real effort to set up 
a national organization began in 1963 with the establishment of the Muslim Student 
Association (MSA).  
According to Ali M. M., Muslims in America: The Nation’s Fastest Growing 
Religion – (Washington Report May/June 1996) it was at this time that Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini was expelled from Iran, Maulana Maudoodi was sentenced to death 
in Pakistan, Sayed Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood was jailed and later executed in 
Egypt, the Masjumi Party was banned in Indonesia and the Algerian revolution was 
coming to a head. All of these developments had a very strong reaction among the 
Muslim students in Europe and America.  
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Muslim organizations in American society are many and there are multiple 
branches and various activities had been planned and executed. Some of these 
established organizations began their operations with the arrival of the first Muslim 
immigrants to the United States of America. 
 
The MSA launched an “action plan,” setting up offices across the country with 
initial headquarters in Gary, Indiana. In 1975, the MSA acquired property in Plainsfield, 
Indiana and moved there. This also was the period when the North American Islamic 
Trust (NAIT) was created to hold title to MSA properties such as Islamic centers, the 
American Trust Publications, the International Graphics Press and the Islamic Book 
Service. 
(Basnawi ND) The Muslim organizations in America vary in size and have 
various services according to the surrounding community and its participants. The 
researcher chose a number of large organizations that provide a large variety of services 
and are not just Islamic centers or mosques. The following is a list of the largest Islamic 
organizations in the US:  
Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Main branch) 
Muslim World League (Main branch) 
American Muslim Community 
American Islamic Community Organization 
Islamic Society of North America 
Islamic Circle of North America 
American Islamic Supreme Council 
Islamic Council of North America 
MSA Islamic Information Center 
Association of Muslim youth in America 
Council of Islamic Associations 
Islamic Chamber of Commerce in the United States 
American Institute for Islamic Affairs 
Islamic Waqf in North America 
Islamic Medical Science Foundation (p 7) 
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Of these Islamic organizations, the researcher has selected the largest and most 
active organizations to be studied as a sample for this research.    
 
The MSA launched an “action plan,” setting up offices across the country with 
initial headquarters in Gary, Indiana. In 1975, the MSA acquired property in Plainsfield, 
Indiana and moved there. This also was the period when the North American Islamic 
Trust (NAIT) was created to hold title to MSA properties such as Islamic centers, the 
American Trust Publications, the International Graphics Press and the Islamic Book 
Service. 
 
In 1981 the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was established to deal 
with all aspects of Islamic activity in the country, allowing MSA to concentrate on the 
university campuses. Professional activities are now coordinated through such 
organizations as the American Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the American Muslim 
Engineers and Scientists (AMES), and the Islamic Medical Association (IMA).  
 
The United Muslims of America (UMA) was established in 1982 in the 
aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon; at the time there were no Muslim political 
organizations in the US Some Bay Area Muslims realized the need for a Muslim public 
affairs organization to educate and encourage American Muslims to participate in the 
political system, and to reach out to mainstream Americans and build the bridges of 
understanding between them and the Muslim community.  
 
While there had been attempts to form political action committees, none took 
hold until the late 1980s and early 1990s when Muslim Americans stepped up their 
efforts to gain a foothold in the American political system. By that time, many had 
realized that they risked being socially and politically sidelined or excluded if they did 
not become involved. American Muslim political groups lobbied Congress on behalf of 
Muslim Americans and their issues; educated Muslim American voters; and addressed 
the political concerns and rights of predominantly immigrant and first-generation 
American Muslims, whose interests often remained focused on their home countries. 
Specifically, four major U.S. Muslim organizations emerged during this time: the 
Muslim Political Affairs Council (MPAC), the American Muslim Council (AMC), the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the American Muslim Alliance 
(AMA). 
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2.6 Professional organizations. 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought, an American social sciences 
organization was founded in 1981 is in Herndon, Virginia, near Washington, D.C. It 
sponsors research and scholarships, organizes seminars and conferences, and publishes 
classical and contemporary works including the American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences. The Institute works closely with universities and organizations in North 
America to help with outreach programs aimed at improving the level of information 
and education about Islam.  
The Islamic Medical Association (IMA) was formed in 1967 to provide a forum 
for Muslim health professionals to meet and share relevant information and services 
with others of their community as well as to benefit the Muslim community. IMA 
publishes biannually, The Journal of the Islamic Medical Association and holds a 
national convention annually.  
The Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) was founded in 
1969 to help promote scientific research and application of science based upon Islamic 
principles. It publishes a newsletter and organizes an annual conference.  
The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) was formed in 1972 as a 
professional, academic and educational, and cultural body dedicated to the initiation, 
revitalization, and promotion of Islamic thought. It holds an annual conference and 
several discipline seminars. AMSS, in cooperation with the International Institute of 
Islamic Thought (IIIT), publishes a journal American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 
(AJISS) and a News bulletin. (http://www.discoverthenetworks.org)  
2.6.1 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 
The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is an independent 
international organization and an Islamic forum that supports the work of Muslim 
organizations and needy communities the world over. WAMY's headquarters are based 
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. WAMY has regional as well as various branches in and 
outside Saudi Arabia. Established in 1972, it has presence in 55 countries and an 
associate membership of over 500 youth organizations around the world. WAMY is a 
member of the United Nations NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), and is 
recognized for its vast scope of humanitarian and relief work that encompasses about 
60% of the Muslim World. The objectives of the WAMY are not much different from 
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other Islamic organizations, usually focusing on the identity of Islamic people and how 
to present it to others. The objectives of WAMY are: 
 
● To preserve the identity of Muslim youth and help them overcome the 
problems they face in modern society;  
● To educate and train them in order to become active and positive 
citizens in their countries; 
● To introduce Islam to non-Muslims in its purest form as a 
comprehensive system and a way of life; 
● To assist Muslim organizations all over the world through training, 
communication and cooperation;  
● To establish a relationship of dialogue, understanding and coordination 
between Muslim organizations, Western societies and beyond.  
● Holding international, regional, and local Muslim youth and student 
camps;  
● Help establish Muslim scout groups where possible and coordinate 
with the scout associations in various countries of the world to encourage the 
Muslim youth to benefit from the programs and activities offered; 
● Organizing conferences, symposia, and research circles to address 
youth issues;  
● Publishing books in various languages by capable writers or by 
research teams  on different Islamic issues of importance to the Ummah (Nation) 
and the Muslim youth; 
● Publishing brochures and exhibition materials that best introduce Islam 
to non-Muslims in its holistic vision; 
● Publishing magazines and newsletters that expose WAMY's work and 
achievements around the world; 
● Organizing exchange visits  and pilgrimage trips to Makkah for 
Muslims around the world; 
● Providing financial and moral support to Muslim youth organizations 
to raise the standard of their Islamic work; 
●. Establish humanitarian and educational projects for the benefit of the 
needy Muslim communities in various countries (like building hospitals and 
schools, orphans’ sponsorship, development projects, building mosques, digging 
wells etc.). WAMY website. 
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 2.6.2 The Muslim World League (MWL) 
The Muslim World League has its headquarters in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. It is a 
broad, international, nongovernmental Islamic organization engaged in the propagation 
of Islam. Its work encompasses: the elucidation of the principles and teachings of Islam, 
refuting dubious statements and false allegations against the religion, persuading people 
to obey the commandments of Islam, providing necessary assistance to solve problems 
facing Muslims and non-Muslims and helping to carry out projects that include the 
dissemination of the religion, education and culture. It also opposes violence and 
terrorism and promotes constructive dialogue with other faiths and religions.   
 
The MWL, which was established in 1962 has the following objectives: 
● Expounding the merits of the application of the Islamic Law; 
● Coordinating the efforts of Islamic preachers the word over; 
● Developing methods of propagation compatible with the dictates of the Holy 
Quran and the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammad sayings); 
● Improving the productivity of the mass media, Islamic propagation, education 
and culture; 
● Holding symposia, conferences, seminars, workshops, rehabilitation and 
refresher courses; 
● Bringing intellectuals and opinion leaders together during the pilgrimage 
season and at many other times; with the aim of fostering closer relations among 
them, and urging them to develop practical methods of raising the standards of 
Muslims in the world; 
● Overseeing the activities of the Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) council and 
supporting it with the needs to find Islamic solutions to contemporary problems; 
● Subsidizing activities that aim at spreading Arabic and upgrading the standing 
of teaching the language both to Arabs and non-Arabs; 
● Setting up branch offices as well as Islamic centers to serve the cause of 
Islam; 
● Extending urgent relief to Muslims affected by wars and national disasters; 
● Augmenting the activities of mosques and providing assistance for their 
construction. (http://www.themwl.org/Profile/default.aspx?l=Ar)  
 
The MWL is represented in a number of international organizations, among 
which are: 
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● United Nations where it enjoys a category (A) observer status as well as 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECO-SOC) 
● United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) as a member. 
 
The Muslim World League (MWL) has bodies affiliated with the (MWL) and 
these organizations are: 
 ● The General Islamic Conference                
 ● The Constituent Council 
 ● The World Supreme Council for Mosques  
 ● The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) council  
 ● International Islamic Relief Organization  
● Commission on Scientific Signs in the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah  
● Makkah Charity Foundation 
 ● Al-HaramainAl-Aqsa Charity Foundation 
 
2.6.3 The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR). 
The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a non-profit, grassroots 
membership organization. It has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and chapters 
across the US. CAIR was established to promote a positive image of Islam and Muslims 
in America. The organization believes misrepresentations of Islam are most often the 
result of ignorance on the part of non-Muslims and reluctance on the part of Muslims to 
articulate their case. CAIR’s mission is dedicated to presenting an Islamic perspective 
on issues of importance to the American public. In offering that perspective, it seeks to 
empower the Muslim community in America through political and social activities to 
help shape a positive image of Islam. To achieve this goal, the organization works 
closely with media professionals around America. CAIR activists also monitor the local, 
national and international media to challenge negative stereotypes of Islam and 
Muslims. CAIRfor  uses three channels to achieve its goals: conferences, seminars, and 
publications. CAIR organizes conferences and seminars for media professionals, 
government officials and the academic community. These events are designed to present 
otherwise unavailable information about Islam and Muslims. A variety of publications 
addressing the needs of Muslims in America are offered to opinion leaders and the 
public. It also publishes a quarterly newsletter Faith In Action. CAIR also produces 
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practical handbooks, such as "Hajj and Ramadan Publicity Kits," for use by Muslim 
leaders and activists. 
 
Other activities of the organizations include: seminars, workshops, conferences, 
charities events, scholarships, sponsorships, fundraising, local set upand community 
education.  
 
2.7 September 11: Review of Event, Story and Analysis.  
2.7.1. History  
Since September 11, 2001 , a variety of theories regarding the 9/11 attacks have 
 been put forward in websites, books, and films. Many groups and individuals 
advocating 9/11 conspiracy theories identify as part of the 9/11 Truth Movement. 
Unlike conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana, 9/11 conspiracy theories 
did not emerge immediately after the event. Indeed, most professional conspiracy 
theorists in the United States appeared to be as shocked as the rest of the population. 
The early  theories that emerged focused primarily on various anomalies in the publicly 
available evidence, and proponents later developed more specific theories about an 
alleged plot. One allegation that was widely circulated by email and on the Web, is that 
not a single Jew had been killed in the attack and that attacks must have been the work 
of the Mossad, not Islamic terrorists.  
 
By 2004, conspiracy theories about the September 11 attacks began to gain 
ground in the United States. One explanation for the increase in conspiracy theory 
popularity was growing criticism of the Iraq War and the presidency of George W. 
Bush, who had been reelected in 2004. Furthermore, there were revelations of spin 
doctoring and lying by federal officials, such as the claims about the existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the belated release of the President's Daily Brief of 
August 6, 2001 and reports that NORAD had lied to the 9/11 Commission, may have 
fuelled the conspiracy theories. In the commission's report, contradictions were ignored, 
and no military or civilian official was reprimanded. 
 
Between 2004 and the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks in 2006, 
mainstream coverage of the conspiracy theories increased.  Reacting to the growing 
publicity, the U.S. government issued responses to the theories, including a formal 
analysis by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) about the 
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collapse of the World Trade Center, a revised 2006 State Department webpage to 
debunk the theories, and a strategy paper referred to by President Bush in an August 
2006 speech, which declared that terrorism springs from "subcultures of conspiracy and 
misinformation," and that "terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose 
information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy 
theories.  
An August 2007 Zogby poll, founded by John Zogby 
(http://jzanalytics.com/johnzogby.html) commissioned by 911Truth.org found that 
63.6% of Americans believe that Arab fundamentalists were responsible for 9/11 while 
26.4% believed that "certain elements in the U.S. government knew the attacks were 
coming but consciously let them proceed for various political, military and economic 
reasons" and 4.8% of them believed that "certain U.S. Government elements actively 
planned or assisted some aspects of the attacks."  In 2008, 9/11 conspiracy theories 
topped a "greatest conspiracy theory” list compiled by The Daily Telegraph. The list 
was based on following and traction. Mainstream coverage generally presents these 
theories as a cultural phenomenon and is often critical of their content. 
2.7.2 Conspiracy Theories 
Most 9/11 conspiracy theories generally originate from dissatisfaction with the 
mainstream account of 9/11. Less extensive theories allege that official reports have 
covered up incompetence or negligence from U.S. personnel or the Bush 
Administration, or involvement of a foreign government or organization other than Al-
Qaeda. The most prevalent theories can be broadly divided into two main forms: 
Let It Happen On Purpose (LIHOP) suggests that key individuals within the 
government had at least some foreknowledge of the attacks and deliberately ignored 
them or actively weakened America's defenses to ensure the hijacked flights were not 
intercepted.  
 
MIHOP ("made it happen on purpose") - that key individuals within the 
government planned the attacks and collaborated with or framed, Al-Qaeda in carrying 
them out. There is a range of opinions about how this might have been achieved.  
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2.8  Main Conspiracy Theories Related to 9/11 
2.8.1  Foreknowledge 
One popular conspiracy theory maintains that The North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) did not deploy fighter jets to allow the hijacked airplanes 
to reach their targets without interference. According to this theory, NORAD had the 
capability of locating and intercepting planes on 9/11, and its failure to do so indicates a 
government conspiracy to allow the attacks to occur.  
2.8.2 World Trade Center Collapse 
The controlled demolition conspiracy theories claim that the collapse of the 
North Tower, South Tower and 7 World Trade Center was not caused by the plane crash 
damage, nor by resulting fire damage, but by explosives installed in the buildings in 
advance. It is rejected by the mainstream media and the engineering community. 
2.8.3 The Pentagon 
According to some theories, the U.S. administration deliberately chose not to 
shoot down a plane that was heading for the Pentagon, while others contend that no 
plane hit the Pentagon at all. 
 
2.8.4 Flight 93 
The fourth plane hijacked on 9/11, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in an open 
field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after the passengers revolted. Out of the four 
planes hijacked on that day, it was the only one that did not reach its target. One of the 
popular conspiracy theories surrounding this event is that Flight 93 was actually shot 
down by a U.S. fighter jet.  
2.8.5 Hijackers 
During the initial confusion surrounding the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the BBC published the names and identities of some of the hijackers. Although 
this story was superseded by subsequent reporting, the original story has been cited as 
evidence that the 9/11 attacks were part of a US government conspiracy. The BBC 
explained that this confusion may have arisen because the names they reported back in 
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2001 were common Arabic and Islamic names. In response to a request from the BBC, 
the FBI stated: 
“The FBI is confident that it has positively identified the nineteen 
hijackers responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, the 9/11 investigation 
was thoroughly reviewed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States and the House and Senate Joint Inquiry. Neither of these 
reviews ever raised the issue of doubt about the identity of the nineteen 
hijackers.” (BBC.com) 
 
According to the Managing Editor John Bradley of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the 
only public information about the hijackers was a list of names issued by the FBI on 
September 14, 2001. When the FBI released photographs four days after the cited 
reports on September 27, the mistaken identities were quickly resolved. According to 
Bradley, "all of this is attributable to the chaos that prevailed during the first few days 
following the attack. What we're dealing with are coincidentally identical names." In 
Saudi Arabia, says Bradley, the names of two of the allegedly surviving attackers, Said 
al-Ghamdi and Walid al-Shari, are "as common as John Smith in the United States or 
Great Britain."  
2.8.6 Phone Calls 
After 9/11, cellular experts said that they were surprised calls were able to be 
placed from the hijacked planes, and that they lasted as long as they did. They said that 
the only reason that the calls went through in the first place is that the aircraft were 
flying so close to the ground.  
 
2.8.7 Jewish and Israeli involvement 
There are theories that 9/11 was part of an international Jewish conspiracy. 
Another myth popular with 9/11 conspiracy theorists is that 4,000 Jewish employees 
skipped work at the World Trade Center on September 11. This was first reported on 
September 17 by the Lebanese-Hezbollah-owned satellite television channel Al-Manar 
and is believed to be based on the September 12 edition of the Jerusalem Post that 
stated "The Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem has so far received the names of 4,000 
Israelis believed to have been in the areas of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
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at the time of the attacks." Both turned out to be incorrect; the number of Jews who died 
in the attacks is variously estimated at between 270 to 400.  
2.9 Other Theories 
2.9.1 Cover-up Allegations 
Conspiracy theorists say they detect a pattern of behavior on the part of officials 
investigating the September 11 attack meant to suppress the emergence of evidence that 
might contradict the mainstream account. 
2.9.2 Cockpit recorders 
9/11 Commission Report (2002) Thomas H. Kean ( According to the 9/11 
Commission Report, the cockpit voice recorders (CVR) or flight data recorders (FDR) 
(commonly known as "black boxes") from Flights 11 and 175 were not recovered from 
the remains of the WTC attack; however, two men, Michael Bellone and Nicholas 
DeMasi, who worked extensively in the wreckage of the World Trade Center, stated in 
the book Behind-The-Scenes: Ground Zer that they helped federal agents find three of 
the four "black boxes" from the jetliners. (9/11 Commission Report (2002) 
 
“At one point it was assigned to take Federal Agents around the site to 
search for the black boxes from the planes. We were getting ready to go out. My 
ATV was parked at the top of the stairs at the Brooks Brothers entrance area. We 
loaded up about a million dollars worth of equipment and strapped it into the 
ATV. There were a total of four black boxes. We found three." 
  
According to the 9/11 Commission Report both black boxes from Flight 77 and 
both black boxes from Flight 93 were recovered. However, the CVR from Flight 77 was 
said to be too damaged to yield any data. On April 18, 2002, the FBI allowed the 
families of victims from Flight 93 to listen to the voice recordings. In April 2006, a 
transcript of the CVR was released as part of the Zacarias Moussaoui trial. Some 
conspiracy theorists do not believe that the black boxes were damaged and that instead 
there has been a cover up of evidence. 
2.9.3 Bin Laden Tapes 
A series of interviews, audio and videotapes have been released since the 9/11 
attacks were reported to be produced by Osama bin Laden. At first the speaker denied 
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responsibility for the attacks but over the years has taken increasing responsibility for 
them culminating in a November 2007 audiotape in which the speaker claimed sole 
responsibility for the attacks and denied the Taliban and the Afghan government or 
people had any prior knowledge of the attacks. According to the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the speaker was most likely Osama bin Laden. Some 
observers, especially people in the Muslim world, doubt the authenticity of the tape.  
2.9.4 Foreign Governments 
There are other conspiracy theories that claim that while Al-Qaeda is mostly 
responsible for the attacks, Pakistan, Israel or Saudi Arabia also played a role in the 
attacks but this was deliberately overlooked by the official investigation for political 
reasons. 
There is an enormous quantity of literature on the 9/11 conspiracies. The 
Internet has thousands of such write-ups from various individuals and organizations. 
One particular site, http://www.keithhunt.com/Conspi14  under the web page entitled 
Restitution of All Things listed some of the opinions. These opinions are common on 
almost all web pages discussing the theories. Some are rather outlandish, others are 
rather bizarre. In order to have an overview of the types of theories put forward by all 
those interested in the conspiracy theories, the researcher  has chosen Keith Hunt’s web 
page as the representative compiler of the theories.  
2.9.5 Motives: Pax Americana. 
David Ray (2013) there is the suggestion that the U.S. government  may have 
carried out the attacks. This was first articulated in the Defense Planning Guidance of 
1992, drafted by Paul Wolfowitz on behalf of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 
in a document that has been called "a blueprint for permanent American global 
hegemony." 
Taibbi (2008) argued that this was "taken completely out of context", and that 
the "transformation" referenced in the paper was explicitly stated to be a decades-long 
process to turn the Cold War-era military into a "new, modern military" which could 
deal with more localized conflicts. He further ridiculed this position by pointing out 
that, for this to be evidence of motive, that either those responsible decided to openly 
state their objectives, or read the paper in 2000 and quickly laid the groundwork for the 
9/11 attacks using it as inspiration. In either case, he argued that this is a form of 
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"defiant unfamiliarity with the actual character of America's ruling class" and 
constitutes part of a "completely and utterly retarded" narrative to explain the attacks.  
2.9.6 Invasions 
Other conspiracy theories claim that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 
2003 invasion of Iraq were both planned before 9/11.  
Conspiracy theorists have questioned whether  oil and 9/11 provided the United 
States and the United Kingdom with a reason to launch a war they had wanted for some 
time. They suggest that this provided the two countries with a strong motive for either 
carrying out the attacks, or allowing them to take place.  
2.9.7 Suggested Historical Precedents  
Charlie Sheen and others (ND) The Hunt website also mentioned how Time 
magazine compared the events of 9/11 and the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 
terms of how each event inspired conspiracy theories. Whereas the assassination of 
Kennedy was a small-scale event, millions of people all around the world witnessed the 
attack on the World Trade Center and the event was widely documented in videos and 
photos. Time magazine explained that "there is no event so plain and clear that a 
determined human being can't find ambiguity in it."  
2.9.8 Criticism 
Charlie Sheen and others (ND) at the end of his essay, reminded the readers that 
critics of these conspiracy theories say they are “a form of conspiracism common 
throughout history after a traumatic event in which conspiracy theories emerge as a 
mythic form of explanation.” Another  criticism is offered by a form of research on 
which the theories are based such as the one undertaken by Thomas W. Eagar (2001), 
an engineering professor at MIT. He implied that they "use the 'reverse scientific 
method'.” Proponents of such theories usually begin with trying to ascertain what had 
happened, eliminate data that do not conform to their findings, and then conclude that 
their deductions are the only explanations for the phenemenon. Eagar's criticisms (9-
11Research.com) also exemplify a common stance that the theories are best ignored.  
 
Michael Shermer, the founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine 
(www.skeptic.com) and columnist for Scientific American, said: "The mistaken belief 
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that a handful of unexplained anomalies can undermine a well-established theory lies at 
the heart of all conspiratorial thinking.  All the evidence for a 9/11 conspiracy falls 
under the various spins of this fallacy. Such notions are easily refuted by noting that 
scientific theories are not built on single facts alone but on a convergence of evidence 
assembled from multiple lines of questions and answers. Scientific American, Popular 
Mechanics, and Skeptic magazines have published articles questioning various 9/11 
conspiracy theories such as the investigative article on the 9/11 “Truth Movement.” 
Believers of these conspiracy theories have attacked the contribution to the Popular 
Mechanics article by senior researcher Ben Chertoff whom they suspected of being 
related to a high ranking officer with Homeland Security. Popular Mechanics has 
published a book entitled Debunking 9/11 Myths (http://www.debunking911.com and 
http://www.jod911.com) that expands upon the research findings that were presented in 
the earlier publication. U.S. Senator John McCain provided a foreword to the book in 
which he wrote that blaming the U.S. government for the events of 9/11 "mars the 
memories of all those lost on that day" and "exploits the public's anger and sadness. It 
shakes Americans' faith in their government at a time when that faith is already near an 
all-time low. It trafficks in ugly, unfounded accusations of extraordinary evil against 
fellow Americans."  
 
Roger Sauer (2010) dismissed 9/11 conspiracy theories as a "panoply of the 
absurd" stating that "as diverse as these theories and their adherents may be, they share 
a basic thought pattern: great tragedies must have great reasons." David Ray Griffin has 
published a book entitled Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular 
Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory, and Jim Hoffman 
has written an article called 'Popular Mechanics Assault on 9/11 Truth" in which he 
attacks the methods Popular Mechanics used in forming their arguments. 
 
Journalist Matt Taibbi (2008) in his book The Great Derangemen discusses 9/11 
conspiracy theories as symptomatic of what he calls the "derangement" of American 
society; a disconnection from reality due to widespread "disgust with our political 
system." He drew a  parallel with the Charismatic Movement, and opined that both 
"chose to battle bugbears that were completely idiotic, fanciful, and imaginary," instead 
of taking control of their own establishment and their lives.  Taibbi however felt that the 
9/11 conspiracy theories are different from "Clinton-era black-helicopter paranoia" and 
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constitute more than "a small, scattered group of nutcases they really were, just as they 
claim to be, almost everyone you meet."  
Hunt also reported that other writers such as historian Kenneth J. Dillon argued 
that 9/11 conspiracy theories represent an overly easy target “for skeptics and that their 
criticisms obfuscate the underlying issue of what actually happened if there wasn't a 
conspiracy.” He emphasized the possibility that these theories were so widespread 
because they were developed with the intention to divert attention to the possible act of 
criminal negligence on the part of the president and vice president, who were kept 
informed and repeatedly warned, followed by a cover-up conspiracy after 9/11.  
British historian Antony Beevor wrote in January 2009 that "studies of internet 
sites reveal an unholy alliance between left-wing 9/11 conspiracy theorists, right-wing 
Holocaust deniers and Islamic fundamentalists." He claimed that 9/11 and other 
conspiracy theories are a result of a "Wikipedia-age" phenomenon that author Damian 
Thompson dubbed "counterknowledge."  
 
David Aaronovitch, a columnist for The Times, in his book entitled Voodoo 
Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History that was 
published as an audio version in 2010, wrote that the theories are impossible to 
comprehend and are ridiculous. 
 
The report by Keith Hunt(2010) http://www.keithhunt.com/Conspi14.html) 
which was accessed on 18 March 2010 has certainly provided a wide overview of the 
conspiracy theories. Other theories that were not mentioned include those related to the 
drug cartels, motives of the Pax Americana and the oil factor. 
 
Although the researcher is a skeptic with regard to the conspiracy theories, he 
could not exclude the theories altogether. There are many researchers inside the U.S. 
and outside who deeply believe that there is something not truly transparent about 9/11. 
Whether this assumption is right or not, the researcher simply believes that the dramatic 
events of 9/11 had a negative impact on the presence of Islam in America and 
contributed to the negative image of Muslims worldwide. Due to this unfortunate turn 
of events, the Islamic charity organizations have been affected most seriously by the 
aftermath of these tragic events. 
2.9.9 The Importance of Uncovering the Truth About September 11  
64 
 
The events of 9/11 are the pretext being used to justify a war that will not end in 
our lifetime, being waged in preemptive interventions in over 50 countries. Yet, more 
than ten years after the event we still do not have a full and formal account of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. 
 
Ajamu Baraka (2010) An extensive body of evidence and well-documented 
analysis has called into question the official story. Furthermore, the extreme responses 
that followed 9/11 raise questions about the U.S. Administration's ongoing obstruction 
and delay of a full and impartial investigation that searches for the truth and demands 
accountability.  
 
Fundamental baseline questions articulated by 9/11 CitizensWatch 
(washingtonpeacecenter.net/pla_911- US) include:  
1. Why in the months before 9/11 did FBI headquarters consistently 
obstruct field agent investigations of potential terrorists or terrorist financiers?  
2. Why were many detailed warnings from the intelligence services 
of Britain, Germany, Israel, Egypt, Russia, Italy, and other foreign governments 
ignored?  
3. Why were some prominent travelers warned not to fly on 9/11?  
4. Why in the days immediately before 9/11 were there massive 
spikes in the number of "puts" on the stocks of airline and insurance companies?  
5. Why in the wake of the most cataclysmic intelligence and air 
defense failures in American history have no government officials or Pentagon 
brass been held accountable for the September 11 tragedy?  
6. Why, in the wake of the most cataclysmic intelligence and air 
defense failures in American history, have responsible government officials and 
Pentagon brass been rewarded with promotions?  
7. Why did the Bush/Cheney Administration for over a year 
stonewall victims' family members demands for a full independent 
investigation?  
8. Why, after 9/11, are new government contracts being issued to 
private government contractors who have never been accountable for $3.3 
trillion of "undocumentable adjustments" in the accounting and information 
systems they manage?   
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9. Were all the 19 suspects named and pictured by the FBI in press 
reports actually on the planes on 9/11? Eight people came forward in Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia after the incident claiming that the pictures and names listed were 
their own, but they were still alive and not aboard the planes. Was the source of 
that support for the mujehaddin and Al-Qaeda primarily American CIA funding, 
Saudi Arabian funding, and opium funding? (Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, 
America and International Terrorism by John Cooley, 2002)  
10. What is the actual history of the movements and relations of the 
19 suspects inside and outside the United States in the years prior to the attack? 
11. Were or are there existing or ongoing connections between Bin 
Laden, his family and President Bush, his father, and their corporate and 
administrative allies and friends?  
12. What was the relationship of major oil companies who provided 
key figures in both Bush administrations, and their suppliers (Unocal, 
Haliburton, Enron companies) to the Taliban? Did the refusal of the Taliban to 
accommodate a planned oil pipeline through Afghanistan lead to plans for their 
removal that predated 9/11?.  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
      Mohammed R. Kroessin (ND)   The terrorist threat is real, yet Islamic 
charities are not guilty by default. Nonetheless, both the lack of support for Islamic 
charities to help them address their shortcomings in transparency and accountability and 
the rhetoric about their funding for terrorism contribute to their inability to fulfill their 
social roles. For example, the Humanitarian Forum was initiated in June 2004 to help 
foster partnerships and facilitate closer cooperation between Western humanitarian 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Muslim-majority 
countries. Islamic Relief, which has been unaffected by the drop in funding experienced 
by other British Muslim charities, consulted a wide spectrum of international and 
Muslim NGOs. This highlighted the need for action and proactive change within the 
Islamic charity sector, with external help where necessary. 
 
The way forward is to enable a more open and informed debate about the 
Muslim charity sector. Islamic NGOs must be seen as partners, not enemies, in 
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combating both terror and the roots of terrorism. To do this job effectively, their 
vilification must end, and they must be helped to better engage with the mainstream 
humanitarian community, since their contribution to relief and development is 
considerable. The ill-directed ‘War on Terror’ only makes the problem more deep-
rooted, whilst the victims of today’s greatest evil, poverty, remain unaided.  
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the methodology in terms of the 
selection of cases to study, data collection procedures, methods of data analysis, etc. 
This chapter aims to determine the most suitable methods to study and analyze the 
impact of 9/11 events on Islamic non-profit organizations in the U.S. According to the 
norms of social research, two methodological approaches are generally employed in this 
kind of research: qualitative and quantitative. For the current study, the researcher will 
use both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. Methods of data collection 
used here include: interviews, content analysis, questionnaire, and analyses of 
documentary evidence.  
 
3.1 Research Approach 
According to a number of researchers, there are four main approaches to 
academic research these are: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, and predicative 
approaches (Saunders et al., 2007: Ryan et al., 1992).  
 
Due to the fact that this study attempts to shed light on a complicated and multi-
phase phenomenon, a qualitative research approach will be employed using collective or 
multiple case studies as methodology. Furthermore, this research will try to analyze 
social phenomena after collecting data through interviews with relevant personnel, 
questionnaires and the analysis of media content including articles and news stories. 
Therefore, it can be said that the study will use a combined descriptive and exploratory 
methodology. 
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3.2 Collective Case Study 
Case studies usually focus on analyzing one case, or a small number of cases, 
which will be studied in depth and detail. As Punch (1998) argued, the main objective 
behind using a case study is to develop deep understanding of that case. Thus, it focuses 
on the study of a “single unit of analysis”, such as a company, a group of workers, an 
event, a process or an individual (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). As a result, detailed 
information will be obtained from the “unit of analysis’ allowing for the acquisition of 
“in-depth knowledge”. Thus, a well-constructed case study can enable researchers either 
to challenge an existing theory or to provide a source of new research questions 
(Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
Using of collective case studies can include documentary analysis, interviews, 
and observation. Yin (1994) noted that one of the main characteristics of case study 
research is the use of multiple methods for gathering data, which may be qualitative or 
quantitative. Collective case studies are sometimes called descriptive case studies which 
are used to describe phenomena in the real life context in which they occur ( Yin, 2003).  
 
However, Hussey and Hussey (1997) point out that one the limitation of the case 
study as an instument is the difficulty to get access to certain organizations to conduct the 
study.  In addition, it is also difficult to define the boundaries of the study due to difficulty 
in understanding the facts during a particular period (Yin, 1993). To overcome this 
difficulty, the researcher visited the relevant organizations and used his personal 
relations to collect data through his friends who live in the United States.  
3.2.1 Generalizability 
One of the main criticisms of the case study instrument is what is known as 
generalizability; i.e. how focusing on a single sample or even multiple samples can be 
representative so that it might produce findings that can be applied more generally to 
other cases (Bryman. 2008). In answer to this, Yin (2003) argued that "the important 
point is not whether the case study findings can be widely generalized, but how well the 
researchers generate theory out of the findings.” In this regard, researchers may 
generalise by using findings from comparable cases investigated by others. Here the 
resarcher will take advantage of adopting collective case studies to solicit data which 
will be supported by content analysis in order to obtain reliable findings.  
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3.2.2 Validity 
The establishment of validity is problematic due to subjectivity of the 
researcher. In order to solve such a problem, Yin (1994) suggested the use of multiple 
sources of evidence, the construction of a chain of evidence, and the use of a draft case 
study reviewed by key informants.  
 
According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003), the validity of findings implies both 
correct and precise analysis. Thus, there are two dimensions to assess validity. The first, 
internal validity, which is concerned with explanatory cases where the problem is a 
deduction of case studies, can be managed through the use of diverse data from the case 
and then linking to some theoretical proposition. This is actually what the researcher 
did, when he used diverse data from diverse sources such as organizations, media, and 
individuals. For media the researcher used articles published in representatives of the 
most popular media in the United States; The Washington Post and CNN. Other media 
were also used in some relevant context to consolidate the outcomes of the study.    
3.2.3 Reliability 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), reliability  refers to the extent to which the 
techniques of data collection used will produce consistent findings. It is mainly centered 
on the consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different 
observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Silverman, 2005, p.220).  
 
Regarding case study, Yin (l994; p.64-65) proposed the use of a case study 
protocol in order to make sure that the reliability of the case study research is 
maintained. Thus, he suggested the following protocols:  
 The overview of the case study should include the research questions and 
the purpose of the case study;  
 Data collection procedures should contain organizing data collection 
activities and planning for unexpected events;  
 Case study questions should be carefully designed, particularly the key 
questions that the researcher should consider during the data collection process;  
 There should be an outline to conduct the case study report. 
Regarding the current study, the researcher has taken into account all these 
techniques in order to accomplish the research before the data collection phase. 
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3.3 Data Collection Methods 
It is important to determine the techniques that will be used for data collection. 
This will help the researcher to conclude findings and thus be able to answer the 
research questions. In qualitative research, the most common methods used for 
collecting data are: observations, interviews, group discussions, narratives, and the 
analyses of documentary evidence.  
3.3.1 Questionnaire   
A questionnaire is an instrument that consists of a number of questions  
addressed to a number of participants to obtain relevant information which can be 
statistically arranged and analyzed. Questionnaires are effective tools in collecting data 
especially when properly constructed and responsibly administered. They can be used to 
target specific groups of people or entire populations. 
 
Questionnaires are mainly used for various types of social science research such 
as the current one. The researcher considers it as the most important tool for collecting a 
wide range of information from a large number of individuals, which include average 
persons, managers, and ordinary employees. The researcher takes into account the 
importance of constructing a good questionnaire by ruling out inappropriate questions, 
incorrect ordering of questions, incorrect scaling, or bad questionnaire format that may 
negatively affect the survey values.  
Questions were carefully constructed taking into account the following: 
1- Questions are consistent with the main questions of the research; 
2- All questions contribute to the objectives of the research; 
3- Respondents were given enough information and time to answer 
the questions truthfully;   
4-  The wording was written in simple language- in case of Saudi 
based organizations the questions were written in Arabic and later translated into 
English;  
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5- Biased questions or those designed to encourage respondents to 
answer one way rather than another were ruled out; 
6- The questions were designed according to the statistical data 
analysis techniques available; 
7- Likert Scale was used to generate data from responses.  
Likert scale (Wuensch, Karl L. 2005) is a type of scale which is commonly used 
in questionnaires and is the most widely used scale in survey research. In this type of 
scale respondents specify their level of agreement to a statement.  
In this study five ordered response levels are used in the following format: 
1. Strongly disagree,  
2. Disagree, 
3. Indifferent ( i.e. neither agree nor disagree),   
4. Agree,  
5. Strongly agree.  
The demographic questions were composed of five questions and preceded the 
questionnaire in order to form a kind of background of the respondents. The 
demographic questions include:  
1- Educational background  
2- Age  
3- Occupation, 
4- Position in the organization 
5- Activities within the organization 
 
The questionnaire was designed to cover the key areas which are relevant to the 
main objectives of the study and in order to answer the first and second research 
questions which are: Q1: What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic 
community in general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular? Q2: 
What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations ? 
 
The areas covered in the questionnaire were as follows: 
1- The negative and positive impact of September 11 on non- profit 
Islamic organizations;  
2- Type of activities that have been affected most;  
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3- The role of organizations in introducing Islam in a better way and 
in correcting stereotypes and distorted images of Islam;  
4- The role of Islamic organizations in serving Muslim 
communities;  
5- Management systems of these organizations;  
6- Organization needs in order to vitalize their role. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
An interview is an instrument that involves the collection of data through using 
either face-to-face meetings or using of phone calls, emails, Internet, and so on. When 
conducting an interview, the interviewer tries to obtain data or opinions from the 
interviewee strongly related to the research questions and objectives (Ghauri and 
Gronhaugh, 2005: Saunders et al., 2007). In this study, interviews were used to help 
answer the first two research questions:  
1-  What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in general and 
on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular?  
2- What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic 
organizations? 
 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), interviews can be arranged according to 
level or formality and structure, as described hereunder:  
a) Structured: Structured interviews are based on a predetermined or standard 
set of questions, which are designed to obtain fixed responses from specific categories 
and systematic samples. They are used to collect quantifiable data; they are usually 
employed in quantitative research interviews.  
b) Semi-structured: This type of interview allows both the interviewer and 
interviewee to explore unexpected topics because of the flexible structure (Mason, 
2002). Here, the interviewer uses a list of questions and issues to be tackled; but these 
questions may be changed or increased according to the circumstances of any interview. 
Data may be recorded by audio recording or by note taking. 
c) Unstructured or in-depth interviews: This kind of interview does not follow 
any prepared framework, and it helps the researcher to explore a particular issue in depth. 
Meanwhile, it allows respondents the freedom to discuss any topic according to their own 
thoughts (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005).  
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The main difference between semi-structured, non-structured and structured 
interviews is that semi-structured and non-structured interviews depend mainly on the 
researcher's skills. However, structured interviews depend on the uniformity of the 
interviewer behavior that allows him or her to direct the interview in certain situations. 
In the current study the researcher adopted the semi and in-depth interview style which 
was intended to gather qualitative data that fits in with cases of study methodology.  
The interviewees included managers of the three organizations and details of 
how the interviews were conducted are as follows:  
 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY): The 
researcher formulated the questions around the main topic which was: How did 
the events of September 11 affect your organization? He then requested a 
meeting with the Secretary General of the organization, Dr. Saleh Al Waheebi, 
who agreed to meet the researcher at the organization’s headquarters in Riyadh. 
The interview lasted 15 minutes during which the researcher probed the 
interviewee about the impact of 9/11 on the organization. The interviewee was 
highly cooperative and answered all the questions fully and also provided a great 
deal of background information in the form of the organization’s annual reports 
and comparisons of its activities for five years before and five years after 9/11. 
As for the questionnaires, the researcher distributed them himself among the 
participants and collected the questionnaires after they were answered.   
 The Muslim World League (MWL): In the case of MWL it was 
more difficult obtaining an interview with the Secretary General, Abdul Rahman 
Al Zayd, as he was occupied with a great deal of work and work-related travel. 
However, the researcher was finally able to obtain an interview for 10-15 
minutes at the MWL headquarters in Makkah. There the researcher had the 
opportunity to conduct a face-to-face interview and also received a great deal of 
information about the organization as well as its publications, annual reports and 
periodicals. As for the questionnaires, the researcher distributed them himself 
among the participants and collected the questionnaires after they were 
answered.  
 The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR): Due to the 
fact that CAIR is located in the U.S., the researcher conducted the interview via 
telephone. As for the questionnaires, he mailed the questionnaires to a friend in 
the U.S. who then undertook distributing them among the participants.  
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3.3.3 Content Analysis   
In this study, content analysis is used to analyze all types of information that 
appear in the American media with special emphasis on The Washington Post  and 
CNN. Thus, content analysis was used to answer research question 3: What is the 
content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to Islam, Muslims and Islamic 
nonprofit organizations? 
 
Stories, articles, editorials were scrutinized and analyzed within the scope of this 
study. The analysis consists of counting and classifying types of content. When the 
researcher gathered information about the entire topic of 9/11 events a large number of 
pages were collected from both electronic and hard copies. The bulk of the analysis 
focused on each content item in depth. The researcher analyzed each story in terms of 
characteristics such as topic, sources, integrity of coverage, and geographic focus.  
 
    3.3.3.1 Selecting representative U.S. Media 
 
The researcher selected two major media representatives which have significant 
impact on both global and local arenas.  The period of coverage was five years before 
and five years after 9/11. The sampling was made according to the importance of both 
CNN and Washington Post in terms of news coverage.  
 
Cable News Network (CNN), is considered a major U.S. news network that 
provides 24-hour TV news coverage.  Globally, CNN International can be seen by 
viewers in over 212 countries and territories. In terms of regular viewers (Nielsen 
Ratings), CNN is rated as the United States' number two news network, after Fox News 
(Ibarra, Sergio 2009) but it has more unique viewers and topics. CNN was the first 
network to break the news of the 9/11 attacks.  
 
The Washington Post is the newspaper with the largest circulation in the U.S. 
and is the city's oldest and most respected paper. It is also regarded among the leading 
American daily newspapers.  
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Analysis of content focused on the following topics: 
- The situation of Muslims and organizations before 9/11; 
- The impact of 9/11 attacks on Americans;  
- Reactions of the government and legislations against terror;  
- Response of Muslims against the 9/11 attacks;  
- Response of Muslims to resist the negative consequences in the 
aftermath of 9/11. 
 
 
Statistical data and Annual Reports of Organizations  
Statistical data and annual reports were also collected from non- profit Islamic 
organizations and subjected to content analysis in order to show how 9/11 impacted the 
activities of these organizations statistically. The analysis focused on the period five 
years before and five years after 9/11. The analysis of data is based on 15 types of 
activities which represent the most important activities carried out by these 
organizations inside the U.S. They are as follows: 
1- Provide financial support to Dawah teachers,  
2- Dawah ( Islamic Call) Trips to introduce Islam, 
3- Financial support to Islamic Centers and societies, 
4- Hosting delegates, 
5- Student subsidiaries, 
6- Educational and youth camps, 
7- Training courses, 
8- Brochures, cassettes and exhibition material that best introduce 
Islam,  
9- Regional and international conferences, 
10- Propagation for Islamic dress for women, 
11- Quran memorization classes,   
12- New converts to Islam, 
13- Scholarships for gifted students, 
14- Feasts of breaking the fast in Ramadan, 
15- Distribution of free cassettes and books that introduce Islam to 
non- Muslims.  
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In order to ensure that the research procedures are systematic and properly 
structured, the researcher has devised the following steps in the pursuance of the 
research planning and the seven stages of research. It was based on the module for 
research compiled by Open University of Malaysia, (2011). 
 
 
 
 
                               Figure 1. The seven steps of research 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
4.0  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the modes of analysis used in this study; qualitative, 
quantitative, and generative. It presents the data collected from different sources and a 
discussion of the findings as related to the objectives of the study. In so doing, three 
methods of data collection were used: questionnaires, interviews, and content analysis. 
Questionnaires and interviews were used to solicit data from members of Islamic 
organizations, while content of statistical data and annual reports were used for the 
evaluation of 9/11 event impact on activities of these organizations. 
4.1  General Background of the Respondents 
The questionnaire was distributed to 45 selected respondents who represent 
three non- profit Islamic organizations, that is, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY), the Muslim World League (MWL) and the Council of American Islamic 
Relations (CAIR). Only 15 leaders and members of each of these organizations were 
selected. The general demographic and socio-economic backgrounds of the selected 
respondents are presented in the following sub-sections.  
4.1.1. Educational background 
According to Table 1 below, 86.6% of respondents had at least a bachelor’s 
degree from a university, , and only 2.2% had elementary education. It can be assumed 
that the majority of respondents had a relatively high level of education and were able to 
understand and to articulate the implications or the impact 9/11 on Muslim community 
and Islamic organizations. 
Table 4.1: Educational Background of Respondents 
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Level of education Number Percentage 
Elementary 1 2.2 
Intermediate 0 0 
High School 2 4.4 
Bachelor 23 51.1 
Master 10 22.2 
Ph.D 6 13.3 
Others 3 6.7 
   
Total 45 100.0 
 
 
4.1.2. Age of Respondents 
Table 4.2 below shows that the respondents' age ranged from 20 years to 50 
years and above. Most of them 88.8% (51.1% + 24.4%+13.3%) were below the age of 
50. The majority of respondents are considered relatively young. 
 
Table 4.2 : Age of Respondents 
Age Groups Number Percentage 
20-29 6 13.3 
30-39 23 51.1 
40-49 11 24.4 
50 and above 5 11.1 
Total 45 100 
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4.1.3. Occupation of Respondents 
Table 4.3 shows that most of the respondents occupy high positions in their 
organizations (62.2%). They represent decision makers and key persons (leaders) who 
get in contact and have formal access to government and influential bodies in the U.S. 
That is why their opinion has a special significance for these reasons. 
 
Table 4.3 : Occupation of Respondents 
 
    Type of   
Occupation/Duty 
Number Percentage 
Normal member 17 37.8 
Leader of the Organization 28 62.2 
   
                  Total 45 100.0 
 
4.1.4. Positions of Respondents 
According to Table 4.4 below, the majority of respondents (93%) were 
employees with these organizations and only three persons were just volunteers. 
However, the opinions of volunteers can reflect and represent a neutral view on the 
impact of 9/11 on the work of organizations.  
 
Table 4.4 : Type of Work of Respondents 
Types of work Number Percentage 
Employees 42 93.3 
Volunteers 3 6.7 
Total 45 100.0 
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4.1.5. Activities of Respondents 
Table 4.5 indicates that the two important activities of respondents were political 
and media activities (24.4% + 26.7%). Social activities were also among the major tasks 
of respondents. Daawah activity, which was the least practiced activity, includes 
introducing Islam to non Muslims by different means. This result is consistent with the 
statistical and annual reports of these organizations. 
 
Table 4.5 : Type of Activities of Respondents 
 
Types of Activities Number Percentage 
Daawah 6 13.3 
Social Works 11 24.4 
Political 16 35.6 
Media 12 26.7 
Total 45 100.0 
 
4.2. Questionnaire results  
4.2.1. Type of activities that have been most affected by 9/11 (Research 
Question 2) 
     In this section, the researcher will discuss the questions that were included in 
the questionnaire with the aim of answering the second research question: What were 
the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations? The 
following question was asked in the questionnaire: Do you think that this organization 
has been affected by the events of September 1 2001? Respondents were asked to reflect 
their own opinion to general question of the impact of 9/11 events on the organization in 
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which they work. According to Table 4.6, it is clear that the majority of respondents 
(66.7%) believe that 9/11 had an impact on their organization. 
  
     Table 4.6 : General Opinions of Respondents of the Effect of  9/11 
              Categories Number Percentage 
   
Strongly Agree 30 66.7 
Agree 13 28.9 
Indifferent 2 4.4 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100.0 
       
      The table shows that 95.6% of respondents strongly agree and agree that 
9/11 event had an impact and they support the general trend that they generally have 
been affected by these events. However, in what aspects 9/11 events have impacted 
these organizations, the following sub-questions will clarify in details:  
Which types of activities have been most affected? 
 
Table 4.7 : Effects on Dawah Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Very much Affected 23 51.1 
Much Affected 12 26.7 
Somewhat affected 8 17.8 
Least affected 1 2.2 
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Total 45 100.0 
 
Dawah activities which are carried out by members of these organizations, 
include but are not limited to the following:  
1. Conduct congregational religious services and prayers, 
2. Introduce Islam to non-Muslims as the righteous way,   
3. Teach, and to disseminate the faith among Muslims and non-
Muslims,  
4. Establish mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools, and meeting 
places,  
5. Strengthen fraternal bonds and brotherly relationships among 
Muslims, 
6. Revitalize cooperative endeavors with other Muslim 
organizations, 
7. Promote friendly relations and understanding between Muslims 
and followers of other religions, 
8. Printing books and distributing Dawah materials.   
However, there is an interrelationship between Dawah activites and other 
activities. This is because the concept of Dawah in Islam includes a wide scope of 
activities.  
 
Table 4.8 : Impacts of 9/11 on Social Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Very much 
affected 
16 35.6 
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Much affected 14 31.1 
Somewhat 
affected 
12 26.7 
Least affected 2 4.4 
Not affected at all 1 2.2 
Total 45 100 
Social activities were thought to have been affected by 35%. Very few 
Respondents think that social activities were the least affected (only 2.2%). This may be 
due to the fact that after 9/11 attacks most of the group work of Muslims such as 
gatherings, fund raising and charitable initiatives were suspected of being connected 
with terrorist groups. That is why they have been affected and retracted. 
 
Table (9) indicates the extent of the effect of 9/11 on political activities of these 
organizations. Some respondents think that political activities were to some extent 
affected. This finding may be understood in the context that politics was used as a way 
to find out a solution to several problems faced by Muslims after 9/11. Politics was 
necessary to change and reverse the momentum. 
 
         Table 4.9 : Effects of 9/11 on Political Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Very much 
affected 
19 42.2 
Much affected 8 17.8 
Somewhat 
affected 
16 35.6 
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Least affected 0 0.0 
Not affected at all 2 4.4 
Total 45 100 
Table 4.10 : Effects of 9/11 on Media Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Very much 
affected 
18 40.0 
Much affected 12 26.7 
Somewhat 
affected 
13 28.9 
Disagree 00 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 2 4.4 
Total 45 100 
 
According to Table and Figure (10) the effect of 9/11 on media activities of 
these organizations reached a high degree (40% + 28.9%) also confirms previous 
findings because media represent a mirror that reflects the activities of organizations. 
 
In addition, in the aftermath of 9/11 media endeavors of Islamic organizations 
faced a media backlash that diminished their role and minimized their effect in 
preserving the true image of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. The media backlash was 
fierce, strong and supported by lobbies that took advantage of the prevalent anti-Muslim 
sentiment. 
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Islam recognizes other revealed religions and considers believing in all prophets 
is one of the articles of faith. Islam has encouraged Muslims to treat Christians and Jews 
with due justice, giving them rights and duties, securing their safety in Muslim 
territories and imposing a Muslim payment of blood-money in the event that one of 
them is killed accidentally. Islam has prohibited the killing of any Christians or Jews 
living in Muslim countries or territories. Prophet Muhammad said that whoever kills a 
Jewish or Christian person, whose people are in alliance with Muslims, will not enjoy 
the taste of the Paradise smell. Islam encourages Muslims to treat non-Muslims who 
have neither fought nor expelled Muslims from their homes, well.  
4.2.2 The Negative and Positive Impact of 9/11 attacks (Research Question 
1) 
This part discusses the results of the questionnaire that relate to the first research 
question: What is the impact of 9/11 on the Islamic community and Islamic nonprofit 
organizations? The first question in this section was: Do you agree that this organization 
can benefit from September 11th events? 
Table 4.11 indicates that 24.4% strongly agree that their organization can benefit 
from 9/11 event, while 42.2% believe 9/11 was beneficial in some way to their 
organization.  
 
Table 4.11 : Benefits of 9/11 to the Organization 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 11 24.4 
Agree 19 42.2 
Indifferent 13 28.9 
Disagree 2 4.4 
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Strongly Disagree 00 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
        The events of September 11 had a negative impact on the participation of 
Muslims especially the youth in organizational activities. Regarding the negative impact 
of 9/11 on the participation of Muslim youth in the organization activities, table (12) 
shows that less than half of the respondents are in favor of this view. There are also 
some views which think that participation of youth was not affected. 
 
Table 4.12 : Effect of 9/11 on Organization of Muslim Youths 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 8 17.8 
Agree 12 26.7 
Indifferent 13 28.9 
Disagree 12 26.7 
Strongly Disagree 00 0.0  
Total 45 100 
         
One of the consequences of September 11 is that it encouraged non-Muslims to 
ask about Islam and its view of Jihad, violence, and September 11 events. Regarding the 
negative impact of 9/11 on participation of Muslim youth in the organization activities, 
Table and Figure (13) show that less than half of the respondents are in favor of this 
view. Some respondents think that the participation of youth was not affected.  
 
Table 4.13 : Effects of 9/11 on Activities of Muslim Youths. 
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Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 18 40.0 
Agree 21 46.7 
Partially agree 6 13.3 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
 
After September 11, all activities of the organization became more closely 
watched by governments. Table and Figure (14) show one of the most significant results 
of this study, which is effect on activities of Islamic organizations. The vast majority of 
respondents believe that activities of these organizations have been affected as a result 
of the close watching of government agents who sometimes did harmful and illegal 
actions against these organizations. The literature review provided in this study also 
provides support for this argument.  
 
Table 4.14 : Effects of 9/11 on the activities of the Organization 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 8 17.8 
Agree 19 42.2 
Partially agree 17 37.8 
Disagree 1 2.2 
Strongly Disagree o 0.0 
Total 45 100 
88 
 
  
With regard to whether September 11 events have limited the presence of the 
activities of the organizations with respect to using the media, the results are stated as 
follows: 
Again Table 15 shows more evidence of how many Islamic organizations have 
been influenced by 9/11 in terms of humanitarian, cultural, and social activities 
However, a good deal of respondents (13.3% + 37.8%+8.9%) have different view on 
this issue. 
           Table 4.15 : Effects of 9/11 on the Activities of Organization 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 0 0.0 
Agree 18 40.0 
Partially agree 6 13.3 
Disagree 17 37.8 
Strongly Disagree 4 8.9 
Total 45 100 
  
As for whether American media projected a negative view of the activities of 
these organizations, from table and Figure 16, it is evident that approximately 60% 
senior staff members working in Islamic non-profit organizations agree or even strongly 
agree that American media project negative views about the activities of their 
organizations. This relates to research question 3.  
 
Table 4.16 : Opinions Towards American Media Project Negative View of the 
Activities of the Organization 
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Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 17 37.8 
Agree 10 22.2 
Partially agree 15 33.3 
Disagree 3 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
The next question tried to discover if September 11 events have consolidated the 
campaign against Muslims in American society. 
Table 4.17 : Opinions About how American Media Have Consolidated the 
Campaign Against Muslims. 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 11 24.4 
Agree 10 22.2 
Partially agree 20 44.4 
Disagree 3 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 2.2 
Total 45 100 
 
Table and Figure (17) reflect that a vast majority of the respondents; 90.8% fully 
or partially agree that September 11 events have consolidated the campaign against 
Muslims in the American society.  
 
90 
 
Table 4.18 :  Opinions about the Participation of Muslim Scholars in Activities 
of the Organization. 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 4 8.9 
Agree 6 13.3 
Partially agree 13 28.9 
Disagree 22 48.9 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
 
        When asked about the level of participation of Muslim Scholars almost half 
of the participants (48.9%) believe that scholar participations have not decreased as a 
result of 9/11. 
 
Table 4.19 : Hatred Against Muslims After 9/11. 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 14 31.1 
Agree 14 31.1 
Partially agree 17 37.8 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
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When asked about the participation in government activities, more than 60% of 
the participants see that the number of participants who work with the government has 
decreased after September 11. 
 
Table 4.20 : Participation in Government Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 1 2.2 
Agree 4 8.9 
Partially agree 13 28.9 
Disagree 23 51.1 
Strongly Disagree 4 8.9 
Total 45 100 
 
As for how the organizations can minimize the negative impact of 9/11, the results are 
as follows: 
21- Participation in political life  
 
Table 4.21 : Political Participation to Minimize the Impact of 9/11 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 23 51.1 
Agree 10 22.2 
Partially agree 10 22.2 
Disagree 2 4.4 
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Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
Table 4.21 suggests that Islamic organizations can minimize the negative impact 
of 9/11 by participating in political life. A majority of 51.1% strongly agree that 
political participation can be a solution and 22.2% agree on the same statement. That 
means that most respondents think this is the right way for organizations to overcome 
the bad consequences of September 11. Only 4.4% disagree with this approach.  
 
 
Table 4.22 : Opening New Branches to Minimize the Impact of 9/11 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 12 26.7 
Agree 13 28.9 
Partially agree 17 37.8 
Disagree 3 6.7 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
  
Table and Figure (22) show that some respondents suggest opening new 
branches can be helpful in reducing the negative impact of 9/11. 37.8% partially agree 
on this point and 6.7% disagree with this solution.  
 
Table 4.23 : Using Media to Present the Organization 
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Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 29 64.4 
Agree 10 22.2 
Partially agree 6 13.3 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
  
Using media as a means to minimize the negative impact of 9/11 scores the 
highest by respondents; 46.4% strongly agree and 22.2% agree on this alternative.  
None of the respondents disagree with this practical and effective alternative. This result 
is consistent with other findings.   
 
Table 4.24 : Involving Very Important Persons (VIP) in Activities 
 
Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 27 60.0 
Agree 11 24.4 
Partially agree 7 15.6 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
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According to Table and Figure (25) the suggestion of calling VIPs to participate 
in activities has also gained a high degree of support from respondents. Along with the 
use of media, this suggestion was viewed as the most effective method of minimizing 
the negative effects of 9/11. 
As for what organizations need in order to vitalize their role, the following 
results show what the respondents think in this regard.  
 
Table 4.25 : Financial Support for Activities 
  
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 34 75.6 
Agree 9 20.0 
Partially agree 2 4.4 
Disagree 0 0.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
25- The organization needs financial support, so it can continue its social 
philanthropic and Dawah activities.      
 
 
Table and Figure (25) show that 75.5% of participants strongly agree that 
financial support is important in order that organizations continue their philanthropic 
and Dawah activities. None of the respondents disagreed with this point. This finding is 
significant because it shows as will be elaborated in the discussion how these 
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organizations suffered after 9/11 when most of their accounts and financial assets were 
either seized or frozen by American government agencies. 
 
Table 4.26: To Provide Cultural, Educational, Administrative and Trained 
Specialists 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 15 33.3 
Agree 17 37.8 
Partially agree 7 15.6 
Disagree 6 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
26- The organization needs to be provided with cultural, educational, 
administrative and trained specialists.  
 
Table and Figure (26) indicate that providing cultural, educational, 
administrative and trained specialists can be necessary to some extent but they are less 
important compared to financial support. 
 
27- The organization needs to use the public and the private media very well to 
explain the Islamic position on violence and terrorism. 
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Table 4.27:  To Use the Private and Public Media to Explain the Position on 
Violence and Terrorism 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 15 33.3 
Agree 17 37.8 
Partially agree 7 15.6 
Disagree 6 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
According to Table and Figure (27) very few respondents believe that the 
effective use of media is needed in order to explain the Islamic position. Although this 
result might seem to contradict previous results are not harmonious with them, it 
signifies the fact that media is not in the hands of these organizations and they have no 
influence on the media. Furthermore, the media in the West, especially in the United 
States, often present a stereotyped image of Islam; thus they are unlikely to provide 
access for Islamic organizations to reflect the true image of Islam.     
 
4.2.3 What is the Role of Organizations in Introducing Islam in a Better 
way and in Correcting Stereotypes and Distorted images of Islam? (Research 
Question 3) 
The organizations under study have a great presence in Muslim society in 
America and have demonstrated great comprehension of the events of September 11, 
2001. As will be seen in later sections, there is a negative portrayal of Islam in the U.S. 
media which has led to a distorted image of the religion and of Muslims. Thus, it is 
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important to discover if Islamic nonprofit organizations can play a role in changing this 
image and how individuals working in such organizations see their role in this regard. 
 
Table 4.28 : Roles of Organizations in correcting Stereotypes and Distorted 
Images of Islam 
 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 2 4.4 
Agree 24 53.3 
Partially agree 11 24.4 
Disagree 6 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 4.4 
Total 45 100 
From Table and Figure 28, show that Islamic charity organizations have a 
significant presence in Muslim society in America. Almost (57.7%) agree or even 
strongly agree with this statement. 
The offices and centers of the organizations must cover the whole Muslim 
community in the US. 
Table 4.29 : Coverage of the Whole Muslim Community in the US 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 14 31.1 
Agree 18 40.0 
Partially agree 11 24.4 
Disagree 2 4.4 
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Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
 
Table and Figure (29) show that the overwhelming majority think that the 
organizations' centers and serving offices do not cover the Muslim community. This 
indicates one of the shortcomings of the organizations in serving Muslims. Physical 
presence is important for both Muslims and non-Muslims.   
30-The activities must cater to the members needs with respect to their different 
life philosophies and ages.  
 
Table 4.30 : Activities Do Not Cater to the Members Needs 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 6 13.3 
Agree 8 17.8 
Partially agree 12 26.7 
Disagree 17 37.8 
Strongly Disagree 2 4.4 
Total 45 100 
 
Again Table and Figure (30) show a similar result to the previous table which 
may be categorized under shortcomings of these organizations. The two previous results 
indicate a serious problem with regard to the role of these organizations in serving Islam 
and Muslims.  The following result also supports this trend and suggests that Islamic 
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organizations need to vitalize their role in order to deliver better services to Muslim 
communities and eliminate any negative images about Islam.  
As for whether the organizations need to be more useful to both the Muslims 
and non-Muslims in society, the results are as follows. 
 
Table 4.31: Organization Needs to be More Beneficial to Non-Muslims 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 13 28.9 
Agree 16 35.6 
Partially agree 10 22.2 
Disagree 6 13.3 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
 
Table and Figure (31) reveal that Islamic organizations need to be more 
beneficial to both Muslim and non-Muslim groups in American society. Indeed, more 
than (57 %) of the participants agree or strongly agree with this suggestion. 
 
                                 Table 4.32 : Newspaper and TV Channel 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 16 35.6 
Agree 13 28.9 
Partially agree 9 20.0 
Disagree 7 15.6 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
100 
 
Total 45 100 
 
Table and Figure (32) show that most of the respondents think it is important for 
these organizations to have their own media, such as television channels and 
newspapers. The result implies that Islamic organizations lack media coverage within 
Muslim and non- Muslim communities.  
 
As for the results to the question that attempted to find out whether respondents 
think the organizations need to build bridges with influential members of local 
government through a variety of activities; table 4.33 shows what respondents think. 
 
Table 4.33 : Needs to Build Bridges with Members of Local Government 
 
 Categories Number Percentage 
Strongly agree 22 48.9 
Agree 19 42.2 
Partially agree 3 6.7 
Disagree 1 2.2 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 
Total 45 100 
       According to Table and Figure (33) an overwhelming majority, i.e., (48.9% 
+ 42.2%) of respondents believe that building relations with influential government 
officials is important.   
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4.3 The Role of the American Media in Nourishing Islamophobia (Research 
Question 3) 
Before analyzing the content of the American media with regard to this study’s 
subject, it is important to introduce the mechanisms and the system by which the 
American media function.  The following section investigates the American media 
system and focuces on the role of the major news providers such as CNN that have 
shaped the American public’s perception regarding non-profit Islamic organizations in 
America.   
4.11.1 The Role of CNN 
From his analysis, the researcher has concluded that in the period after 9/11, 
CNN coverage has been relatively exaggerated and biased, helping promote 
Islamophobia. . The impact of CNN’s coverage on Islamic nonprofit organizations in 
America has always been incredibly harmful. Below are some examples of reports 
presented by CNN.  
 
Title of first report: “FBI slammed for fighting 9/11 reforms Bureau 
disputes panel's findings, citing improvement” From Pam Benson and Kevin Bohn 
CNN Thursday, October 20, 2005 Posted: 2300 GMT (0700 HKT)  
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The former members of the 9/11 commission 
slammed the FBI on Thursday for the pace of its reforms, saying the agency has 
fought the changes more than expected and warning that "terrorists will not wait." 
The criticism came in a report by the former commission, now called the 9/11 
Public Discourse Project, released Thursday in Washington. 
"Reforms are at risk from inertia and complacency," said former commission 
Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton. If the pace of reform is" not accelerated," he said, 
Congress will have to consider "other alternatives," a veiled reference to removing the 
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FBI's intelligence function. The report faulted the FBI for continued deficiencies in its 
analytical capabilities and information sharing with other agencies, as well as its 
failure to improve information technology. The bureau was also cited for too much 
turnover in its workforce. 
Former commission Chairman Thomas Kean complimented FBI Director 
Robert Mueller for setting the right priorities, but said there was "much more resistance 
than anticipated" from the rest of the bureau.  
The FBI has been criticized for having a culture entrenched in law enforcement, 
one not geared to carry out intelligence missions. 
 
The bipartisan 9/11 panel -- formally known as the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States -- was created by Congress in 2002 to 
investigate aspects of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  It released its final 
report in a nearly 570-page book in July 2004. The panel disbanded as a government 
entity the following month, but the 10 members formed the Public Discourse Project 
with the aim of fulfilling their original mandate of protecting against future terrorist 
attacks. Thursday's report card listed 14 of the panel's recommendations for the FBI 
and other parts of the federal government, grading progress on eight of them as 
minimal, insufficient or unsatisfactory. 
 
President Bush signed legislation in December that overhauled the U.S. 
intelligence community based on the 9/11 commission's recommendations, including the 
creation of a director of national intelligence post that was filled by John D. 
Negroponte. 
Last week, Negroponte announced the creation of a National Clandestine 
Service headed by an undercover CIA official, based on the recommendations of the 
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White House's so-called WMD commission, a separate panel that investigated 
intelligence failures regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war.  
 
Bush endorsed 70 of the 74 recommendations made by the WMD commission, 
including the creation in June of a National Security Service within the FBI. 
Title of second report:  
WASHINGTON (CNN) ( December 5, 2005 ) The former chairman and vice-
chairman of the 9/11 commission warned Sunday that the nation is ill-prepared for 
another terrorist attack. The bipartisan panel plans to issue a report Monday assessing 
the federal government's response to the recommendations it made last year. 
The group was created by Congress in 2002 to investigate aspects of the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It released its final report with a slew of 
recommendations in a nearly 570-page book in July 2004. 
 
Thomas Kean, the Republican chairman of the committee, told NBC's "Meet the 
Press" that enacting the changes is "not a priority for the government right now. "A lot 
of the things we need to do really to prevent another 9/11 just simply aren't being done 
by the president or by the Congress. 
What we're concerned about now is that these recommendations -- four years, 
more than four years after 9/11, are still not being done. People are not paying 
attention to them. 
Lee Hamilton, the committee's Democratic vice-chairman, predicted another 
attack will occur -- "It's not a question of if" -- and said the nation is not "as well-
prepared as we should be." 
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Added Kean, "God help us if we have another attack and we haven't done some 
of these things." 
The Bush administration did carry out one of the panel's central 
recommendations for overhauling the nation's intelligence system: creating the post of 
director of national intelligence, charged with beefing up intelligence efforts and 
information-sharing among disparate agencies. 
 
In his first one-on-one interview in that post, John Negroponte told CNN last 
week, "America is safer than it was at 9/11" because of better integrated intelligence 
efforts. 
But Kean and Hamilton said many of the commission's most important 
recommendations for strengthening U.S. security have been given short shrift. 
Among their top concerns: first responders still cannot communicate with each 
other in an emergency because no part of the radio spectrum has been allocated for 
their use, the two men said. 
"It really approaches scandal to think that, four years after 9/11, the police and 
the fire cannot talk to one another at the scene of the disaster," said Hamilton 
"They could not do it on 9/11, and as a result of that, lives were lost. They could 
not do it at Katrina. They still cannot do it." 
 
Congress is considering a bill to establish such a radio frequency, but even if it 
passes, "the best hope we have is a bill that fixes it by 2009," said Kean, former 
governor of New Jersey. 
 
The two men, and the other members of the former commission, also want 
funding for first responders to be distributed based on risk -- with more likely targets 
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receiving a bigger chunk of the funding -- rather than on a per capita or geographical 
basis. 
 
"We've had some of this money spent to air condition garbage trucks. We've had 
some of the money spent for armor for dogs. This money is being distributed as if it's 
general revenue sharing," said Kean. 
Title of third report: “U.S., Saudis suspect terror group in Riyadh 
bombings” 
Wednesday, May 14, 2003 Posted: 0232 GMT (10:32 AM HKT) 
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia (CNN) CNN correspondents Rula Amin, David Ensor, John 
King, Andrea Koppel and Brent Sadler, and producer Elise Labott, contributed to this 
report. 
 --President Bush said Tuesday that he wouldn't be surprised if al Qaeda were 
behind the suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. officials said they were 
worried that the terrorist group might be planning new attacks. 
The triple car bombings Monday night killed at least 21 people, including eight 
Americans and seven Saudis, authorities said.  
Nearly 200 others were wounded in the blasts, including 17 Americans. One 
State Department official said some of the wounded Americans are "in pretty bad 
shape."  
U.S. and Saudi officials said it appears that the simultaneous attacks in the 
Saudi capital were the work of al Qaeda, the terrorist organization headed by Saudi 
exile Osama bin Laden.  
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah said Tuesday that there is "no place for terror" in 
his country and vowed to "destroy" the group responsible for the attacks. Another Saudi 
official called the bombings "a declaration of war against Saudi Arabia."  
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The three residential compounds targeted included one used by an American 
defense contractor and one owned by a pro-Western Saudi billionaire. 
 
Attacks follow U.S. warning 
 
Rula Amin and others (2003) The blasts came less than two weeks after the U.S. 
State Department warned Americans of possible terror attacks in Saudi Arabia. Last 
week, the Saudi government issued an all-points bulletin for 19 men -- 17 of them 
Saudis -- on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks.  
In Washington, a senior U.S. official involved in national security affairs said 
the statement by the Saudi crown prince was "the strongest thing we have ever seen 
from them."  
The State Department said Tuesday that Saudi cooperation in the wake of 
Monday's bombings was "outstanding."  
"We've had excellent cooperation with Saudi Arabia with this attack," Deputy 
Spokesman Philip Reeker said.  
One official said Saudi approval for the FBI team to travel to Riyadh to aid with 
the investigation came "within hours" of the blast.  
"That is the quickest approval by the Saudi government I have ever seen," he 
said. "It is very significant."  
Some U.S. authorities and lawmakers have criticized Saudi Arabia for its 
cooperation -- or lack thereof -- in cracking down against terrorism. FBI officials were 
especially critical of what they called a Saudi lack of cooperation in the 1996 
investigation of the Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 U.S. service members.  
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Title of fourth report: “Terror suspect 'had Navy plans'” 
(CNN.com) Friday, August 6, 2004 Posted: 1637 GMT (0037 HKT) CNN's 
Diana Muriel in London contributed to this report 
LONDON, England (CNN) -- A British man facing extradition to the United 
States on terrorism-related charges was found in possession of a U.S. Navy battle 
group plan, U.S. officials have alleged. 
The charges against Babar Ahmad also link him to a Chechen group that seized 
a Moscow movie theater and hundreds of hostages in October 2002. 
Ahmad is accused of using U.S.-based Web sites in connection with "acts of 
terrorism in Chechnya and Afghanistan." 
Ahmad was denied bail when he appeared before a London judge on Friday. He 
told Bow Street Magistrates' Court he did not want to voluntarily go to the United 
States, and he was remanded to jail until his next hearing on August 13. 
Later Friday, the U.S. Attorney's office in New Haven, Connecticut, unsealed the 
31-page indictment against Ahmad detailing the charges against him. 
U.S. Attorney Kevin O'Connor said investigators found a floppy disk at Ahmad's 
home that contained plans for a U.S. Navy battle group from April 2001. 
The plans included drawings of the battle group's formation, details of specific 
assignments of individual ships and details of each ship's vulnerability. 
The battle group was patrolling the Straits of Hormuz and tasked with 
operations against al Qaeda and enforcing sanctions against Iraq. 
The document concludes that the battle group had nothing except Navy SEALs 
armed with Stinger missiles to stop an attack by a small vessel armed with rocket-
propelled grenades. 
Ahmad is charged in Connecticut with conspiracy to provide material support to 
terrorists; conspiracy to provide money to support the Taliban, to kill people abroad 
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and to support terrorists; conspiracy to support designated terrorist groups; and 
solicitation to commit crimes of physical violence. The charges carry maximum 
penalties from 10 years in prison for conspiring to support designated terrorist groups 
to life in prison for conspiring to provide material support for terrorists. 
"Between 1997 and 2003, Mr. Ahmad -- through various entities -- created, 
maintained and operated Web sites in Connecticut, Nevada and outside the United 
States," O'Connor told a news conference in New Haven. 
"The main purpose of all of these sites was to solicit financing for certain 
terrorist organizations including the Taliban and Chechen mujahedeen and to recruit 
individuals to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya for the purpose of waging jihad 
against the perceived enemies of Islam, including the United States." Ahmad, 30, was 
arrested in Britain on Thursday by the Extradition and International Assistance Unit of 
the Metropolitan Police Service. Officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch were 
searching three residential properties and one office in southwest London on behalf of 
U.S. authorities. 
Friday's hearing included a formal reading of charges. After the charges were 
read, the judge asked Ahmad if he understood them. 
"Not really," he responded. "It's a bit confusing." 
The charges against Ahmad link him to a Chechen group that seized a Moscow 
movie theater -- and hundreds of hostages -- in October 2002. More than 125 of the 
hostages died in the rescue.  
U.S. authorities argued that freeing Ahmad before his trial would result in his 
continued cooperation with terrorists and the destruction of evidence. 
Ahmad's attorney said he was in need of psychiatric care, suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder following what he called an assault by police last year. The 
attorney said that police raided his home on December 2, 2003, assaulting him in his 
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home and later in a police van, leaving him with kidney and soft-tissue damage. At the 
August 13 hearing, the judge will consider whether to allow the extradition to move 
forward. Ahmad will remain in Woodhill prison near London until then. 
In New Haven, O'Connor said he expected Ahmad to fight extradition. 
"I don't expect it to happen very quickly, even with the cooperation of our 
counterparts, because there are certain rights that this individual is afforded," he said. 
"It could take more than one year. Five years? I hope not." 
O'Connor also said it was "impossible to tell" whether any of the money Ahmad 
allegedly raised on his Web sites was used for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
United States 
"There was a lot of activity pre 9/11, and there was a lot of activity post 9/11," 
he said. "But after it gets into Afghanistan, it's impossible to tell what it was used for. 
We don't know if any of it was used for 9/11 and we'll probably never know." 
O'Connor said the investigation had uncovered at least two U.S. citizens who 
had made contributions via Ahmad's Web sites. 
The investigation also identified a U.S. sailor serving aboard the guided missile 
destroyer USS Benfold who sent a sympathetic e-mail to Ahmad in July 2001, O'Connor 
said. 
Authorities have not decided whether to charge them, he said. 
O'Connor said Ahmad's arrest was the result of more than two years of 
investigation sparked by a U.S. Customs officer who "for a long time was a bit of a lone 
ranger." 
"One tenacious agent, to his credit, began this investigation," he said. "It didn't 
come easy. It took two years of document review, subpoenas and the like." 
Title of fifth report: “Cheney: Bush has right to authorize secret 
surveillance” 
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Tuesday, December 20, 2005 Posted: 2055 GMT (0455 HKT)  
MUZAFFARABAD, Pakistan (CNN) -- Vice President Dick Cheney said 
Tuesday that President Bush has the authority to order international eavesdropping 
on suspected terrorists in the United States without informing a court. 
"If we had been able to do that before 9/11, we might have been able to pick up 
on two of the hijackers who were in San Diego in touch overseas with al Qaeda," 
Cheney said during a tour of earthquake damage in Pakistan. 
"It's good, solid, sound policy," the vice president added. "It's the right thing to 
do." 
Cheney's comments follow Bush's defense of the practice Monday during a year-
end news conference at the White House. Bush said he "absolutely" has the legal 
authority to order the wiretaps, which are necessary to be "quick to detect and prevent" 
possible near-term terrorist attacks. Bush said authorization is derived from the 
Constitution, and Congress following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Cheney said 
such measures were necessary because the United States needed to "aggressively go 
after terrorists." 
 
Critics say Bush had no legal standing to authorize such wiretaps without 
obtaining a warrant from a court in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA). 
Cheney said the program had "saved thousands of lives." "It is, I'm convinced, 
one of the reasons we haven't been attacked in the past four years," Cheney said.  
The New York Times first reported last week that Bush had authorized the 
National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others in the United States 
while they communicate with people outside the country. 
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Although the NSA is usually barred from domestic spying, it can get warrants 
issued with the permission of a judicial body called the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Court. Bush's action eliminated the need to get a warrant from the 
court. 
Bush said that the program had been discussed at least 12 times with Congress 
since 2001 and that it was constantly being reviewed to make sure it was being run 
correctly. The program is reauthorized every 45 days, meaning he has given his 
approval more than 30 times since its inception, Bush said.  
 
Calls for investigation 
Both Democrats and Republicans have questioned the legality of the program, 
and some lawmakers have called for an independent investigation or congressional 
hearings. Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said technological advances 
used by terrorists made it necessary to conduct the surveillance without a court order. 
"We know that a two-minute phone conversation between somebody linked to al 
Qaeda here and an operative overseas could lead directly to the loss of thousands of 
lives," Bush said. "To save American lives, we must be able to act fast and to detect 
these conversations so we can prevent new attacks." 
"It has been effective in disrupting the enemy while safeguarding our civil 
liberties," the president added. 
But lawmakers, several of whom said Congress hadn't been informed about the 
wiretap program, also are concerned about the legality of the president's authorization.  
Democratic Sen. Russ Feingold of Wisconsin told CNN on Sunday that he 
believes Bush's action violated the law. 
"FISA says it's the exclusive law to authorize wiretaps," he said. "This 
administration is playing fast and loose with the law in national security. The issue here 
112 
 
is whether the president of the United States is putting himself above the law, and I 
believe he has done so." 
'I'm just stunned'  
Sen. Jack Reed said the president could have gone back to a FISA court after the 
wiretaps if he was concerned about speed. 
"I'm just stunned by the president's rationales with respect to the illegal 
wiretapping," the Rhode Island Democrat said. "There are two points that have to be 
emphasized with respect to the FISA procedure: They're secret and they're retroactive.  
"There is no situation where time is of such an essence they can't use the FISA 
proceedings. And so the president's justification, I think, is without merit." 
Gonzales said Monday that a congressional act passed after September 11 not 
only authorized President Bush to use force in the war on terror, it gave the president 
the power to allow such wiretaps. 
"There were many people, many lawyers within the administration who advised 
the president that he had an inherent authority as commander in chief under the 
Constitution to engage in these kind of signal intelligence of our enemy," he said. (CNN 
Access) 
"We also believe that the authorization to use force, which was passed by the 
Congress in the days following the attacks of September 11, constituted additional 
authorization for the president to engage in this kind of signal intelligence." (Watch 
Gonzales' explanation of the administration's position -- 5:36) 
Signal intelligence refers to intercepted electronic communications, such as 
phone calls. 
The measure meant the president doesn't need to get a court order to request 
such wiretaps, as called for in FISA, Gonzales said. 
Title of Sixth Report: Court delays Padilla transfer from brig 
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From CNN Justice Producer Terry Frieden  
Wednesday, November 30, 2005 Posted: 2002 GMT (0402 HKT)  
Jose Padilla has been held since May 2002 when he returned to the United States 
from Pakistan. 
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A federal appeals court on Wednesday delayed the 
transfer of accused terrorist Jose Padilla from a military brig to face trial in Miami. 
Padilla, a 35-year-old U.S. citizen, was indicted last week by a federal grand 
jury in Florida. He will remain in the Navy brig in South Carolina for at least two 
weeks under a two-page order issued by the 4th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Richmond, Virginia.  
The development surprised top Justice Department officials. But the three-judge 
panel said it needs to know whether it should set aside a September opinion that upheld 
Padilla's military detention before returning him to civilian authorities. 
The court said it wants to hear arguments on whether the opinion was to be 
vacated "as a consequence of the transfer." The judges pointed out that the facts alleged 
by the government "warranting" Padilla's military detention differed from the charges 
in the indictment.  
The government was ordered to reply by December 9, and Padilla's lawyers 
have a deadline of December 16 to respond -- the same date the government is also due 
to respond to Padilla's latest appeal to the Supreme Court. 
"We're disappointed that Mr. Padilla's transfer to the civilian justice system has 
been delayed," said Padilla defense attorney Jonathan Freiman, who argued Padilla's 
case before a South Carolina judge earlier this year.  
"The case is pending in the Supreme Court, and we think the Supreme Court 
should decide whether to address the question of the president's power to detain 
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American citizens seized in a civilian setting in the United States indefinitely and 
without charges." 
The 4th Circuit must rule on the transfer to clear the way for U.S. marshals to 
take Padilla from the brig to Miami.  
"We intend to comply with the 4th Circuit Court's order," the Justice 
Department said in a brief statement. Officials declined further comment.  
The indictment charges Padilla with conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim 
people in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and 
providing material support to terrorists. 
Padilla was added as a defendant to an existing case against four other men, 
accusing them of forming a "North American support cell" of a global "violent jihad" 
movement. Padilla specifically was accused of little more than attending al Qaeda 
training camps in Afghanistan in 1999 and 2000. 
Prior to the criminal charges, Padilla had been designated an enemy combatant 
and held in military custody without charges for nearly three and half years. 
Padilla, who has served two criminal sentences in the United States and lived 
abroad, was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 by the FBI and jailed as a material 
witness in the investigation into the September 11, 2001, terrorists attack. 
One month later, President Bush designated him an "enemy combatant" for 
posing "a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United 
States." 
The attorney general at the time alleged that Padilla had plotted to blow up a 
radioactive "dirty bomb" in the United States. 
The indictment does not include allegations related to a dirty bomb plot or any 
reference to allegations publicly stated last year that Padilla also plotted to blow up 
apartment buildings with natural gas lines. 
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The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over Padilla's case because the 
government had appealed the ruling of a South Carolina federal judge who ruled his 
continued detention unconstitutional and said he must be charged or released. 
The appeals court overruled U.S. District Judge Henry Floyd, a Bush appointee 
who ruled that the president does have the legal authority to declare enemy combatants 
and hold them indefinitely in military custody. 
CNN's Phil Hirschkorn contributed to this report. 
 
4.3.2 The role of the American Press 
From his observations, the author has concluded that the American press has a 
tendency to magnify issues and exaggerate events in relation to Muslims and terrorism. 
Furthermore, with regard to 9/11 this tendency is even clearer than with other issues. 
The events were clearly exaggerated and closely linked with Islam and Islamic activities 
with the ultimate objective of distorting the image of Islam.  
Some articles from the Washington Post and other American newspapers and 
magazines will be cited below to support the researcher's point of view. 
 
1. Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; 
Hundreds Dead. Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert 
By Michael Grunwald 
Washington Post Staff Writer 
Wednesday, September 12, 2001 
 
Terrorists unleashed an astonishing air assault on America's military and 
financial power centers yesterday morning, hijacking four commercial jets and then 
116 
 
crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the 
Pennsylvania countryside.  
There were no reliable estimates last night of how many people were killed in 
the most devastating terrorist operation in American history. The number was certainly 
in the hundreds and could be in the thousands.  
 
It was the most dramatic attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, and it 
created indelible scenes of carnage and chaos. The commandeered jets obliterated the 
World Trade Center's twin 110-story towers from their familiar perch above 
Manhattan's skyline and ripped a blazing swath through the Defense Department's 
imposing five-sided fortress, grounding the domestic air traffic system for the first time 
and plunging the entire nation into an unparalleled state of anxiety.  
 
U.S. military forces at home and abroad were placed on their highest state of 
alert, and a loose network of Navy warships was deployed along both coasts for air 
defense.  
The terrorists hijacked four California-bound planes from three airports on the 
Eastern Seaboard; the airliners were loaded with the maximum amount of fuel, 
suggesting a well-financed, well-coordinated plot. First, two planes slammed into the 
World Trade Center. Then an American Airlines plane out of Dulles International 
Airport ripped through the newly renovated walls of the Pentagon, perhaps the world's 
most secure office building. A fourth jet crashed 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, 
shortly after it was hijacked and turned in the direction of Washington.  
 
None of the 266 people aboard the four planes survived. There were even more 
horrific but still untallied casualties in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
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which together provided office space for more than 70,000 people. At just one of the 
firms with offices in the World Trade Center, the Marsh and McLennan insurance 
brokerage, 1,200 of its 1,700 employees were unaccounted for last night.  
 
The spectacular collapse of the Trade Center's historic twin towers and another 
less recognizable skyscraper during the rescue operations caused even more bloodshed. 
At least 300 New York firefighters and 85 police officers are presumed dead. The 
preliminary list of victims included the conservative commentator Barbara K. Olson, 
"Frasier" executive producer David Angell and two hockey scouts from the Los Angeles 
Kings.  
 
No one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but federal officials said they 
suspect the involvement of Islamic extremists with links to fugitive terrorist Osama bin 
Laden, who has been implicated in the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa 
and several other attacks. Law enforcement sources said there is already evidence 
implicating bin Laden's militant network in the attack, and politicians from both parties 
predicted a major and immediate escalation in America's worldwide war against 
terrorism.  
 
In a grim address to the nation last night, President Bush denounced the attacks 
as a failed attempt to frighten the United States, and promised to hunt down those 
responsible. "We will make no distinction," he said, "between the terrorists who 
committed these acts and those who harbor them."  
Bush vowed that America would continue to function "without interruption," and 
federal offices and Congress are scheduled to be open today. But the New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq Stock Market will remain closed, along with most businesses in 
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lower Manhattan. And yesterday was a day of extraordinary interruptions -- for the 
president, for federal Washington and for the country.  
 
Bush was in a classroom in Florida yesterday morning when the attacks began 
and spent the day on the move for security reasons, flying to military bases in Louisiana 
and then Nebraska before returning to Washington in the evening. At one point at 
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, the president rode in a camouflaged, armored 
Humvee, guarded by machine gun-toting soldiers in fatigues.  
 
Vice President Cheney and first lady Laura Bush were whisked away to 
undisclosed locations in the morning, and congressional leaders were temporarily 
moved to a secure facility 75 miles west of Washington. The White House, the Capitol, 
the Supreme Court, the State Department and the Treasury Department were evacuated, 
along with federal buildings nationwide and the United Nations in New York.  
 
Private buildings also were shut down, from the Space Needle in Seattle to the 
Sears Tower in Chicago to Walt Disney World in Orlando. America's borders with 
Canada and Mexico were sealed. New York's mayoral primary was abruptly postponed. 
So was Major League Baseball's schedule for the night.  
 
Wireless networks buckled under the barrage of cell phone calls. The besieged 
Internet search engine Google told Web surfers to try radio or TV instead. Amtrak train 
and Greyhound bus operations were also halted in the Northeast.  
Last night, fires were still burning amid the rubble of the World Trade Center, 
and pools of highly flammable jet fuel continued to hinder rescue teams searching 
through waist-deep rubble.  
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The Federal Emergency Management Agency dispatched eight search-and-
rescue teams to New York and four teams to the Pentagon. The Department of Health 
and Human Services sent medical teams and mortuary teams, and activated a national 
medical emergency cadre of 7,000 volunteers for the first time.  
 
The Empire State Building went dark as a symbol of national mourning. In 
Washington, Republicans and Democrats presented a united front in condemning the 
attacks; members of Congress delivered a spontaneous rendition of "God Bless 
America" after a news conference on the Capitol steps.  
 
"We are outraged at this cowardly attack on the people of the United States," the 
leaders of Congress said in a bipartisan statement. "Our heartfelt prayers are with the 
victims and their families, and we stand strongly united behind the President as our 
commander-in-chief."  
 
The impact of the attacks reverberated not just in the United States but in every 
major capital. European and Asian airlines canceled all flights to the United States and 
recalled or diverted those already in the air. Flights over London, Paris and other 
capitals were re-routed over less populous areas. London's financial district was 
largely evacuated; security was bolstered around U.S. schools and embassies in many 
countries.  
 
Panic buying caused oil and gold prices to soar while stock investors in all 
major foreign markets dumped shares in the most frenzied wave of selling since the 
1987 crash. In the Middle East, China and the Yugoslav republic of Serbia, some people 
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welcomed the attacks, but an array of international leaders pledged support for the 
victims.  
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon condemned the attack in blistering terms, 
and described it as a "turning point" in the global war against terrorism. Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat condemned the attack as well, although some Palestinians in 
Israeli-occupied territories and Lebanon celebrated with glee.  
But amid all the sadness and all the outrage, there were questions about lax 
security and inadequate intelligence, as Americans tried to fathom how such a 
catastrophe could happen with no apparent warning. On at least two of the airliners, 
according to federal officials, the hijackers were armed with nothing but knives. How 
did they get away with it?  
 
In fact, counterterrorism experts have talked in recent years about cyber-attacks 
and biological attacks. Security officials issued warnings just last month about bin 
Laden's threats to American installations abroad.  
 
But yesterday's attacks caught a vast security apparatus off guard. The military 
command center in Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain, responsible for U.S. air defenses, 
received word just 10 minutes before the first aircraft struck the World Trade Center 
that a American plane had been hijacked. The notification came too late for fighter jets 
to take action, a senior Air Force officer said.  
 
The disaster began to unfold at 8:48 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11, 
carrying 92 people from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center, the landmark glass-and-steel complex at the southern tip of 
Manhattan that provided office space for 50,000 workers. Islamic militants had 
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detonated a bomb there in 1993, killing six people. Yesterday's terrorism turned out to 
be far worse.  
 
Eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people on the 
same Boston-to-Los Angeles route, tore through the South Tower with an even larger 
explosion. The collisions shrouded New York's helter-skelter financial district in pallid 
ash, and created mass pandemonium inside and outside the towers. Workers were 
screaming, running for stairways, gasping for air. Several of them began leaping to 
their death from the upper floors.  
 
But the scene soon shifted from America's financial mecca to its military 
fortress. At about 9:40 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77, carrying 64 people from 
Dulles to Los Angeles, barreled into the west wing of the Pentagon in yet another fiery 
collision, destroying at least four of the five rings that encircle the world's largest office 
building. A Pentagon spokesman called the casualties "extensive," although they were 
clearly not as extensive as New York's.  
 
The Federal Aviation Administration promptly banned takeoffs nationwide, 
ordered domestic flights to land at the nearest airport and diverted international flights 
to Canada. But officials soon confirmed that a fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, 
carrying 45 people from Newark to San Francisco, had crashed in Shanksville, Pa. It 
had been hijacked as well -- one passenger called 911 from a cell phone -- and had 
been heading toward Washington when it went down.  
 
Then it was back to the World Trade Center. Shortly before 10 a.m., the South 
Tower collapsed with an earthshaking roar. Smoke replaced steel as if the building had 
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suddenly imploded. A half-hour later, the North Tower collapsed. Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani publicly urged New Yorkers to stay calm and stay put -- unless they were below 
Canal Street in lower Manhattan.  
 
"If you're south of Canal Street, get out," he warned. "Just walk north."  
America's battle against terrorism, it seemed clear last night, will never be the 
same. The nation's airports are expected to reopen at noon today, but with beefed-up 
security measures: no more curbside check-in, and a possible return of armed "air 
marshals" to prevent future hijackings.  
 
Many members of both parties declared that for all practical purposes, the 
nation is at war. At a briefing last night in the battered Pentagon, Defense Secretary 
Donald H. Rumsfeld warned that America's enemies should not rest easy.  
For now, those enemies have not been publicly identified. But government 
officials said they have strong evidence from multiple sources linking the attacks to bin 
Laden and his terrorist web, known as al Qaeda.  
 
Journalists with access to bin Laden said his followers have been boasting about 
preparations for major attacks against the United States in retaliation for American 
support of Israel. Bin Laden has already been linked to the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and last year's 
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. Yesterday, government officials said they intercepted 
messages from bin Laden associates gloating about hitting their targets.  
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Before the mayhem, though, U.S. intelligence all pointed to an attack overseas. 
The State Department had warned travelers in an advisory Friday, and U.S. military 
and diplomatic posts abroad have been on alert as well.  
 
Terrorism experts have repeatedly warned that U.S. airport security is extremely 
lax, warnings that have been backed up by a stack of studies. When Department of 
Transportation investigators tried to breach security at eight airports three years ago, 
they succeeded 68 percent of the time.  
 
"The security of airports is pathetic," said Harvey W. Kushner, a Long Island 
University professor and terrorism consultant to several federal agencies. "It's very 
easy to have someone get on a plane and wreak havoc."  
 
Today, at least, the debates over education, health care, Social Security and the 
budget surplus that have consumed Washington in recent months have been put on 
hold; perhaps for the first time since the Gulf War, national security is at the top of the 
agenda. Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) was preparing to call for more military spending at 
a news conference at the time of the attacks.  
 
"This is a failure of the U.S. intelligence system, caused by a lack of resources 
and by complacency," he said. "Today, our government failed the American public."  
But that was a discordant note yesterday in Washington, where solidarity was 
the watchword of the day. In his speech last night, Bush emphasized the nation's 
harmony, noting that "a great people have been moved to defend a great nation." After 
reading from the 23rd Psalm, he proclaimed that even amid suffering and death, 
Americans will remain committed to their freedom-loving way of life.  
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"This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for 
justice and peace," he said. "America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so 
this time . 
The American press continued their fierce attacks and allegations against some 
Saudi personnel and staff involved in nonprofit Islamic organizations in America. The 
press goes further to accuse the Saudi Government and several members of the Saudi 
Royal Family of being involved directly or indirectly in providing finance for the 9/11 
events. All this has had a severe negative effect on Islamic nonprofit organizations 
working in America to secure relief for the needy and to promote Islam. 
In this regard, Newsweek, the famous American magazine published the 
following article under the heading "The Saudi Money Trail.'  
 
The Saudi Money Trail  
by Michael Isikoff  
Published in Newsweek, December 1, 2002 (retrieved from: 
http://www.newsweek.com/saudi-money-trail-140813) 
When the two Al Qaeda operatives arrived at Los Angeles International Airport 
around New Year's 2000, they were warmly welcomed. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid 
Almihdhar would help hijack American Airlines Flight 77 and crash it into the 
Pentagon a year and a half later, but that January in Los Angeles, they were just a 
couple of young Saudi men who barely spoke English and needed a place to stay. At the 
airport, they were swept up by a gregarious fellow Saudi, Omar al-Bayoumi, who had 
been living in the United States for several years. Al-Bayoumi drove the two men to San 
Diego, threw a welcoming party and arranged for the visitors to get an apartment next 
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to his. He guaranteed the lease, and plunked down $1,550 in cash to cover the first two 
months' rent. His hospitality did not end there. 
 
Al-Bayoumi also aided Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they opened a bank account, 
and recruited a friend to help them obtain Social Security cards and call flight schools 
in Florida to arrange flying lessons, according to law-enforcement officials. Two 
months before 9-11, al-Bayoumi moved to England; several months later, he 
disappeared.  
 
Who is al-Bayoumi? At various times, the affable father of four told people that 
he was getting his doctorate at San Diego State, though the school has no record he 
ever attended. He told others that he was a pilot for the Saudi national airline. He 
apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive 
contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the 
father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to 
informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been 
an advance man for the 9-11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that 
ultimately claimed 3,000 lives. 
 
The Feds' interest in al-Bayoumi has been heightened by a money trail that 
could be perfectly innocent, but is nonetheless intriguing--and could ultimately expose 
the Saudi government to some of the blame for 9-11 and seriously strain U.S.-Saudi ties. 
It is too soon to say where the trail will wind up, but it begins with a very surprising 
name on a Washington bank account. 
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About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, 
NEWSWEEK has learned, al-Bayoumi's wife began receiving regular stipends, often 
monthly and usually around $2,000, totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money 
came in the form of cashier's checks, purchased from Washington's Riggs Bank by 
Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince 
Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of 
the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who 
in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi's wife (and her friend), Manal Ahmed 
Bagader. The Feds want to know: Was this well-meaning charity gone awry? Or some 
elaborate money-laundering scheme? A scam? Or just a coincidence? 
 
A spokesperson for Princess Haifa told NEWSWEEK that she had no idea the 
money was going to the al-Bayoumi family or that it might in any way be used for some 
nefarious purpose. Saudi officials and members of the royal family routinely give money 
to supplicants who need medical or financial help and write the embassy. Dwei-kat's 
husband, Osama Basnan, had first pleaded to the Saudi Embassy for help in 1998, 
saying that he needed money to treat his wife's thyroid condition. At the time, Prince 
Bandar wrote Basnan a $15,000 check. The monthly payments to his wife, Majeda, 
began in January 1999 and ended only last summer. Until she was contacted late last 
week by NEWSWEEK, Princess Haifa was unaware that the payments are being 
investigated by U.S. authorities, according to the spokesperson. 
Questions over the money trail have enflamed a fierce, behind-the-scenes 
struggle between two congressional committees looking into 9-11 and the Bush 
administration. Senate Intelligence Committee co-chairman Robert Graham of Florida, 
a Democrat, and Richard Shelby of Alabama, a Republican, believe that the FBI failed 
to fully investigate 9-11.  
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The FBI is still trying to figure out if al-Bayoumi played a role in the 9-11 plot. 
Within a few days of the attacks last fall, New Scotland Yard, working with the FBI, had 
found him enrolled in a business graduate program at Birmingham, England's Aston 
University. The British investigators arrested al-Bayoumi, and tore up the floorboards 
in his house. They discovered records of phone calls to two diplomats in the Saudi 
Embassy in Washington. The officials, who worked in the Islamic section of the 
embassy, which supports mosques and Islamic charities, apparently offered innocent 
explanations to FBI investigators. Al-Bayoumi, who adamantly denied any connection 
to the attacks or knowledge of the hijackers' links to Al Qaeda, was released after a 
week without charge. 
 
Before he vanished, al-Bayoumi offered a benign explanation of how he met with 
Almihdhar and Alhazmi. He told investigators that he just happened to be in a 
restaurant at the Los Angeles airport and overheard the two men talking in Arabic. He 
introduced himself and offered to help the two newcomers get settled and adjust to life 
in southern California. It was a chance meeting, he insisted to the skeptical agents. His 
offer of help was nothing more than the usual charity extended by one Muslim "brother" 
to another. 
 
Al-Bayoumi was a familiar figure in San Diego's burgeoning Islamic 
community. He was often seen at the mosque or at social functions, chatting amiably, 
almost always holding a video camera. Al-Bayoumi seemed to pay so much attention to 
the comings and goings of young Saudi college students that some were convinced that 
he was a Saudi government spy. "He was always watching them, always checking up on 
them, literally following them around and then apparently reporting their activities 
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back to Saudi Arabia," said Henry Bagadan, a Pakistani businessman who worships at 
the San Diego Islamic Center. 
 
After al-Bayoumi left San Diego in July 2001, the cashier's checks purchased by 
Princess Haifa continued to flow to Majeda Dweikat, who in turn signed many of them 
over to her husband, Osama. Basnan also befriended the two hijackers, Almihdhar and 
Alhazmi. After the terrorist attacks, Basnan, who was known as a vocal Qaeda 
sympathizer, "celebrated the heroes of September 11" and talked about "what a 
wonderful, glorious day it had been," according to a law-enforcement official. Wife 
Dweikat appears to have been at least a minor scamster. She was convicted of marriage 
fraud to obtain immigration papers and pleaded guilty--along with al-Bayoumi's wife, 
Manal--to shoplifting in April 2001. The checks from Princess Haifa stopped when 
Basnan was arrested for visa fraud last August. (He told a judge, "I love this country," 
but was ordered deported to Saudi Arabia.) Interestingly, Osama Basnan showed up in 
Houston last April when Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah came to town with a vast 
entourage en route to President George W. Bush's ranch. According to informed 
sources, Basnan met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence 
matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States to be 
distributed to Saudi students when they come to welcome the crown prince. A Houston 
police report obtained by NEWSWEEK shows that Basnan complained he had been 
robbed of his Saudi passport and $400. It is dated April 25, the same week the crown 
prince was in town. 
 
The congressional investigators looking into 9-11 argue that the Feds aren't 
doing enough to stop another attack. The FBI's failure to thoroughly investigate the 
Saudi connection reveals the bureau's inherent weakness as a counterterror 
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organization, these investigators tell NEWSWEEK. Senator Graham has been pushing 
for a new domestic-intelligence service, modeled on Britain's M.I.5, to track terror cells 
in this country. Graham says he fears that a concealed terrorist "infrastructure" set up 
to support the 19 hijackers is still in place--waiting for a new call to action. 
 
The Bush administration has been reluctant to give the congressional committee 
investigating 9-11 everything it asks for. Cheney and others believe that Congress is 
intruding on the executive branch's intelligence-gathering and foreign-policy-making 
powers and that a "witch hunt" will distract and hobble the CIA and FBI. But the 
administration may also worry that if investigators keep digging, the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship will wind up in a deep hole. 
 
4.20 A Royal Connection to September 11th? 
According to the above article from Newsweek, a Saudi man named Omar al-
Bayoumi arrived in the United States and settled in the San Diego area. Over the next 
few years he got a job and immersed himself in the Islamic community. After meeting 
two of the would-be 9-11 hijackers at L.A. International Airport, al-Bayoumi set them 
up in an apartment and paid the first two months of their rent in early 2000. Al-Bayoumi 
allegedly started receiving stipends in the form of cashier's checks, originally purchased 
by Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi envoy Prince Bandar. He facilitated 
getting IDs for the two hijackers. In July 2001Al-Bayoumi left the United States for 
England; his close friend Osama Basnan continued to receive the money. In September 
2001 he was detained by authorities in England, while asserting he had no connection to 
the 9-11 attacks.  
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The Washington Post also published allegations against Muslim charity 
organizations and their staff. They presented the following article about one of the 
leaders of these charity organizations, Holy Land Foundation. The article was as 
follows:  
US-based Muslim charity convicted of funding terrorism 
(AFP) – Nov 24, 2008 
Dallas, Texas (AFP) — The leaders of what was once the largest Muslim 
charity in the United States were found guilty of acting as a front for Palestinian 
militants in the largest terrorism financing prosecution in American history. 
 
It was a major victory in the White House's legal "war on terror" and comes 
after a mistrial was declared last year in the case involving the now defunct Texas-
based Holy Land Foundation, charged with funneling 12 million dollars to Hamas. 
 
"Today's verdicts are important milestones in America's efforts against 
financiers of terrorism," Patrick Rowan, assistant attorney general for national 
security, said in a statement. 
"This prosecution demonstrates our resolve to ensure that humanitarian relief 
efforts are not used as a mechanism to disguise and enable support for terrorist 
groups." 
Family members could be heard sobbing in the Dallas courtroom as guilty 
verdicts were read on all 108 charges of providing material support to terrorists, money 
laundering and tax fraud. 
One woman cried out: "My dad is not a criminal! He's a human!" 
131 
 
Holy Land was one of several Muslim organizations the Bush administration 
closed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for allegedly raising 
money for overseas Islamic extremists. 
Muslim charities that remain open have reported significant drops in 
contributions because of fears of prosecution even as juries deadlocked or rendered 
acquittals or convictions of lesser charges in two other high-profile terror financing 
cases in Florida and Chicago. 
 
The United States Justice Department vowed in October 2007 to retry the five 
former charity organizers in the Holy Land case after jurors could not agree on verdicts 
on nearly 200 charges and a new jury was seated in mid-September. 
 
Over the past two months, the government has presented largely the same 
evidence hoping to prove that Holy Land was created in the late 1980s to gather 
donations from deep-pocketed American Muslims to support the then-newly formed 
Hamas movement resisting the Israeli occupation. 
 
Hamas -- a multi-faceted Islamist political, social and armed movement which 
now controls the Gaza Strip -- was designated a terrorist organization by the United 
States in 1995 and the trial centered over whether Holy Land continued to support the 
group after this point. 
 
Prosecutors did not accuse the charity of directly financing or being involved in 
terrorist activity. Instead, they said humanitarian aid was used to promote Hamas and 
allow it to divert existing funds to militant activities. 
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Defense attorneys said the charity was a non-political organization which 
operated legally to get much-needed aid to Palestinians living in squalor under the 
Israeli occupation and argued that the chief reasons their clients were on trial are 
family ties. 
After reading the verdicts, U.S. District Judge Jorge Solis ordered the men 
detained because of fears they would flee the country before sentencing given their 
international ties. 
 
Khaled Meshaal, Hamas' political leader in Syria, is the brother of defendant 
Mufid Abdulqader, a top Holy Land fundraiser whose Palestinian band played at the 
charity's events and now faces up to 55 years in jail. 
 
Meshaal's deputy, Mousa Abu Marzook, is a cousin of defendant Mohammad el-
Mezain, a foundation co-founder, and is married to the cousin of defendant Ghassan 
Elashi, former Holy Land board chairman. 
 
Mezain faces up to 15 years in prison while Elashi, who is already serving six 
and a half years for export law violations, faces up to life in prison. 
The brother of defendant Shukri Abu Baker, Holy Land's former chief executive 
officer, is Jamal Issa, former Hamas leader in Sudan and its current head in Yemen. 
Baker, the former chief executive officer of Holy Land, faces up to life in prison. 
A fifth defendant is Abdulrahman Odeh, Holy Land's New Jersey representative, 
who faces up to 55 years in jail. 
Jurors also found that the defendants owed the government 12.4 million dollars. 
 
133 
 
The American press continued its aggressive attack on Muslim charity 
organizations even in Canada and reported allegations against their staff and leaders. 
The National Post presented this article a few months after 9/11. 
 
 
Ottawa pulls Saudi group's charity status. Muslim World League being sued 
by 9/11 families 
National Post  12/1/2003 | Stewart Bell 
Ottawa pulls Saudi group's charity status Tax violation: Muslim World League 
being sued by 9/11 families  
Stewart Bell National Post  
Monday, December 01, 2003  
TORONTO - Federal regulators have revoked the charity status of the Canadian 
branch of a Saudi organization that has faced longstanding allegations of ties to 
terrorism.   
A notice in the government publication Canada Gazette said the Muslim World 
League (MWL) is one of several charities that "have not met the filing requirements of 
the Income Tax Act."  
The revocation came into effect on Nov. 15, but the organization, dedicated to 
promoting Islam, was still calling itself an officially registered charity on its Internet 
site yesterday.  
The action by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency was unrelated to 
terrorism allegations that have dogged the League, founded in Mecca in 1962 and later 
established in Etobicoke, Ont.  
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The MWL is among dozens of charities being sued by the families of those killed 
in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. "The Muslim World League has numerous 
connections to al-Qaeda," the suit claims.  
The group has publicly condemned terrorism.  
The Canadian branch has never itself been accused of supporting terrorists, 
although one of its directors was also a director of Benevolence International 
Foundation-Canada, which has been blacklisted under United Nations terror-financing 
regulations.  
But the international offices of the Muslim World League, and those of its sister 
organization the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), have surfaced 
repeatedly in intelligence reports and affidavits.  
"I know that terrorists who have attacked or tried to attack the United States 
around the world have been associated with the MWL/IIRO," Special Agent David Kane 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security said in a recent court affidavit.  
A U.S. law enforcement task force has been investigating allegations that a 
series of related companies and charities based in Virginia, including the IIRO and 
MWL, are involved in the financing of terror.  
The class action lawsuit filed by the families of the victims of 9/11 lists several 
ties between the Osama bin Laden network and the MWL, including claims the charity's 
office in Peshawar was headed by al-Qaeda co-founder Wa'el Jalaidan."  
"Wa'el Jalaidan spread Muslim World League offices around the world. These 
offices served in the early days of al-Qaeda to attract and train holy warriors for the 
war in Afghanistan," the suit alleges.  
Canadian intelligence claims that Mohamed Harkat, an Ottawa pizza delivery 
man and suspected member of the bin Laden network, worked for the Muslim World 
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League in Pakistan before coming to Canada. Mahmoud Jaballah, a member of the 
Egyptian Al Jihad who was caught in Toronto, worked for the IIRO in Pakistan.  
During the 1979-89 war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Saudi aid 
organizations were often used to move money and get fighters into battle zones. Since 
the war, some of these same groups have been accused of serving as conduits for 
supporting a broader international campaign of anti-Western Islamic terror.  
The Financial Intelligence Branch of the RCMP said in a report last year that 
"the main source of funding of al-Qaeda are charities, NGO [non-governmental 
organizations] and commercial enterprises.  
"The money is given by supporters and is funneled to al-Qaeda through the 
hawala, the international underground banking system." . 
 
Other US publications have tried to find links between 9/11 and many well 
known Muslim figures that lead or support charity activities. The ultimate objective has 
always been to defame Muslims and to cripple Islamic nonprofit organizations working 
in America and worldwide. In this regard Footnote wrote on 28 April 2000 the 
following article: 
Participants in the conspiracy reportedly have offered different explanations 
why so many Saudis were used in the attacks.  
According to the 9/11 Commission, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, considered the 
principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly told interrogators that so many Saudis 
were chosen simply because Saudis make up the largest portion of recruits in al-Qaeda 
training camps (roughly 70 percent).  
 
Many Saudis do have strong feelings against the United States. For example, a 
Gallup poll taken of about 750 Saudis in December 2001 and January 2002 found that 
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49% of Saudis polled had a "very unfavorable" view of the United States, and 64% had 
a "mostly" or "very" unfavorable view. According to the Gallup organization, Saudis 
saw the United States as pursuing biased policies (65%), had high crime (64%), was 
aggressive (62%), and was conceited (61%). Only 3% of Saudis saw the United States 
as friendly or trustworthy. Moreover, only 29% of Saudis thought that better 
understanding would occur fairly or very quickly and 28% of Saudis thought that better 
understanding would never come about.  
 
At least one other conspirator, however, reportedly has said that Saudis were 
chosen specifically to hurt the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  
Ramzi Binalshibh, who helped plan the attacks but did not participate in the 
attacks, reportedly told interrogators that al-Qaeda chose so many Saudis to send a 
message to the United States.  
Binalshibh's comments are in line with the Saudi government's own explanation 
of the Saudi representation in the attacks. Prince Bandar, for example, said in an April 
25, 2004 interview with Tim Russert of NBC News (on-line) that the attack was "an evil 
work done by evil people who were targeting your country, but also targeting the 
relationship between our two countries. Otherwise is it accidental that they would 
choose 15 misguided young people to be out of 19 that when they had the pool of so 
many people from so many different countries? 
 
4.2 Fund Raising 
The Saudi government did freeze Bin Laden out from his family fortune in 
1994. Bin Laden was long thought to have financed al-Qaeda's efforts through a 
personal inheritance of about $300 million which he received when his father died. 
According to the 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden actually received less than a tenth of that 
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amount spread over nearly a quarter of a century (about $1 million a year from 1970 
through 1994) and received no more after 1994.  
 
Kevin Ryan (2011) However, the 9/11 Commission reported that it found no 
evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials 
individually funded the organization.  
Since September 11, 2001, the Saudi Arabian government reportedly has taken 
more steps to cut off al-Qaeda's funding, especially after Saudi Arabia itself experienced 
attacks in May 2003.  
U.S. State Department official E. Anthony Wayne testified in a September 25, 
2003 Senate hearing that Saudi Arabia had made "fundamental and necessary changes 
to its banking and charity systems to help strangle the funds that keep al Qaida in 
business." Wayne noted that Saudi charities cannot deposit or withdraw cash from their 
bank accounts and cannot make wire transfers abroad, and that the Saudi government 
has banned the collection of donations at mosques and discouraged the use of collection 
boxes at retail establishments.  
"The Saudis are not where they need to be, and they have much work to do," 
Wayne testified. "However, we believe they are headed in the right direction, are 
committed to countering the threat of terrorist financing, and are giving us very strong 
cooperation in the war on terrorism."  
 
4.3 Cooperation 
Long before the September 11 attacks, some questioned Saudi Arabia's 
cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts and its efforts against 
Osama bin Laden. This cooperation has improved immediately after the September 11 
attacks in keeping with Saudi Arabia's promises of cooperation and support. .  
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4.4 Extremism as Viewed by American Muslims. 
According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey Muslims in the 
United States largely deny Islamic extremism more than do Muslim minorities in 
Western European countries. Few native-born African American Muslims apparently 
condemn al Qaeda. Younger Muslims in the U.S. have a different Muslim identity to 
older Muslim Americans, and a small number of them believe that suicide bombing is to 
some extent excusable and sometimes justified when used in defense. However, the 
overall level of support for Islamic extremism among American Muslims is found to be 
very low, particularly when compared with Muslims around the world.  
 
In general, the Muslim Americans surveyed were not hesitant in expressing 
dissatisfaction with the American war on terrorism and the impact it has had on their 
lives. A majority of Muslim Americans (53%) believe that Muslims have suffered a lot 
in the U.S. since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Most also believe that the 
government targets Muslims for special searches and inspections. A small number of 
Muslim Americans thought that the U.S is justified in leading a war against terror and 
perceived it as a legalized effort to reduce terrorism. The survey shows that although 
many Muslims are relative newcomers to the U.S., they are highly assimilated into 
American society. With the exception of very recent immigrants, most report that a 
large proportion of their closest friends are non-Muslims. Muslim Americans do not see 
any contradiction between being true Muslim and living in a modern society. 
  Kevin Ryan (2011) The Pew Study Project explored approximately 1.5 million 
adult Muslim Americans, 18 years of age and older. The total Muslim American 
population is estimated at 2.35 million, based on data from this survey and available 
139 
 
U.S. Census Bureau data on immigrants’ nationality. It is important to note that both of 
these figures are estimates.  
 
4.5 The life situations and attitudes of Muslim Americans Compared to 
Europe 
Muslim Americans are so different in their attitude towards their American 
identity because they hold positive attitude. Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 
2006 showed that Muslim minorities from the Western European countries Britain, 
France, Germany and Spain to be greatly concerned about unemployment. Unlike 
Muslims in the U.S., the average annual incomes of Muslims in these countries were 
lower than the incomes of non-Muslims. About half of Muslims in the U.S. (47%) 
identify themselves first as Muslims, then as Americans. However, a larger percentage 
of Muslims in three of the four Western European nations surveyed said they considered 
themselves first as Muslims, rather than citizens of their countries. 
 
These are the main results of a nationwide survey of 1.5 million Muslim adults 
who live in the United States. Interviews were carried out in English, Arabic, Urdu and 
Farsi. The poll was conducted by telephone using a random sample based on three 
sampling sources. About a third of the interviewees (354,000) were obtained from a 
geographically random sample of the general public, which involved 57,549 
households.  
 
4.6 The Lasting Impact of September 11  
While Muslim Americans generally express positive views of American society, 
most believe life for Muslims has become more difficult since 9/11. Many Muslims 
believe that U.S. Government anti-terrorism campaigns are singling out Muslims – and 
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most of those who express this view are worried about the excessive scrutiny. Native-
born Muslims, both African-Americans and others, do believe that they have been 
singled out.  
A quarter of Muslim Americans think they have been victims of discrimination 
in the United States, while 73% believe that they have never felt discrimination 
throughout their lives in America.  More native-born Muslims than Muslim immigrants 
think that they have been victims of discrimination (41% vs. 18%).  
 
4.7 Complex Views about Terrorism 
Kevin Ryan (2011) There is a widespread concern among American Muslims 
about the rise of Islamic extremism, both around the world and in the United States. 
Roughly, half of Muslim Americans (51%) say they are very concerned about the rise of 
Islamic extremism around the world. This is much greater than the concern expressed 
by Muslims in most of Western Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the rise of 
Islamic extremism globally. A smaller but sizable percentage of Muslim Americans 
(36%) are very concerned about the potential rise of Islamic extremism in the United 
States. While most Muslims in America express concern about the rise of Islamic 
extremism around the world, they express relatively little support for the global war on 
terrorism. Only 26% said that they thought the U.S.-led war on terror is a sincere effort 
to reduce international terrorism. In contrast, a Pew Survey of the general public in 
2004 found 67% thought that the U.S.-led war on terror is a sincere effort to reduce 
terrorism. In this regard, Muslim American views come closer to the strong disapproval 
Muslims in the Middle East have voiced regarding the war on terrorism. 
 
The overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans were opposed the war in Iraq, 
and most of them disagree with the decision to go to war in Afghanistan as well. 
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Roughly six-to-one (75%-12%), Muslim Americans say the U.S. did the wrong thing in 
going to war in Iraq; the general public is divided over the Iraq war. Only about a third 
of Muslim Americans (35%) have a positive view of the decision to go to war in 
Afghanistan, compared with 61% of the general public.  Very few Muslim Americans – 
just 1% – say that suicide bombings against civilian targets are often justified to defend 
Islam. In Western Europe, higher percentages of Muslims in Great Britain, France and 
Spain said that suicide bombings in the defense of Islam are often or sometimes 
justified.  
 
All segments of the Muslim American population share negative views about 
terrorism, but the polling did find a small percentage in support of extremism. Overall, 
just 5% of Muslim Americans express even slightly favorable opinions of al Qaeda. Yet 
strong hostility toward al Qaeda varies widely – 63% of foreign-born U.S. Muslims say 
they have a very unfavorable opinion about al Qaeda, compared with 51% of all native-
born Muslims, and just 36% of African American Muslims 
 
More generally, native-born African American Muslims are the most 
disillusioned segment of the U.S. Muslim population. When compared with other 
Muslims in the U.S., they are more skeptical of the view that hard work pays off, and 
more of them believe that Muslim immigrants in the U.S. should try to remain distinct 
from mainstream society. They also are far less satisfied with the way things are going 
in the United States. Just 13% of African American Muslims expressed satisfaction with 
national conditions, compared with 29% of other native-born Muslims, and 45% of 
Muslim immigrants. 
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In addition, the survey finds that younger Muslim Americans – those under age 
30 – are both much more religiously observant and more accepting of Islamic 
extremism than are older Muslim Americans. Younger Muslim Americans reported that 
they attend services at a mosque more frequently than older Muslims. In addition, a 
greater percentage of younger Muslims in the U.S. think of themselves first as Muslims, 
rather than primarily as Americans (60% vs. 41% among Muslim Americans ages 30 
and older). Moreover, more than twice as many Muslim Americans under age 30 as 
older Muslims believe that suicide bombings can be often or sometimes justified in the 
defense of Islam (15% vs. 6%). 
Most religious Muslim Americans are less likely to believe that groups of Arabs 
carried out the 9/11 attacks than are less religious Muslims. In addition, the survey finds 
that those who say that suicide bombings in defense of Islam can be often or sometimes 
justified are more disbelieving than others that Arabs carried out the September 11 
attacks. Kevin Ryan (2011). 
 
4.8  Muslims in the United States views 
Pew (2007) Pew Global Attitude Project Survey, 2007 a comprehensive survey 
on American Muslims, shows them to be largely assimilated, lead happy lives, and 
adopt moderate attitudes with regard to several topics that have divided Muslims and 
Westerners around the world. According to the survey, American Muslims are a largely 
diverse group that consists mainly of immigrants. However, they are able to maintain 
their American identity and they believe hard work is the right way to make a better 
living. Their main concern is to raise their income and education levels. The survey 
(Pew Global Attitude Project Survey, 2007) found that roughly two-thirds (65%) of 
adult Muslims living in the United States were born outside, and 39% have come to the 
U.S. since 1990. The majority of Muslim immigrants to the U.S. come from Arab 
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countries, but a good number of them also come from Pakistan and other South Asian 
countries. The survey discloses that among native-born Muslims, little more than half 
are African American (20% of U.S. Muslims overall), and a great deal of them are 
converts to Islam.   
 
However, the exact size of Muslim American population is a matter of great 
debate.  Incomplete data and instruments make it difficult to give reliable estimates of 
the U.S. Muslim population. The result of this uncertainty gives quite different 
estimates based on different methodologies that use very different data. 
 
The Pew Research Center conducted a survey-based study designed to collect 
data about a nationwide representative sample of Muslim Americans from each of the 
three categories of the U.S. Muslim population: Muslim immigrants, U.S.-born 
Muslims, and converts to Islam. In spite of the challenges of reaching this diversified 
population, the Pew study provides reliable data that may be used by any researcher.  
 
Regarding their general stance, Muslim Americans have a generally positive 
view of the way of life and society they live in. Most of them express their satisfaction 
by saying that their communities are excellent or good places to live. They also express 
their contentment with the state of the nation. In addition, 71% of Muslim Americans 
believe that most people who want to advance in the American society can make it if 
they have the will to work hard. 
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4.29  Diverse Population 
Rew (2007) There were many attempts carried out with the aim of determining 
the size of the U.S. Muslim population that date back to at least 1960, when the 
Federation of Islamic Associations in America put the number at 1.2 million. 
Depending on the methods used, subsequent estimates differed considerably from this. 
The American Religious Identification Survey stimated in 2001 that there were 
approximately 1.1 million adult Muslims in the U.S. The 2005 Britannica Book of the 
Year ( ref.) reported the total number of Muslims in the U.S. to be 4.7 million. Several 
leading national Muslim groups estimated Muslims there at 6-7 million, or more. Some 
of the difficulties in counting U.S. Muslims are attributed to the diverse nature of the 
population itself. Muslim immigrants to the United States come from at least 68 
countries, and have different traditions, practices, doctrines, languages and beliefs. In 
addition, large numbers are native-born Americans who have converted to Islam; 
estimates of the proportion of native-born Muslims who are African American range 
from 20% to 42%. 
Finally, there are the children born to either immigrants or converts. While each 
of these sources accounts for a significant share of the total U.S. Muslim population, the 
actual proportions who are immigrants, converts and native-born Americans remain 
unknown. 
 
4.30 Previous Survey Estimates 
Most of the researchers who work on similar topics mainly use public opinion 
surveys for estimates of religious affiliation. So it is logical that researchers would turn 
to surveys to provide estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. These polls, conducted 
with varying degrees of methodological rigor, have produced relatively consistent 
estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. 
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The General Social Survey (GSS), regarded as one of the most reliable 
barometers of social trends in the United States, has been administered every other year 
since 1972 to more than 2,000 randomly sampled adults nationally. The GSS asks 
people their religion, and their verbatim response is recorded and later coded. In 
combined data from the five GSS surveys conducted between 1998 and 2006 Muslims 
made up 0.5% of the U.S. adults interviewed, which projects to about 1.2 million adults 
nationwide. 
The 2001 American Religious Identification survey, which surveyed a random 
sample of 50,281 adults, also found the proportion of the adult population who identify 
themselves as Muslim to be 0.5%. Other surveys, including national surveys conducted 
by the Pew Research Center, Gallup and Washington Post-ABC News, estimate that 
Muslims make up less than 1% of the U.S. adult population. 
 
In 2002, Tom W. Smith, director of the GSS, published a review of every major 
national survey conducted over the previous five years that produced an estimate of the 
Muslim American population. These polls, on average, estimated that Muslims 
constitute 0.5% of the total population. That average, combined with an estimate of the 
number of Muslim children, produced an estimate of the Muslim population of about 2 
million. 
 
Researchers also have used data from surveys of special populations to estimate 
the U.S. Muslim population. Every year since 1966, UCLA researchers have surveyed 
incoming college freshmen. In 2006, a total of 271,441 first-time, full-time students at 
393 colleges and universities were interviewed. This study estimated the proportion of 
Muslims in this group at 0.8%, virtually identical to the proportion recorded in previous 
waves of the freshmen survey. A similar estimate was obtained by another research 
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team that examined the stated religious preference of high school students who took the 
SAT college admissions exam. 
 
There are reasons to question all of these estimates, as Smith and other 
researchers have noted The UCLA study is limited only to incoming college students 
and is not an accurate reflection of the percentage of Muslims – or any other group – in 
the general population. For example, less affluent young people and those with limited 
English language abilities are underrepresented among the students who take these 
college entrance exams. 
 
Language difficulties also pose obstacles to the major national polls. 
Researchers who study immigrant populations estimate as many as a quarter of all 
recent arrivals have limited or no English-language ability, meaning they could not be 
interviewed by the GSS, Gallup, the Washington Post-ABC News survey, the American 
Religious Identification Survey, or other polls done primarily or exclusively in English.  
1 Smith, Tom W. 2002. “The Polls – Review: The Muslim population of the 
United States: The Methodology of Estimates.” Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 
66:404-417. 
 
4.10.1 Other Estimates 
Other studies have produced higher estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. An 
ambitious 2001 survey led by researchers from Hartford Institute for Religious Research 
provided a basis for the frequently cited estimate of 6-7 million Muslim adults and 
children. The study, sponsored by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, 
attempted to identify every mosque in the U.S. Leaders from a representative sample of 
mosques were then questioned about a host of issues, including the number of 
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worshippers associated with each one. This study concluded that 2 million Muslims in 
the U.S. are involved with mosque, at least tangentially. By taking this number into 
account, the author surmises that estimates of a total Muslim population of 6-7 million 
in America seem reasonable. Some critics speculated that mosque representatives may 
have inflated or otherwise misreported the number of people associated with the 
mosque, a tendency researchers have found among religious leaders in other faiths. 
 
Other estimates of this population bypass surveys and use data from the U.S. 
Census and immigration records that identify an individual’s country of origin and 
preferred language. The 2000 Census found that about 0.7% of the population, or about 
2 million people, reported a majority-Muslim country as their country-of-origin. To this 
number must be added an estimate of Muslims born in the U.S. as well as converts. 
However, as Smith has noted, using an individual’s country-of-origin or preferred 
language assumes that every immigrant from these majority-Muslim countries is a 
Muslim and that no Muslim emigrated from a minority-Muslim country.  
 
There is considerable evidence that immigrant waves from the same country can 
be very different in terms of religious composition. For example, only about 1% of 
immigrants who arrived in the U.S. from predominantly Muslim Iran in the 1980s were 
believed to be Muslims, with larger proportions assumed to be Jews, Christians, 
Zoroastrians, and Baha’is. Similarly, the 1975 civil war in Lebanon resulted in 
disproportionately larger numbers of Christians than Muslims immigrating to the United 
States during the 1980s. Other factors further complicate projections of the U.S. Muslim 
population based on immigration and Census data. These estimates must be adjusted to 
reflect the presence of Muslims who arrived earlier, with each new wave added to those 
who are already in the United States. These numbers also must be adjusted to account 
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for births and deaths of Muslims already in the United States. These adjustments require 
researchers to use estimates of the birth and death rates, and then apply them to each 
generation of immigrants.  
 
4.11 American Muslims 
A careful study in San Diego, California, found that the Muslim population there 
was capable of doubling every six years. However, a more rigorous study in Illinois 
found the Muslim population in that state doubled every 17 years, or only about a third 
of the increase estimated in San Diego. 
American-born converts to Islam also increase the U.S. Muslim population, and 
researchers say getting accurate estimates of this group may be the most difficult 
challenge of all. Data on conversion from another religion to Islam is virtually non-
existent, and what estimates exist are based on conversion rates to other faiths that may 
not apply to the Muslim experience. 
 
4.11.1 Nativity, Immigration, and Citizenship 
Most U.S. Muslims (65%) are first-generation immigrants, but more than a third 
(35%) were born in the United States. One-fifth (21%) of the native-born (or 7% of all 
Muslims in the U.S.) are second generation, with one or both parents having been born 
outside of the U.S. The nearly two-thirds who were born outside of the United States 
come from at least 68 different nations, with no single nation accounting for more than 
12% of the immigrants. More than a third (37%) of all foreign-born Muslim Americans 
arrived from the Arab region. An additional 27% emigrated from the South Asian 
region, including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.  
Another 8% come from European countries and 6% from other parts of Africa. 
In terms of specific countries, 12% of foreign-born Muslims arrived from Pakistan, and 
149 
 
the same proportion from Iran. No more than 7% of first-generation immigrants were 
born in any other single country. A majority of the foreign-born Muslims arrived in the 
U.S. in the 1990s (33%) or between 2000 and 2010 (28%). An additional 23% came 
during the 1980s, while just 16% came earlier than that.  
 
The reasons for immigrating are highly varied. Roughly equal numbers cite 
educational opportunities (26%), economic opportunities (24%), and family reasons 
(24%) for moving to the U.S. An additional 20% say they came to the U.S. because of 
conflict or persecution in their home country. Conflict or persecution is cited as a reason 
for immigrating by roughly equal shares of those emigrating from Iran (26%), Arab 
nations (19%) and South Asian countries (19%). 
 
Despite the heavy presence of immigrants among the Muslim population, more 
than three-quarters (77%) of all U.S. Muslims are American citizens. In addition to the 
35% who are citizens by birth, a 65% majority of those who were born outside of the 
U.S. report that they are now naturalized citizens. The vast majority of immigrant 
Muslims who arrived prior to 1990 have been naturalized (92%), as have most of those 
who arrived during the 1990s (70%). Among more recent arrivals (2000 and later), 22% 
so far have become citizens. 
 
4.11.2 Gender and Age 
Estimating the proportion of male and female Muslims in America is more 
complicated than it may seem. Previous surveys of Muslim Americans – including the 
self identified Muslims who participated in the Pew Research Center’s nationwide 
surveys over the past decade – tended to complete more interviews with male Muslims 
than female Muslims. However, potential cultural factors – in particular, the possibility 
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that some Muslims consider it inappropriate for Muslim women to be interviewed by a 
stranger, especially if the interviewer is male – make these unreliable as measures of the 
overall gender balance among U.S. Muslims. 
 
For this reason, the survey asked Muslim respondents for information about the 
number of people living in their household, and the gender and religious affiliation of 
each person. When compiled, these figures indicate that 54% of all adult Muslims in the 
U.S. are male, while 46% are female. 
 
The survey’s finding that most adult Muslims in the U.S. are male is consistent 
with U.S. Census data on immigrants from majority-Muslim nations. Males constitute a 
majority of immigrants from several Muslim nations that are the source of significant 
numbers of people coming to the U.S. 
 
The balance of men and women is similar across most immigrant groups, 
including South Asians and Arabs. In addition, more than six-in ten native-born African 
American Muslims are male (64%); there is a closer division between males and 
females (52% male vs. 48% female) among other native-born Muslims. 
Muslim Americans are significantly younger than the non-Muslim population. 
More than half of adult Muslims (56%) are between the ages of 18 and 39; in the 
general public, just 40% of adults are in this category. The survey finds that 13% of 
Muslim adults are 55 and older; in the broader population, 30% of adults fall into this 
age group. Muslim adults who were born in the United States are younger than those 
who were born elsewhere, and it is the non-black native born who are the youngest. 
Nearly half (46%) of native-born Muslim adults who are not African American are 
between 18 and 29 years of age. The group under age 30 is lower among both native-
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born African American Muslims (28%) and foreign-born Muslims (26%), though these 
groups are significantly younger than the public at large. 
 
Marriage rates are similar for Muslims and non-Muslims. Sixty percent of the 
survey’s respondents say they are married, compared with 57% among the general 
public. The percentage of Muslim Americans who report being divorced or separated 
(9%) is slightly lower than among the general public (13%). 
 
4.11.3 Race and Ethnicity 
No single racial group constitutes a majority among the Muslim American 
population: 38% describe themselves as white, 26% black, 20% Asian, and 16% other 
or mixed race. Foreign-born Muslims are 44% white, 28% Asian, and 18% mixed or 
other. Just 10% say they are black. By comparison, a 56% majority of native-born 
Muslims are black, 31% are white and just 2% describe themselves as Asian.  
Within specific ethnic heritages, 64% of Muslims from the Arab region say they 
are white, while 20% say they are some other or mixed race. By contrast, 85% of 
Pakistanis and 77% of those from other South Asian nations describe their race as 
Asian. Overall, just 4% of Muslim Americans say they are of Hispanic origin or 
descent, though this number is 10% among native-born Muslims. This includes 8% 
among African American Muslims and 11% among others who were born in the U.S. 
 
4.11.4 Income and Education 
American Muslims generally mirror the U.S. public in education and income. 
Compared with the general public, somewhat fewer Muslims have finished high school 
and considerably fewer own their home, but just as many have earned college degrees 
and attended graduate school. More than one-fifth of U.S. Muslims (22%) are enrolled 
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in college classes, with similar rates of college enrollment among foreign-born Muslims 
(22%) and native-born Muslims (20%). About a quarter (24%) of American Muslims 
have a college degree, including 10% who have gone on to graduate study. 
 
These numbers are similar to the U.S. general public. A somewhat larger 
proportion of Muslims have not finished high school (21%) than is true for the public at 
large (16%). Economically, family income among American Muslims is roughly 
comparable with that of the population as a whole. Among adults nationwide, 44% 
report household incomes of $50,000 or more annually, as do 41% of American Muslim 
adults. At the highest end of the income scale, American Muslims are about as likely to 
report household incomes of $100,000 or more as are members of the general public 
(16% for Muslims compared with 17% among the public). Roughly a third of both 
Muslim Americans (35%) and adults nationwide (33%) report household incomes of 
less than $30,000 annually.  
 
The extent to which Muslims are integrated into the economic mainstream in 
America is in stark contrast to the position of Muslims living in four major Western 
European nations. Surveys of Muslim populations in Great Britain, France, Germany 
and Spain conducted in 2006 as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project found Muslims 
to be much less affluent relative to the general populations of those nations. For 
example, a majority of Muslims in Germany (53%) reported family incomes of less than 
18,000 Euros annually compared with 35% of Germans overall. A similar gap exists in 
France. In Great Britain, 61% of Muslims reported incomes of less than 20,000 pounds, 
compared with 39% of the general public. In addition, 73% of Spanish Muslims report 
incomes of less than 14,500 Euros compared with half of the population nationwide. 
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4.11.5 Economic Satisfaction and Employment 
Muslim Americans are slightly less likely than members of the general public to 
express overall satisfaction with their personal financial situation (42% “excellent” or 
“good” vs. 49% in a recent national survey). Immigrant Muslims are happier with their 
finances than are native-born Muslims (47% excellent/good among immigrants vs. 37% 
among native-born). Differences between individual subgroups are especially large: 
68% of Muslims of Pakistani heritage rate their situation excellent or good, compared 
with 42% among those of Arab descent and just 30% among African American 
Muslims. Although Muslim Americans as a group are doing reasonably well financially, 
a lower percentage reports being employed fulltime than among the general public.  
 
Overall 41% say they work full-time, compared with 49% of the general 
population. There is little difference in the overall rate of employment between foreign-
born (40%) and native-born Muslims (42%). But there are significant differences by 
subgroups. Immigrants who came to the U.S. prior to 1990 have a full-time employment 
rate comparable to the general public’s (55%), while more recent immigrants lag behind 
(33% work full-time). Among Arab Americans, only 29% are employed full-time. 
African American Muslims (at 45%) match the full-time employment rate for all 
Muslims (41%). 
 
Part-time employment is fairly common among American Muslims, with rates 
exceeding the U.S. public’s (16% vs. 11% in the public). In addition, a significant 
number of Muslims say that they are self-employed or own a small business (24%), 
including 32% among African American native-born Muslims and 29% among 
Muslims of Pakistani heritage. 
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4.11.6 Household Composition 
Most U.S. Muslims (61%) live in multiple-person households in which everyone 
is a Muslim. But nearly one-in four (23%) live in a household with at least one non-
Muslim. Among native born Muslims, the number living in mixed households is 
considerably higher (43%); 57% of native-born African American Muslims share a 
home with one or more non-Muslims. 
One-third of adult Muslims (33%) live in households with no children; half 
(48%) live in households where all of the children are Muslim, and smaller numbers 
live in households with one or more non-Muslim child. Native-born Muslims are 
especially likely to live in households with at least one non- Muslim child (24%). 
 
4.11.7 Religious Belief and Practice 
Just like the larger American public of which they are a part, most U.S. Muslims 
say that religion is very important to them and that they accept the basic tenets of their 
faith. Most pray every day and four-in-10 attend a mosque at least once a week. Yet 
there is considerable religious diversity in American Islam, resembling the diversity of 
American Christian. A large majority of Muslims accept the Koran as the word of God, 
but only half say that it should be taken literally, word for word. Most Muslims also say 
there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam. 
 
One distinctive feature of the Muslim American population is the relatively large 
number of converts from outside of the tradition. Nearly one-quarter have converted to 
Islam, most of them from Christianity. Nearly all of the conversions to Islam are among 
the native-born population, and the majority of all converts to Islam are African 
Americans. 
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4.11.8 Islamic Affiliation 
Muslims in the United States belong to diverse religious traditions within Islam. 
Half identify with Sunni Islam, the largest Muslim tradition worldwide. The second 
largest segment of the Muslim American population – about one-fifth of the total (22%) 
– volunteers they are just Muslim, without any particular affiliation. An additional 16% 
identify with Shia Islam, which is the second largest Muslim tradition worldwide. Only 
5% of U.S. Muslims identify with another Muslim tradition, and 7% did not offer a 
response. Sunni Muslims make up about half of both the native-born (50%) and foreign-
born (53%) segments of the U.S. Muslim population, but there are bigger differences 
when it comes to other traditions. Among Muslim Americans who were born in the 
United States, just 7% identify with Shia Islam, while 30% say they are Muslim without 
specifying a tradition. Among Muslims who immigrated to the United States, 21% 
identify themselves as Shia. Those who say they do not have a particular affiliation 
(18%). Not surprisingly, religious affiliation is strongly linked to a person’s country of 
origin. 
American Muslims who are first- or second-generation immigrants from Arab 
countries are mostly Sunni (56%), with about one-fifth each either Shia (19%) or just 
Muslim (23%). Large majorities of Pakistanis (72%) and other South Asians (82%) are 
Sunni, while Iranians are overwhelmingly Shia (91%). 
 
Overall, 20% of U.S. Muslims are native-born African Americans, nearly half of 
whom (48%) identify as Sunni. Another third (34%) of native-born African Americans 
say they are just a Muslim, and 15% have another affiliation, including Shia and the 
Nation of Islam. 
 
4.11.9 Converts to Islam 
156 
 
More than three-quarters (77%) of Muslim Americans say they have always 
been a Muslim, while 23% say they converted to Islam. Nine-in-10 (91%) converts to 
Islam were born in the United States, and almost three-fifths (59%) of converts to Islam 
are African American. A 55% majority of converts identify with Sunni Islam and 
another quarter (24%) identify with no specific tradition. Only 6% of Muslim converts 
in America identify themselves as Shia. Almost half (49%) of Muslim converts in 
America report that their conversion occurred when they were under 21 years of age, 
another third (34%) converted when they were between ages 21 and 35, and 17% when 
they were older than 35.  
 
The early age of most conversions to Islam resembles the typical pattern of 
conversion in the general public, where religious change is concentrated in adolescence 
and early adulthood. Two-thirds (67%) of all converts to Islam in the U.S. came from 
Protestant churches, 10% came from Catholicism, and just 5% from other religions. 
Nearly one-in-seven converts to Islam (15%) had no religion before their conversion. 
Most converts to Islam (58%) cite aspects of the religion as the reason for their 
conversion. These include references to the truth or appeal of Islam’s teachings, the 
belief that Islam is superior to Christianity, or that the religion just “made sense” to 
them. Just 18% of converts mentioned family reasons, such as marrying a Muslim, as 
the reason for their conversion. 
 
4.11.10 Religious Beliefs 
Overall, Muslim Americans are fairly traditional in their religious beliefs. For 
example, 86% say that the Quran is “the word of God” and half (50%) say that the 
Quran is to be read literally, word for word. Fewer than one-in-10 U.S. Muslims (8%) 
say the Quran is a book written by men. In this regard, Muslims in this country are more 
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likely to adopt a strict literal view of the Quran than American Christians are to adopt a 
strict literal view of the Bible (50% to 40%). 
 
Large majorities of Muslim Americans accept the basic teachings of Islam. For 
example, nearly all (96%) believe in “One God, Allah,” and the Prophet Muhammad 
(94%). Belief in a future Day of Judgment (91%) and the existence of angels (87%) is 
nearly as common. While U.S. Muslims hold many traditional Islamic beliefs, a 60% 
majority also say that “there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of 
Islam.” A third says that “there is only one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam.” 
Views on diverse interpretations of Islam are associated with views of the Koran. Two-
thirds (66%) of those who believe there is only one true way to interpret the teachings 
of Islam accept a literal view of the Koran. In contrast, less than half (45%) of those 
who believe there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam hold a 
literal view of the Koran. 
 
4.11.11 Religious Practices 
Muslims in the United States take their faith seriously. For example, 72% say 
religion plays a “very important” role in their life. Another 18% say it is “somewhat 
important,” and just 9% say that religion is “not too important” or “not at all important” 
to them. 
 
While religion is very important to the vast majority, not all Muslim Americans 
practice their faith in the same way. For instance, when asked about attending a mosque 
or Islamic center for salah and Jum’ah prayer, 40% say they attend either more than 
once a week (17%) or once a week (23%). An additional 8% say they attend once or 
twice a month, and 18% report attending a mosque a few times a year, especially for the 
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Eid services. Roughly a third of Muslim Americans say they either “seldom” (16%) or 
“never” (18%) attend worship services. 
 
Mosque attendance among U.S. Muslims varies by nativity and nationality. 
Native-born Muslims (45%), especially African Americans (54%), are more likely to 
attend mosque weekly than are the foreign-born (37%). Muslims of Pakistani descent 
(57%) are more likely to be frequent attendees compared with other South Asians 
(38%). Muslims of first- or second generation Iranian descent stand out for their very 
low levels (7%) of weekly mosque attendance. Overall, nearly three-quarters (74%) of 
Muslim Americans say they are satisfied with the quality of mosques in their area, while 
15% say they are dissatisfied. Among those who attend services weekly or more often, 
83% are satisfied, while 16% are not. Satisfaction is lower among the 18% of Muslim 
Americans who never attend a mosque, but mostly because they don’t have an opinion 
one way or the other. Nationwide, 3% of Muslims note that there is no mosque nearby, 
a response that is most common among those who seldom (6%) or never (10%) attend.  
 
Three-in-10 Muslim Americans report taking part in other social and religious 
activities at a mosque or Islamic center outside of regular salah and Jum’ah prayers, and 
more than three quarters (78%) of those who are active in this regard also say they are 
satisfied with the quality of mosques available to them. A solid majority of Muslim 
Americans (61%) say they pray every day. Roughly four-in- 10 (41%) Muslims report 
praying all five prayers daily, one of the Five Pillars of Islam. Another 20% say they 
make some of the five salah every day; 20% make salah occasionally, while just (6%) 
only make Eid prayers. About one-in-10 Muslim Americans (12%) say that they never 
pray. Muslim Americans also assign considerable importance to other Islamic religious 
practices included among the Five Pillars of Islam. For example, about three-quarters of 
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Muslim Americans say that giving charity or zakat (76%) to the poor and fasting during 
Ramadan (77%) are “very important” to them.  
 
A pilgrimage to Mecca is “very important” to 63% of U.S. Muslims. Small 
minorities of Muslim Americans say that these practices are “not too” or “not at all 
important,” ranging from 8% for zakat to 15% for the Hajj pilgrimage. Most Muslim 
Americans (58%) also say that it is “very important” to read or listen to the Koran daily. 
Another 23% say this is somewhat important, while 17% say it is not too or not at all 
important to read or hear the Koran every day. 
 
4.11.12 Levels of Religious Commitment 
Nearly one-quarter (23%) of Muslim Americans have a high level of religious 
commitment, which is defined as attending mosque at least once a week, praying all 
five salah every day, and reporting that religion is “very important” in their lives. About 
as many as (26%) have a relatively low level of religious commitment, rarely engaging 
in these practices and generally regarding religion as less important in their lives. A 
majority of Muslim Americans (51%) fall somewhere in between. Religious 
commitment varies by religious affiliation. Among Sunni Muslims, 28% are highly 
religious, compared with just 13% of Shia Muslims. Those who say that they are just 
Muslim, without specifying an Islamic tradition, closely resemble U.S. Muslims as a 
whole (21% high commitment). 
 
 Muslim immigrants who arrived before 1990 are more likely than native-born 
Muslims to report low levels of religious commitment. Muslim men and women 
practice their faith in different ways. Men tend to attend services at mosques or Islamic 
centers more often than women (48% attend weekly or more vs. 30% of Muslim 
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women). However, nearly half of Muslim women (48%) say that they pray all five salah 
every day, compared with barely a third (34%) of men. Regular mosque attendance is 
particularly high among younger Muslim Americans. Full  half (51%) of Muslims under 
age 30 say they attend at least weekly, compared with 36% of those ages 30 to 54 and 
just 26% of those ages 55 and older. But daily prayer is observed somewhat more 
frequently by older Muslims. Nearly two thirds (64%) of those ages 55 and older say 
that they pray every day, compared with 54% of Muslims under age 30. 
 
4.12 The Muslim Experience: Identity, Assimilation and Community 
While Muslim Americans are somewhat less upbeat about their life and 
circumstances than are other Americans, the differences are modest, and Muslims in the 
United States are mostly satisfied with their communities and their lives. As with the 
general public, however, Muslims are less satisfied with the overall direction of the 
country. On the question of assimilation, a plurality of U.S. Muslims (43%) say that 
Muslim immigrants arriving in the U.S. should mostly adopt American customs and 
ways of life, though a significant minority (26%) thinks that new immigrants should try 
to remain distinct. Nearly half of Muslims say they think of themselves as a Muslim 
“first,” while 28% say they think of themselves as an American “first.” However, 
Muslims in Western Europe and in predominantly Muslims countries are generally 
much more likely to think of themselves primarily as Muslims, rather than as citizens of 
their countries. 
 
4.13 Happiness and Community 
Nearly eight-in-10 U.S. Muslims say they are either “very happy” (24%) or 
“pretty happy (54%) with their lives. This is modestly lower than the proportion of the 
general public expressing this view (36% very happy and 51% pretty happy). Few 
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notable demographic differences emerge in overall levels of personal satisfaction. 
Muslim immigrants are somewhat less content (74% very or pretty happy) than 
Muslims who were born in the United States (84%). Bigger differences emerge among 
younger and older Muslims: Just one-in-10 Muslims younger than 30 say they are not 
very happy with their lives, while 89% are very or pretty happy. Among Muslims ages 
30 and older, 21% are unhappy with how things are in their lives, while 74% say they 
are very or pretty happy. A similar age-related difference is evident in the general 
public. 
 
Like other Americans, Muslims are generally pleased with the communities in 
which they live. More than seven-in-10 rate their community as an “excellent” (28%) or 
“good” (44%) place to live. In the general population, 41% rate their communities as 
excellent, and 41% as good. Three-in-four Muslim immigrants (76%), compared with 
65% of all native-born Muslims, rate their home communities as either “excellent” or 
“good” places to live. Contentment with their lives and communities does not extend to 
their views about the country. Most Muslim Americans (54%) say they are dissatisfied 
with the overall direction of the county – a critical view shared by an even larger 
proportion of the general public (61%). 
 
4.14 U.S. Muslims: Americans First? 
Asked whether they think of themselves first as Americans or first as Muslims, a 
47% plurality of U.S. Muslims say they consider themselves Muslims first; 28% say 
they think of themselves first as Americans. In May 2006, when U.S. Christians were 
asked a parallel question, 42% said they think of themselves as Christians first, while 
48% said they are Americans first. The survey findings suggest the question is as much 
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a measure of personal religious commitment as an expression of patriotism to the 
United States.  
 
Among Muslim Americans who have a high level of religious commitment, 
70% say they consider themselves to be Muslims first. But among those with low 
religious commitment, just 28% see themselves this way, while a 47% plurality identify 
first as American, and 12% say they consider themselves equally Muslim and 
American. The link between religiosity and selfidentity is similar among Christians in 
America. By roughly two-to-one (59% vs. 30%), U.S. Christians who say religion is 
very important identify as Christians first, while those who say religion is less important 
identify as Americans first, by a margin of 76% to 18%. Similarly, most white 
evangelical Protestants (62%) say they primarily identify themselves as Christians 
rather than Americans, while most white mainline Protestants (65%) identify as 
Americans first. The relationship between religious attendance and religious identity 
may partially explain why younger Muslims are more likely to consider themselves as 
Muslim first. By a margin of more than two-to-one (60% vs. 25%), most Muslim 
Americans under age 30 say they think of themselves as Muslims first. About half of all 
Muslims under age 30 say they attend mosque at least once a week compared with 
slightly more than a third of Muslims age 30 and older. Among young people who 
attend weekly, nearly seven-in-10 (68%) say they identify first as Muslim compared 
with 36% of all Muslims who seldom or never attend services.  
 
4.15 Muslim Identity and Extremism 
The poll finds that one’s identification as Muslim or American also relates to 
opinions about Muslim extremism. For example, 13% of those who think of themselves 
primarily as Muslims believe that suicide bombing to defend Islam from its enemies can 
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be often or sometimes justified, compared with 4% of those who say they are American 
first. Still, overwhelming majorities of both groups reject suicide bombing as a strategy, 
including 85% of those who identify primarily as Americans and 79% who consider 
themselves Muslims first.  
 
Somewhat larger differences emerge when it comes to views about who carried 
out the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Those who 
identify themselves first as Muslim are twice as likely (40% vs. 20%) to say these 
attacks were not carried out by groups of Arabs. Slightly fewer than three-in-10 U.S. 
Muslims (28%) who think of themselves primarily as Muslim say they believe the 9/11 
attacks were carried out by groups of Arabs while six-in-10 Muslims (61%) who think 
of themselves first as American say Arabs were responsible.  
 
4.16 Assimilation vs. Maintaining Identity 
Like other U.S. religious groups, Muslims believe that their religious 
convictions can fit comfortably in a world of rapid change and shifting values. More 
than six in- 10 U.S. Muslims (63%) say they see no conflict between being a devout 
Muslim and living in a modern society, a belief they share with many Muslims around 
the world. Still, Muslim Americans struggle to find a balance between two worlds and 
two very different cultures. They divide over the best strategy for Muslim immigrants to 
pursue when they arrive in the United States. The largest share (43%) say new arrivals 
should “mostly adopt American customs and ways of life.” But 26% believe Muslims 
should “mostly try to remain distinct from the larger American society.” Another 16% 
volunteer that new immigrants should try to do both. Muslims who were born in the 
United States – particularly African American Muslims – are more likely than Muslim 
immigrants to argue against new arrivals assimilating fully into American life. Nearly 
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half of African American Muslims (47%) say that Muslim newcomers to the U.S. 
should strive to keep their religious and cultural identities; just 31% believe they should 
try to assimilate. By contrast, pluralities of other native-born Muslims and foreign-born 
Muslims say that Muslims arriving in the U.S. should try to adopt American customs. 
Gender and religiosity also are linked to views about whether new Muslim immigrants 
should assimilate. Men are more likely than women to say Muslims should adapt (48% 
vs. 38%).  
Devout Muslims are less inclined to favor new arrivals integrating into 
American life. Among those Muslims with the strongest religious commitment, fewer 
than four-in-10 (37%) say immigrants should adopt American customs, a view held by 
more than half (58%) of less religious Muslims. In general, Muslim Americans reject 
the idea that their fellow Muslims in the U.S. are becoming less religious. Roughly four-
in-10 (43%) say that Muslims in the United States are not changing very much in terms 
of their religiosity. If anything, a greater percentage says that U.S. Muslims are 
becoming more religious (31%) rather than less religious (17%). Two-thirds of those 
who say that Muslims in the United States are becoming more religious say that is a 
good thing, while about half of those who say Muslims are becoming less religious view 
this as a bad thing. Other questions portray U.S. Muslims as a community in the process 
of assimilating with the larger society. Nearly half (47%) report that all or most of their 
close friends are Muslims, while 51% report having relatively few Muslims in their 
inner friendship circle. Muslim American women are particularly likely to have mostly 
Muslim friends. A majority of Muslim women (56%) say that all or most of their close 
friends are Muslims, compared with 39% of Muslim men. For the most part, Muslim 
Americans say it is acceptable for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim, even though 
Islamic law prohibits a Muslim woman – but not a man – from marrying outside the 
faith. Overall, 62% believe it is “okay” for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim, while 
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24% say it is unacceptable; 11% volunteered that it depends. More than eight-in-10 
(84%) American Muslims with a relatively low level of religious commitment say there 
is nothing significantly wrong with interfaith marriages, compared with just 45% of 
highly religious U.S. Muslims. In addition, many more men (70%) than women (54%) 
think it is okay to marry a non-Muslim. 
 
4.17 Full Transcript of the Interview with Secretary General of Muslim World 
League   
Q. How Did the Events of 9/11 affect the Muslim World League? 
A. Muslim World League, as part of the world was affected positively or 
negatively by the events of 9/11. However, the degree of impact was uneven and varied 
according to type of activities undertaken by the Organization.  
Regarding the Dawah activity (Calling non- Muslims to embrace Islam), there 
was an increase eagerness to know about Islam and its teachings.  People here also 
become more curious to know about all aspects of the event. On the financial side, our 
organization was subjected to more scrutiny and follow-up, but because our 
organizations is one of the affiliates of the United Nations which provided us with the 
necessary legitimacy and helped the Muslim World League to be looked at with  respect 
and appreciation in the world especially the humanitarian activities.  
On the other hand, the Muslim World League has been receiving great support 
of the Muslim world as a whole assisted us to get financial support to run the various 
activities of the Organization.  
The Muslim World League has managed to avoid many of the negative aspects 
of the events of September Eleven by declaring its official position and the viewpoint of 
Islam in terrorism as counter to humanity. The World Muslim League has also led an 
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effective media campaign against anti Muslims attacks following the 9/111 events.   I 
also dealt with financial matter with transparently and legality.  
4.18 Interview with CAIR  
Q. How Did the Events of 9/11 affect CAIR? 
A. September Eleven was a horrible disaster to the whole world and all human 
kind. Humanitarian and NGOs has greatly been affected. CAIR was not an exception as 
it represents one of the biggest Islamic organizations in the United States.  It is a legal 
origination working under the American law with all transparency and commitment to it 
objectives. After 9/11 events CAIR has more challenges and greater role to play in 
removing the negative impact of the events and introducing true Islam and in protecting 
Muslims  in the United States against all types of prejudices and  aggressions.  
Regarding the positive impact of 9/11, of course there are some positive aspects, 
for instance many people start to come to the center asking about Islam and the Holly 
Book of Quran. They are so eager to know about the Islamic view on terrorism and the 
meaning of Jihad in Islam.  
Since CAIR is an American organization and abide by American law, we have 
succeeded to good extent in doing our job here and serving Muslim community because 
of our wide range of networking and good relations we have built with government and 
officials, particularly governmental bodies of humanitarian activities.    
 
4.19 The Muslim Experience: Challenges, Worries and Problems 
The terrorist attacks on September 11 continue to cast a long shadow over 
Muslim Americans. Most say life has become more difficult for Muslims in this country 
in the post-9/11 era. Many worry about government surveillance, job discrimination, 
and being harassed in public. When asked to name the biggest problem facing U.S. 
Muslims, concerns about discrimination and prejudice top the list. Fewer Muslim 
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Americans than African Americans report that they have encountered bigoted acts in the 
past year. Still, a third of U.S. Muslims report that, in the past year, they have been 
verbally harassed, physically threatened, or treated with suspicion because of their faith. 
 
A majority (53%) of all Muslim Americans say that, since the 9/11 attacks, it 
has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States. This view is particularly 
prevalent among highly educated and wealthier Muslims: Nearly two-thirds of U.S. 
Muslims (65%) who have attended graduate school, and 68% of those with household 
incomes of $100,000 a year or more, say 9/11 has made it harder to be a Muslim. In 
addition, highly religious Muslims also are more likely to say things have become more 
difficult for Muslims in the post-9/11 era compared with those who are less religious 
(by 57%-46%).  
 
Prejudice, being viewed as terrorists, ignorance about Islam, and negative 
stereotyping lead the list of the biggest problems that U.S. Muslims say they face. At 
the same time, other problems that typically rank among the public’s top worries barely 
make the list of Muslim concerns. For example, just 2% mention economic and job 
worries. The rankings display a consistent pattern: Problems rooted in prejudice, 
ignorance or misunderstandings dominate the list. Beyond discrimination (19%), 
American Muslims say that their most important problems are being viewed as terrorists 
(15%), ignorance about Islam (14%), and stereotyping (12%). Significantly, an 
overwhelming majority of Muslims named at least one of these problems as a top 
concern for U.S. Muslims. 
 
More than half of Muslim Americans (54%) believe the government’s anti-
terrorism efforts single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. And 
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most of those who believe the government gives extra scrutiny to Muslims say this 
attention bothers them either a lot (40%) or some (34%). The belief that government 
anti-terrorist policies target Muslims is much more widespread among immigrants who 
came to the U.S. before 1990 (61%) than among more recent Muslim immigrants 
(40%). However, a relatively large proportion of recent immigrants declined to respond 
to this question (22%). A large majority of native-born Muslim Americans say that U.S. 
anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for extra surveillance.  
 
This view is shared as widely among African American Muslims (72%) as 
among native-born Muslims who are not black (74%). Notably, many non-Muslims also 
believe that government anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims. Nearly half of the 
public (45%) believes these policies do target Muslims, while 43% say they do not. 
However, only about half of the Americans who think Muslims are singled out (52%) 
say they are bothered a lot or some by this, compared with 74% of Muslim Americans.  
About one-in-five Muslim Americans (22%) say they are very worried that 
women who wear the hijab – the traditional Muslim headscarf – will be treated poorly 
because it identifies them as Muslim; 29% say they are somewhat worried about this. 
Muslim American men and women are equally likely to worry that Muslim women 
wearing a hijab will be treated poorly.  
 
Notably, Muslim women who always wear a hijab are slightly less concerned 
about this than are women who never wear it. Overall, 43% of Muslim American 
women say they wear the hijab all the time (38%) or most of the time (5%), while 
another 8% wear one only some of the time. Nearly half of Muslim women (48%) 
report they never wear the traditional head covering. In terms of their personal concerns, 
37% of Muslim Americans say they are very or somewhat worried about not being 
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hired for a job or promoted because of their religion. Slightly fewer (32%) are very or 
somewhat concerned about their telephone calls and emails being monitored by the 
government because of their religion.  
 
A quarter of American Muslims say that, in the past year, “people have acted as 
if they were suspicious” of them. Somewhat fewer (15%) say they have been called 
offensive names. Smaller proportions report they have been singled out by law 
enforcement (9%) or physically threatened or assaulted (4%) because they are Muslim. 
Overall, a third of Muslim Americans interviewed report that they experienced at least 
one of these hostile acts in the past 12 months. To place these findings in context, Pew 
conducted a separate survey of African Americans and measured personal experiences 
with racial discrimination. A third of all African Americans report that people have 
acted as if they are suspicious of them in the past year, compared with 26% of Muslim 
Americans. Roughly the same share of blacks and U.S Muslims report they had been 
called offensive names (20% vs. 15%).  
 
While the overall percentages are small, African Americans also are more than 
twice as likely as U.S. Muslims to say they have been singled out by police, or 
physically threatened or attacked, in the past 12 months. Taken together, nearly half 
(46%) of all blacks report that they have had at least one of these four experiences in the 
past year, or 13 percentage points greater than the proportion of Muslims who have 
personally encountered similar acts of intolerance. In the past year, younger Muslim 
Americans are more likely to say they have been victims of discrimination or 
intolerance based on their religion. Roughly four-in-10 (42%) Muslims under the age of 
30 say in the past year they have experienced verbal taunts, been treated with suspicion, 
been physically threatened or attacked, or been targeted by police because they are 
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Muslims, compared with 29% of Muslims who are 30 years old or older. African 
Americans who are Muslim appear to bear a double burden, as they say they face racial 
as well as religious intolerance.  
 
Overall, half of all Muslims who are African American say they have been the 
target of bigotry based on their religion in the past 12 months, compared with 28% of 
white Muslims and 23% of Asian Muslims. However, expressions of support are just as 
common as incidents of bigotry and intolerance, the survey suggests. Overall, about a 
third of U.S. Muslims (32%) say someone had offered them support because they were 
Muslim, which is virtually identical to the proportion that reported experiencing an act 
of prejudice or hostility. Native-born Muslims are significantly more likely than 
immigrants (54% vs. 22%) to report having been the recipients of supportive words. 
While younger Muslims appear to encounter more intolerant acts, they are also more 
likely to have had positive encounters: 40% say someone has expressed support for 
them because they are Muslim, compared with 29% of those 30 or older. In addition to 
overt expressions of prejudice, 18% of Muslim Americans report they have been singled 
out by airport security for inspection or questioning in the past year. When the analysis 
is limited to Muslims who report having taken a trip by airplane in the past year, 30% 
report having been singled out by security because they are Muslim, while 68% say this 
experience did not happen to them. 
 
Asked whether they believe groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the 
United States on Sept. 11, 2001, 40% of Muslim Americans say yes, while 28% say 
they do not believe this, and about a third (32%) say they do not know or decline to 
answer the question. When those who say Arabs were not involved in the 9/11 attacks 
are asked who they believe was responsible, most say they do not know or declined to 
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answer. Seven percent of Muslims overall say that the attacks were the result of a 
conspiracy involving the United States government or the Bush administration. Very 
small proportions hold others responsible, including individuals other than Muslims 
(1%), Israel or Jewish interests (1%), and crazy or misguided people (1%). Despite 
widespread doubts about the official accounts of 9/11, Muslims in the U.S. are more 
likely than Muslims living in a number of European and majority-Muslim countries to 
believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks. For instance, Muslims in the U.S. 
are more than twice as likely as Muslims in Great Britain (17%), Turkey (16%), 
Indonesia (16%) and Pakistan (15%) to say that groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 
attacks. In all of these countries, clear majorities or pluralities reject the official account 
of the attacks. In the U.S., younger Muslims are more likely than older Muslims to say 
they do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, among 
Muslims under the age of 30, 38% reject the fact that groups of Arabs were responsible 
for 9/11. By comparison, among Muslims 55 and older, just 16% say that Arabs were 
not responsible for the attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
The events of 9/11 have impacted the world in many ways and to varied degrees. 
There is a change in attitudes towards Muslims whether they live in the United States or 
abroad.  Legislative changes made many Muslims and nonprofit organizations subject 
to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in the U.S. at large had also 
been affected. In the aftermath of 9/11 tens of international Muslim organizations were 
either shut down, frozen or reduced their activities on the assumption that they had 
some relation with terrorist groups that attacked the two towers of the World Trade 
Center.  Some of these organizations were based in the US while others were working 
from outside the soil of the United States. 
 
This research explores the influence of the September 11, 2001 attacks on 
nonprofit Islamic organizations which have activities in the United States. Content 
analysis is used to examine articles from newspaper published in the United States and 
interviews of leaders of these organizations as well as data and figures released by these 
organizations.  The articles were mainly taken from US media, namely CNN and 
Washington Post as representatives of the US media.  
 
The current research is both qualitative and quatitative in which three 
organizations were studied to find out how nonprofit Islamic organizations have been 
affected in the aftermath of 9/11 in terms of their activities and services rendered to 
Muslim communities in the United States. The three organizations are:  
a- The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). 
b- The Muslim World League (MWL). 
c- The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR). 
The study is intended to realize the following objectives:  
1. To assess the impact of 9/11 media reports on selected Islamic non-profit 
organizations and their activities.  
2. To shed light on the most and least affected areas of activities of the 
three Islamic organizations that were selected for the study.  
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3. To study the U.S. media coverage of 9/11 and assess this type of 
coverage from a professional point of view.   
 
This study includes a qualitative case study of Islamic nonprofit organizations. 
Instruments of data collection about these organizations included, semi-structured 
interviews, a questionnaire, and an in-depth analysis of media material, news reports 
and articles published by CNN and the Washington Post. Content analysis was used to 
analyze the media articles and news stories.  
The study attempted to answer the following questions:  
1. What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in 
general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular ?  
2. What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic 
organizations ? 
3. What is the content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to Islam, 
Muslims and Islamic nonprofit organizations? 
The results of the questionnaire also indicate that the 9/11 events have also 
negatively impacted the level of participation of Muslim youth and Muslim Scholars in 
the various activities arranged by the organizations under study. 
It is also revealed that the organizations’ activities are now more closely 
watched by the government and the security forces. 
On the American media level, the results of the study indicate that the media 
always project negative views of the activities of the Islamic organizations based in 
America. 
The respondents have also claimed that the events of September 11 have led to a 
campaign against Islam and Muslims, they also claimed that hatred for Muslims has 
significantly increased after the 9/11 events. 
Generally speaking one can arrange the activities that mostly affected by 9/11 
attacks in the following order from top to down:  
1- Dawaa activities (77.8%)  
2- Media activities (66%)  
3- Social activities (66.1%) 
4- Political activities (60%)  
 
Thus the most affected activity was Dawaa and the least affected was political 
activity. The reason behind this may be due to the fact that Dawaa activity is closely 
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related to religion and connected with Islamic teachings such as Jihad. Unfortunately 
Jihad was tremendously misunderstood by many Western governments and people 
particularly after 9/11. The reason for this is due to Muslim radical practices and 
thoughts which had a negative impact on the image of pure Islam and tolerant Muslims. 
There are some radical Muslims including Al Qaeda group that misinterpret Islamic 
teachings in a way that leads to the killing of innocent people. Their attitude was widely 
refuted and rejected by most well known Muslim scholars, organizations and even 
countries.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
The events of 9/11 have impacted the world in many ways and to varied degrees. 
There is a change in attitudes towards Muslims whether they live in the United States or 
in other countries.  Legislative changes made many Muslims and nonprofit 
organizations subject to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in the U.S. 
at large had also been affected. After many nonprofit Muslim organizations were either 
shut down, frozen or reduced their activities on the assumption that they had some 
relation with terrorist groups that attacked the Two Towers of the World Trade Center.  
Some of these organizations were based in the US while others were working from 
outside the soil of the United States. 
 
The media has played a negative role in shaping the public opinion showing that 
a large number of Americans have a negative attitude towards Islam and hate crimes 
against Muslims continue unabated. This is the logical consequence of stereotyping of 
Muslims by the media. 
 
The researcher has come to the conclusion that the U.S. press has a tendency to 
exaggerate in its coverage of events related to Muslims, thus promoting Islamophobia. 
The impact of these reports on Islamic nonprofit organizations based in America 
has been incredibly harmful.  
 
 
Nevertheless, the researcher has a strong sense of optimism that the current 
wave of Islamophobia will recede in due time and American Muslims will regain their 
civic vitality and rejoin the mosaic of other minorities and ethnic groups. The American 
Muslims will join their predecessors: Japanese Americans, American Jews, Irish 
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Americans and African Americans who also, in times past, endured national intolerance, 
social prejudice, and legal injustice. 
 
Many people many not agree with these observations but the biased government 
legislation and policies which infringe on the civil rights of the Muslims and Arabs and 
the growing use of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric by media and some local and 
national opinion leaders give credence to the arguments of this research. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
In order to change the negative attitudes which have developed towards Islam 
and Muslims in general and the Islamic charity organizations based in America or 
outside America, a number of rigorous measures have to be followed to safeguard the 
continuity of the vital services provided by these organizations Those may include : 
1- According to respondents. It is suggested that Islamic 
organizations can minimize the negative impact of 9/11 events by participating 
in political life. 
2- Opening new branches : Their strategy should involve opening 
new branches. 
3- Using media to present organizations properly and correct false 
views of Islam and Islamic organizations. 
4- They should also call on VIPs to participate in their activities. 
5- The organizations need financial support, so they can continue 
their social philanthropic and Dawah activities. 
6- The organizations need to be provided with cultural, educational, 
administrative and trained specialists. 
7- The organizations need to use the public and the private media 
very well to explain the Islamic position on violence and terrorism. 
8- These organizations must have a great presence in the Muslim 
society in America and must demonstrate great comprehension of September 
11th events. 
9- The offices and centers of the organizations must cover the whole 
Muslim community in the U.S. 
10- The activities must cater to the members’ needs with respect to 
their life philosophy and ages. 
176 
 
11- The organizations need to be more useful to both the Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the society. 
12- The organizations need to build bridges with influential members 
of local government through a variety of activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
References 
Aaronovitch, D. (2010). Voodoo Histories:  How  the Conspiracy Theory is    Shaping 
Modern Histories,  London:Tantor Media Inc (audio book) 
Ali, M. S. (2002). “Arab/Muslim ‘Otherness: The Role of Racial Otherness in the Gulf 
War and the Continuing Crisis with Iraq”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22, 131-
148. 
 
Ali, M. S. (2003). Reconstructing ‘Evil’: A Critical Assessment of Post- September 11 
Political Discourse, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 23, 249-269.  
 
Ali, M.S. (2004) On Textualization and Periodization of Muslim Civic and Political 
Activities in Portland, Oregon. The pluralism report at Harvard University.  
 
 Allen, S. Y.( 2005). President Bush’s Enthymeme of Evil: The Amalgamation of 9/11, 
Iraq, and Moral Values. American Behavioral Scientist, 49, 32-47. 
 
Associated Press, August 6, 2003 
 
Barber, Peter. (2008). The Truth is Out  There, Part 1 and 2, The Financial Times, 7 
June 2008.uleyman Ahmad (ND) " An activists Guide to Arab and Muslim campus and 
community organiztions in North America" P7 
Basnawi, S 
 
Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Cole, D. (2011). Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual Rights After 9/11, 
Wayne Law Review, vol. 57 pp1203-1267 
 
Cooley, J. (2002). Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, 
London: Pluto Press 
 
Carlson, Tucker, MSNBC, August 9 2006, Interview with Dr David Ray Griffin, 
http:www.yuotube.com.watch?v=AxKW3EqbfRE&mode=related&search   Accessed 
on 4 October 2011 
178 
 
Clyde-Ahmad, W. (1977). Islam in Early North and South America, al.Ittihad, vol 14, 
July- October, p 58-66 
 
Ellis, Colin (2009) A Conspiracy Nut Walks Into A Coffee Shop. Online Collaboration 
and invoice management. Aug 20 
 
 Emily, W. September 19, (2001). Multicultural Neighbors Share History of 
Community, Fears about the Future. The Washington Post,  B-1. 26.  
 
Engel, M. (2007). U.S. Media Cowed by Patriotic Fever, The Guardian, 17. May, 2007 
 
 Esposito (eds.) Muslims on the Americanization Path?. Atlanta: Scholars Press.  
 
 Esposito, J. (1998). Muslims in America or American Muslims. in Yvonne Yazbeck, 3-
15.  
 
Fell, B. (1980). Saga America. New York: Times Books 
 
Fredrickson, G. M. (2002). Racism: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Gamson, W. A., Croteau, D., Hayes, W. and Sasson, T. (1992). Media Images and the 
Social Construction of Reality. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 373-393. 
 
Ghauri, Pervez  and Gronhaug, K. (2005). Research Methods in Busines     Studies: A 
Practical Guide. Essex: Prentice Hall. 
  
Ghazali, Abdus Sattar (2012) Islam & Muslims in the Post-9/11 America, 
www://amazon,com 
 
Glover, Scott, (2009). FBI monitored members of D.C. mosques at gyms, Los  Angeles 
Times, 28, April, 2009 
 
Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
179 
 
Yazbeck, H.Y and Lummis, A. T. (1987). Islamic Values in the United States. New 
York: Oxford University Press. Yazbeck, H. Y.(1998). The Dynamics of Islamic 
Identity in North America. 19-39 in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L.  
 
Griffin, D.R. (2007). Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics 
and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory, Northampton: Olive Branch 
Press 
 
Harris, S. (2010). The Watchers: The Rise of America’s Surveillance State, London: 
Penguin Press 
 
Haddad and Esposito, J. (Eds.). Muslims on the Americanization Path?. New York 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Huff, M & Rea, P.W. Deconstructing Deceit: 9/11, the Media and Myth Information 
www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20090309170952776 
 
Hunt, Keith. Restitution Of All Things http://www.keithhunt.com/conspi14.html   
Accessed on 14 December 2012. 
 
Hussey, J and Hussey, R. (1977). Business Research: A Practical Guide for 
Undergraduates and Postgraduates, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
 
Hutcheson, John, David Domke, Andre Billeadeaux and Philip Garland. 2004. “U.S. 
National Identity, Political Elites, and the Patriotic Press Following September 11.” 
Political Communication 21, 27-50.  
 
Ingrid, M. (2003). How Muslims Use Islamic Paradigms to Define America, in Yvonne 
Yazbeck Haddad, Jane L. Smith and John L. Esposito (eds.), Religion and Immigration: 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim Experiences in the United States. New York: Altamira 
Press.  
 
IPT News, December, 1, 2010 
 
180 
 
Jennifer, S. August, 10, (2001). On the Road to Endorsements by Ethnic Groups, 
Mayoral Hopefuls Fall into Potholes. The New York Times, B-3. van Dijk, Teun, A. 
(1993). Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society, 4,249-283. 
 
Jim, R. September 16 (2001). Syracusans Talk about Being Muslim-Now. The Post-
Standard, p. B1. Saeed, Agha. (2002). The American Muslim Paradox. 39-57 in Yvonne 
Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I.  
 
Joe, R. (2000). Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations. New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Johnson, R. (2011) A Theoretical Framework for Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Framing 
Tolerance via Moral Malleability and Entitativity Perceptions, The Yale Review of 
Undergraduate Research in Psychology, pdf. Accessed on 22 December, 2012 
 
Judt, Tony, 2006. Bush’s Useful Idiots, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n18/tony-judt/bushs-
useful-idiots. 
 
Karen, L. (2003a). American Muslim Politics: Discourses and Practices. Ethnicities 2: 
147-81.  
 
Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 2003. Muslims in the United States: The State of Research, 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Karim, K. H. (1997). The Historical Resilience of Primary Stereotypes: Core Images of 
the Muslim Other. 153 -182 in Stephen Harold Riggins (ed) The Language and Politics 
of Exclusion.  
 
Kern, M. and Just, M. (eds.). Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, 
and the Public. New York: Routledge.  
 
Khan, Mohommad A. Muqtedar. (2003). Constructing the American Muslim 
Community. 175-198 in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 
 
181 
 
Khan, Mohommad A. Muqtedar. (1998). ‘Muslims and Identity Politics in America.’ 
Pp. 87-101 in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (eds.), Muslims on the 
Americanization Path? Atlanta: Scholars Press 
 
Kroessin, M. R. (2007). Islamic Charities and the ‘War on Terror: Dispelling the 
Myths, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, issue 38. 
 
Laurie, G. September 12, (2001). A Day of Terror: The Ties; In U.S., Echoes of Rift of 
Muslims and Jews. A-12. 
 
Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 2003b. Muslims in the United States: The State of Research, 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
 
Leonie, H., Feldman, S., Lahav, G. and Taber, C. (2003). Fear and Terrorism: 
Psychological Reactions to 9/11.,  in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just 
(eds.), Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public. New 
York: Routledge.  
 
Matsaganis, M. D. and Gregory,  P. J. (2005). Agenda Setting in a Culture of Fear: The 
Lasting Effect of September 11 on American Politics and Journalism. American 
Behavioral Scientists 49:379-392.  
 
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching, London: Sage 
 
McDonald, I. R. and Lawrence, R. G. (2004). Filling the 24 X 7 News Hole: Television 
News Coverage following September 11. American Behavioral Scientist 48, 327-340.  
 
Michael, O. & Howard, W. (1994). Racial Formation in the United States: From the 
1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge.  
 
Michael, P. (2001). Faith and Fear While Joining in Mourning Terrorism’s Latest 
Victims, Muslim-Americans Voice Concerns about a Racist Reaction. Boston Globe, p. 
D1.  
 
182 
 
 
Muwakkil (2002). THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA. 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/21/feature1.shtml 
 
Nacos, B. L. and Ocscar T. R. (2003). Framing Muslim Americans Before and After 
9/11. 133-157 in Pippa Norris,  
 
Nyang, S. S. (1999). Islam in the United States of America. Chicago: ABC International 
Group, Inc 
 
Educational Research Methodology, (2011). Kuala Lumpur: Open University Malaysia 
 
Peter, S. (2007). The 4th World War -The Path from Marx to Allah, Netherlands Middle 
East Quarterly. 
 
Peter, S. September 29. (2001). Amid Islam’s Complexity, Scholars Challenged to 
Influence Change Without Compromising. The New York Times,  D-4. 
 
Project Censored, (www.projectcensored.org) 
 
Punch, Terrence M. (1989). Genealogist's handbook for Atlantic Canada Research, 
New England Historic Genealogical Society: Boston. 
 
Quick, A,H, (1996). Deeper Roots: Muslims in the Americas and the Carribean from 
before Columbus to the Present, London: Ta-Ha Publishers 
 
Reinard, J. C. (2001). Introduction to Communication Research, Boston: McGraw-Hill 
 
Riggins (ed.) The Language and Politics of Exclusion. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage 
Publications.  
 
Riggins, Stephen Harold. 1997. The Rhetoric of Othering.,1-30 in Stephen Harold.  
 
Ritchie, J. and Lewis. J. (eds.) (2003). Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for 
Social Science Students and Researchers. Sage Publications,  London. 
183 
 
 
Rosenberry, J. and Vicker, L.A. (2009). Applied Mass Communication Theory: A Guide 
for Media Practitioners, Boston: Pearson 
 
Saiyd, E. W. (1997). Covering Islam: How Media and the Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Saunders M. et al (2007). Research Methods for Business Students, Harlow: Pearson 
Education 
 
Siebelt, P. (2007). The Fourth World War – The Path from Marx to Allah, The Middle 
East Quarterly, Winter 2007, vol. XIV: Number 1 
 
Silverman, David (2005). Doing Qualitative Research: a Practical Handbook (2nd ed.), 
London: Sage. 
 
Smith (eds.), Muslim Minorities in the West. New York: Altamira Press. - Smith, G. L. 
and Esposito, J. L. (eds.). Religion and Immigration: Christian, Jewish and Muslim 
Experiences in the United States. New York: Altamira Press. 
 
Smyith, T. L. (1978). Religion and Ethnicity in America. American Historical Review, 
83, 1155-1185. Solomon, Alisa. September 4, (2001). Vested Interests. Village Voice, 
p.32. 
  
Taibbi, Matt (2008) The Great Derangement : A Terrying True Story of War, Politics, 
and Religion, London: Random House audio 
 
 Spiegel & Grau, 1st  Edition (May 6, 2008) 
 
Trudie, R. and King, B. (2000). An Alternative to the Fighting Frame in News 
Reporting. Canadian Journal of Communication, 25, 479-496. Riggins, Stephen Harold. 
1997. The Rhetoric of Othering.,1-30 in Stephen Harold.  
 
 
184 
 
U.S. Muslim Charities and the War on Terror: A Decade in Review, (2011). Charity & 
Security Network, December 2011, www.charityandsecurity.org 
 
Van Dijk, T. A. (1997). Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western 
Parliaments. 31-64 in Stephen Harold Riggins (ed) The Language and Politics of 
Exclusion. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications. 
 
Van Sertima, I. (1976). They Came Before Columbus : The African Presence in Ancient 
America, New York: Random House 
 
Weiner, L. (1920). Africa and  the Discovery of America, vol 3, Philadelphia, PA: Innes 
& Sons, p 271 
 
Will. H. (1960). Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology. 
Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. 
Williamson Murray (2006) “Strategic Challenges for counterinsurgency and the global 
waron terrorism” Strategic Studies Institutes. US Army college.P 274.  BOOK 
 
Winthrop, John (1630). A Model of Christian Charity, available  
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html. 
 
Wuensch, K. L. (2005). What is a Likert Scale and How Do You Pronounce Likert, East 
Carolina University 
 
Yazbeck, H.Y and Lummis, A. T. (1987). Islamic Values in the United States. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Yin, R.K.1994.Case Study Research, Design and Methods, 2nd ed. Newbury Park, Sage 
Publications. 
     
185 
 
 
Additional References 
 
a. What the World Wants -- and How To Pay For It Using 
Military Expenditures, a project of the World Game Institute 
 
b. Text and analysis of the `USA PATRIOT Act' and Draft: 
The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 
 
c. The Federalist Society: Hijacking Justice, by George 
Curry & Trevor Coleman, Emerge, October 1999 
 
d. Perversions of Justice, talk by Ward Churchill, 2/22/03 
 
e. Impeach Bush, Cheney, Ashcroft, Rumsfeld Campaign 
 
f. SITE REPLICA: Policy Analysis Market - betting on war, 
capitalism's logical endstate 
 
g. Peter Dale Scott: On War, 9/11, Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, 
Drugs, Oil, Iraq, and Osama bin Laden 
 
h. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is published in Media 
Monitors; and see his book, The War on Freedom, How and Why 
America was Attacked September 11, 2001 (July 2002) 
 
i. The Secret Team, The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the 
United States and the World, by L. Fletcher Prouty, Col., U.S. Air Force 
(Ret.), 1973, 1997  
j. Understanding Special Operations, And Their Impact on 
The Vietnam War Era - 1989 Interview with L. Fletcher Prouty, Colonel 
USAF (Retired), by David T. Ratcliffe, 1999. 
 
k. The Gatekeepers, The Progressive / Left establishment 
and the marginalization of conspiracy research 
186 
 
l. 9/11 Primer: Broadening Our Perspectives of 11 
September 2001, by David T. Ratcliffe, September 2002 
 
m. Sanctions and War on Iraq: In 300 words - Citizens 
Concerned for the People of Iraq, 8/11/02 
 
n. truthout, CommonDreams, Online Journal, and 
CounterPunch - a more representative lens of all our humanity  
o. The Emperor's New Clothes independent analysis 
includes a listing of Articles On 9-11 
 
p. Uprooting "Growth" as Metaphor: 20th Century 
Reflections for the 21st, by Richard Grossman, 1999 
 
q. The Rule Of Law versus Democracy, by Doug 
Hammerstrom, Winter 2002  
r. Richard Grossman on the USA Patriot Act and the Rule 
of Law, 12/11/01 
 
s. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since 
World War II by William Blum (1995, revised 2001)  
t. Faculty Lecture on Bio/Warfare/Terrorism/Weapons  -
  Francis A. Boyle, 4/18/02 
 
u. The Sunshine Project - research and facts about biological 
weapons and biotechnology 
 
v. Council for Responsible Genetics fosters public debate 
about the social, ethical and environmental implications of genetic 
technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Iternet Websites: 
Smiling Ted (2010)  Muslim Brotherhood Declares War on America; Will America 
193761.html-http://absolutewrite.com/forums/archive/index.php/tNotice?      10:12 PM  
 
David Bukay (2008) “Islamic Fundamentalism and the Arab Political Culture” 
AM. http://www.acpr.org.il/publications/books/Muhammads_Monsters.pdf  11:24 
 Hillel Pradkin (2008)  “Current Trend in Islamist Ideology” 
-Culture-Muslim-Islam-on-Magazine-http://www.scribd.com/doc/21001209/Research
AM. History. 12:02-and 
Thatdude (2010) “Worldwide Reactions to the September 11 attacks” 
http://www.ar15.com/archive/topic.html?b=1&f=5&t=1088920 04:12PM 
 
Team Member (2010) “Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases” 
http://archive.adl.org/main_terrorism/american_muslim_extremists_criminal_proceedin
gsba4b.html#.Uv9-7WJ_u2w 12:15 PM.  
 
chief-in-http://bwcentral.org/2013/12/muslimBradlee (2013)  “Muslim in chief” /11:10  
AM. 
Kenneth Mentor (2002) “Crime or Act of War? - The Media, 9-11, and Iraq” 
http://critcrim.org/critpapers/911_iraq.htm  5:12 PM. 
 
  Rev Cutie (2012) “Posts Tagged With: Twin Towers”  
AM towers 11:02-s.com/tag/twinhttp://conspiracyanalyst.wordpres   
 
 Gladius (2011)  “Conspiracy theory”  ) 
http://www.cathinfo.com/catholic.php?a=topic&t=14452&min=204&num=3 4:11 PM. 
 
” ) ESMeeting the VICSIM FAMILI( 2011 )  “ Nonhocapito  
08:35AM. http://www.cluesforum.info/viewtopic.php?p=2361782 
 
  Brundle_Fly ( 2003 ) “General Discussion: Presidential (Through Nov. 2009)” 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=1
1:36 PM.  32x2325171 
CNN team (2005) “U.S. not 'well-prepared' for terrorism” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/12/04/911.commission /01:45PM   
“U.S. worried about more al Qaeda attacks” and others( 2003)  Rula Amin 
m/2003/WORLD/meast/05/13/saudi.blasthttp://edition.cnn.co/  1:48PM  
188 
 
 CNN team (2004) “Terror suspect 'had Navy plans” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/08/06/uk.terror/2:10PM  
 
CNN team (2005) “Cheney: Bush has right to authorize secret surveillance” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/20/cheney.wiretaps/2:10PM  
 
CNN team (2005) “Bush: Secret wiretaps have disrupted potential attacks” 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/nsa/2:23PM.  
 
(2005) “Court delays Padilla transfer from brig”  Terry Frieden 
2:20PM http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/30/padilla.transfer 
 
 National Commission team (2004) “NOTES” 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Notes.htm 0PM.11:1  
 
) Cold War America” -“Islam in the PostGhazali (2011)
9:22AM. http://www.ghazali.net/info/html/introduction.html 
Abdullah Quick (ND) “The African, and Muslim, Discovery of America – 
-african-period/the-classical-http://historyofislam.com/contents/theColumbus”  reBefo
12:22PM. scolumbu-before-america-of-discovery-muslim-and 
 
Casey Olson(2011) 11: meet Twin Towers architect Minoru -“In commemoration of 9
6:35PM. http://www.islandssounder.com/news/129488408.htmlYamasaki”  
 
JP team (2012) “US Supreme Court Affirms Conviction of White Collar Terrorists” 
http://www.jewishpress.com/tag/holy-land-foundation/ 3:50PM. 
(2011)“Sheriff Baca, GOP congressman clash over Baca's support of  Peter King
-gop-baca-http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/03/sheriffMuslim group” 
2:32PM group/comments/page/3-muslim-to-links-over-clash-congressman 
 
” Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead“(2001) el GrunwaldMicha
11:23AM http://marinekslee.egloos.com/m/8514904 
189 
 
Beila Rabinowitz ( 2006) “World Assembly of Muslim Youth -WAMY - a template for 
2:13PM http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/2480 new UK terror groups” 
 
Mohammed R. Kroessin ( 2007 ) “Islamic charities and the ‘War on Terror’: dispelling 
-38/islamic-magazine/issue-exchange-http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarianthe myths”  
M.5:12P myths-the-dispelling-terror-on-war-the-and-charities 
 
Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009 ) “Deconstructing Deceit: 9/11, the Media, and 
-http://www.projectcensored.org/wpMyth Information” 
7:12PM. oads/2010/05/DeconstructingDeceitOnlineEd.pdfcontent/upl 
Harverd Uni. (2004) Contextualization and Periodization of Muslim Civic and Political 
 rg/reports/view/142http://www.pluralism.o Activities in Portland, Oregon (2004)
11:24PM. 
 
Premier Centre (ND) “Charities” 
3:23PM. http://www.premiercallcentre.co.uk/pages/charities.php 
-http://pewresearch.org/files/oldAndrew Kohut (2007 “Muslim Americans” 
9:12AM americans.pdf-assets/pdf/muslim 
 
Williamson Murray (2006)  “Cold war and Modern World Review” 
8:37PM. /12262057/exporthttp://quizlet.com 
David T.R.(20030 “We are not at war – the 9/11 bombings are crimes against 
3:12PM . http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/911summary.htmlhumanity”  
 
Roger Sauer(2010 ) “the Pentagon” 
3:10 PM. http://slapshotsclan.com/index.php?topic=2.27910;wap2 
” Bush Flunks in 9/11 Commission InvestigationAnadolu( 2005) “
12:11PM. http://www.seattlebuzz.net/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=8734 
 
  Prepared' for Terrorism” -Not 'WellSecurityInfoWatch(2005) “9/11 Commission: U.S. 
-well-not-us-commission-11-http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10592337/9
3PM . 4:1 terrorism-for-prepared 
Michael (2001)“US. Shaken by day of devastating terrorism”  
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20010912/NEWS/309129
The Washington Post, September12th 2001. 12:00AM.   66&cid=sitesearch9 
190 
 
.http://www.salon.com/2000/04/06/rashid/12:10PMAhmed Rashid(2000) “Taliban”  
the Americas”“Precolumbian Muslims in    (ND) Youssef Mroueh 
http://www.sunnah.org/history/precolmb.htm3:12PM  
 
CAIR editor (2010) “Council on American-Islamic Relations” 
Islamic_Relations-http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Council_on_American   
4:04PM 
Khurshid KhanBegining of the New World Order” Truth  -War on Terror (2012) “ 
-terror-on-http://truthrevealedpakistan.blogspot.com/2012/09/warPakistan. -evealedR
12:14PM world.html-new-of-begining 
 
Charlie Sheen and others (ND) “9/11 Conspiracy Theories “Truthers” 
10:12AM. http://www.thewordout.net/pages/page.asp?page_id=84228 
 
 Lena North  (2013) “Muslims in the West” 
http://theutteredword.blogspot.com/2013/05/muslims-in-west.html 5:12PM 
 
"9/11 CitizensWatch" Says Unanswered Questions Must be John Judge(2003) 
Addressed; Group Includes Victims' Family Members and Other Americans” 
12:05AM exile.org/news/0304/03/911citizenwatch.html-http://www.usa 
 
Robert D. Crutchﬁeld (ND)“Race and Ethnicity in Social Disorganization Theory” 
20Bockenholt%2http://www.uu.nl/SiteCollectionImages/120.%20PvdH%20C%20and%
3:12PM. 4297.pdf-0Encyclopedia%204291 
 
http://www.veganbodybuilding.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=19Vegan(2009)“Criticism”
6:23PM &t=18976&start=30 
 
Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Grunwald (2001)Michael 
-http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpHit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead 
5:12PM 1/09/12/AR2005033107980.htmldyn/content/article/200 
 
Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009) “Deconstructing Deceit: 9/11, the Media, and 
Myth Information” 
10:23  e_for_printing.php?story=20090309170952776http://www.911truth.org/articl
AM. 
191 
 
Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea ( 2009 )“Deconstructing Deceit: 9/11, the Media, and 
-and-media-the-911-deceit-//www.911truth.org/deconstructinghttp:Myth Information” 
information-myth/8:12 PM.  
 
“Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist -The Commission Report (2002) 
Attacks Upon the United States” 
3:10PM. http://911research.wtc7.net/mirrors/911commission/report/report.htm 
 
David Griffin (2006) “9/11: The Myth and the Reality” 
2:35PM. _9myths.htmhttp://www.911truth.dk/first/en/art 
 
Different responses to 9/1” ( 2001 ) Michael Grunwald
-Drama/English-and-nloads/Englishhttp://www.911educationprogramme.co.uk/dow
9:20AM. Drama_Worksheet_Different_responses_to_911.pdf-and 
 
Kevin Ryan”(2011) “The 9/11 Commission claims that “we found no evidence  
-no-found-we-claims-commission-31/911-10-http://911blogger.com/news/2011
evidence. 7:24PM.  
 
Film Transcripts/Recordings. 
 
- Aftermath: Unanswered Questions From 911, Guerrilla News 
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Appendix A: Organization Activities Before and After 9/11 
 
1. Activities of WAMY 5 years before 9/11 events 
The following Tables show how much aid Islamic organizations provided to 
teachers for five years before 9/ 11 and five years after 9/ 11. 
Table (34) shows how many times WAMY was able to provide financial aid to 
teachers of "Dawah" or “Islamic call” in the United States. 
 
Table 4.34 : Financial Aid From WAMY  Before 9/11 
 
Type of 
activities 
Years before and after September Eleven 
Provide financial support to 
Dawah teachers 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Dawah (Islamic Call) Trips to 
introduce Islam. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
- 
-
- 
-
- 
1 3 2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Financial support to Islamic 
Centers and societies 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
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Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Hosting Delegates 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Student subsidiaries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Educational and Youth camps 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Training courses 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Brochures, cassettes and 
exhibition material that best 
introduce Islam 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
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Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Regional and international 
conferences 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Propagation for Hijab " Veil" 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Quran memorization classes 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
New converts to Islam 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
Type of activities Years before and after September Eleven 
Scholarships for gifted students 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
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Type of activities 5 Years before September Eleven 
Feasts of breaking fasting in 
Ramadan. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
 
Type of activities 5 Years before September Eleven 
Distribution of free cassettes and 
books that introduce Islam to 
non- Muslims 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-
-- 
1 2 3 -
- 
2 
 
4.9 Statistical report about WAMY activities before and after 9/11 
Sr. Type of activities 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 Provide financial support to Dawah 
teachers 
--- 1 2 3 -- 2 
2 Dawah ( Islamic Call) Trips to 
introduce Islam 
-- -- -- 1 3 2 
3 Financial support to Islamic 
Centers and societies 
6 18 25 19 12 11 
4 Hosting delegates -- -- 15 2 --  
5 Students subsidiaries -- 2 36 8 6 41 
6 Educational and Youth camps -- 2 -- 2 5 5 
7 Training courses -- 10 6 1 3 9 
8 Brochures, cassettes and exhibition -- 7830 2824 6695 1579 11010 
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material that best introduce Islam 
9 Regional and international 
conferences 
-- -- 5 3 -- 2 
10 Propagation for Hijab " Veil" -- -- -- -- -- -- 
11 Quarn memorization classes -- -- -- -- -- 20 
12 New converts to Islam -- -- 35 100 96 -- 
13 Scholarships for gifted students -- -- -- 5 73 10 
14 Feasts of breaking fasting in 
Ramadan 
-- 5740 -- -- 10000 4200 
15 Distribution of free cassettes and 
books that introduce Islam to non- 
Muslims 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Table (35) shows WAMY activities 5 years before 9/11. 
4.10 Statistical Report about WAMY Activities After 9/11 
Sr. Type of activities 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 Provide financial support to 
Dawah teachers 
2 3 -- -- -- 1 
2 Dawah ( Islamic Call) Trips to 
introduce Islam 
2 6 -- -- -- -- 
3 Financial support to Islamic 
Centers and societies 
11 12 -- -- -- -- 
4 Hosting delegates -- 37 -- -- -- -- 
5 Students subsidiaries 41 107 -- -- -- 4 
6 Educational and Youth camps 5 11 -- -- -- -- 
7 Training courses 9 10 -- -- -- -- 
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8 Brochures, cassettes and 
exhibition material that best 
introduce Islam 
11010 1312 -- -- -- -- 
9 Regional and international 
conferences 
2 4 -- -- -- 1 
10 Propagation for Hijab " Veil" -- 75 -- -- -- -- 
11 Quarn memorization classes 20 10 -- -- -- -- 
12 New converts to Islam -- 22     
13 Scholarships for gifted students 10 -- -- -- -- -- 
14 Feasts of breaking fasting in 
Ramadan 
4200 7600 -- -- -- 4 
15 Distribution of free cassettes and 
books that introduce Islam to 
non- Muslims 
-- 808 -- -- -- 19250 
 
Table (36) shows WAMY activities 5 years after 9/11 
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 LWM.1
 مقابلة أجريت مع رابطة العالم الإسلامي 
 عن تأثير أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على الرابطة 
 
  من سبتمبر على رابطة العالم الإسلامي ؟ كيف كان تأثير أحداث الحادي عشر
 
رابطة العالم الإسلامي جزء من العالم تتأثر بأحداثه سلبا أو إيجابا ومن هـذا المنطلق فقد كان التأثير 
 متفاوتـا في جوانب النشــاطات التي تقــوم بها الرابطة
ن الجوانب الايجابية لهذه الأزمة ففي الجانب الدعوي فقد كان، الإقبال على التعرف على الإسلام  وهذا م
العالمية.ومن الناحية المالية فقـد كان الأمر أكثر متابعة ولكن باعتبار أن الرابطة إحدى المنظمـات المنضوية تحت 
مضلة الأمم المتحدة وهي مضلة شــرعية أكسبت رابطة العالم الإسلامي حضورا متميزا علىــ مستوى العالم كما 
  نية التي تقوم بها الرابطة وسمو هذه الأنشطة أكسب الرابطة احترام وتقدير العالم بأسره.أن الأنشطةالإنسا
من ناحية أخرى فإن رابطة العالم الإسلامي تتمتع بدعــم دول العالم الإسلامي بأسره وهي الممول 
 الرئيسي لأنشـطة الرابطــة المتنوعـة.
ر من الجوانب السلبية لأحداث الحادي عشر من ولقد استطاعت رابطة العالم الإسلامي تجنب الكثي
سبتمبر وذلك بإعلان موقفها الرسمي المنبثق من رأي الإسلام في الإرهاب وكذلك كانت مساهمتها فعالة 
التصدي للهجمة التي نضمت للإساءة للإسلام والمسلمين .كمــا تعاملت الرابطة بالشفافية المعهودة  في
 في جميع تعاملاتها وأنشطتها وبخاصة النواحي المالية.
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 )RIAC(مقتطف من مقابلة أجريت مع مجلس العلاقات الإسلامية الأمريكية 
 عن آثار أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على أنشطتها
 
كانت 2001كيف تأثر مجلس العلاقات الأمريكية الإسلامية (كير) بأحـــداث الحادي عشر من ؟ .سبتمبر  
هذه الأحداث المؤلمة مروعة ومفزعـة لكل الجنس البشـري وهي بهذا عامل تأثير على كل المنظمات العاملــة في 
يكا وهي منظمة شرعية خاضعة للقانون الشأن الإنساني وكير واحدة من أكبر المنظمات الإسلامية في أمر
 الأمريكي تتعامل بمنتهى الشفافية مع الأفراد والمؤسسات الحكومية.
وقد تعاظـم الدور المــناط بهذ المنظمة بعد أحـداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر من ناحية الدفاع عن 
  كا.الحقوق المدنية للمسلمين في أمريكا ومناهضة الكراهية ضد المسلمين في أمري
الأمر كذلك لايخلو مــن الجانب الايجابي والمتمثل قي الإقبـال على المراكز الإسلامية في أمريكا للسؤال 
عن هذا الدين ومعرفة شي عــن كتابه المقدس "القران الكريم" ومعرفة رأي الإسلام في الإرهاب وكذلك السؤال 
 عن الجهاد وماذا يعني للمسلمين .
مة منظمة تقع في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وخاضعة للقوانين  الأمريكية وتهتم بشأن وباعتبار أن هذه المنظ
المسلمين في أمريكا فقد كانت المسؤولية عظيمة وقد استطعنا بحمد الله القيام بهذا الدور خير قيام ساعدنا في ذلك 
  نساني.حسن علاقتنا بالحكومة الأمريكية والمؤسسات الأمريكية المهتمة بالشأن الإ
